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Poor naked wretches, wheresoe’er you are,
That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,
How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides,
Your looped and windowed raggedness, defend you
From seasons such as these?
William Shakespeare, King Lear, 1606
I was grieved to see a generous, virtuous race of men, who should 
be considered as the strength and the ornament of their country, 
torn from their little habitations, and driven out to meet poverty and 
hardship among strangers. No longer to earn and enjoy the fruits of 
their labour, they were now going to toil as hirelings under some rigid 
Master, to flatter the opulent for a precarious meal, and to leave their 
children the inheritance of want and slavery…. All the connexions 
of kindred were now irreparably broken; their neat gardens and well 
cultivated fields were left to desolation.
Oliver Goldsmith, ‘The Revolution in Low Life’, 1762
His progress in the improvement and exercise of his mental and 
corporeal faculties has been irregular and various…. Yet the experience 
of four thousand years should enlarge our hopes, and diminish our 
apprehensions: we cannot determine to what height the human species 
may aspire in their advances towards perfection; but it may safely be 
presumed, that no people, unless the face of nature is changed, will 
relapse into their original barbarism.
Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and  
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Introduction
The armed men reach the top of the hill and look down. Beyond a heath lies 
the river, grey and putrid, and the city it flows through. This is the end of their 
journey. Here, they would receive justice, or the powers-that-be would cease 
to be. What had begun as resistance against the latest tax had escalated into an 
insurrection that threatened to blow the entire social and economic system apart. 
Many lives had been lost already. The armed men descend to the heath to make 
camp. The reckoning will begin tomorrow.
On another hill, 24 miles away, another group traces out the waste ground 
before them. They are armed with spades and hoes. This land is unclaimed and 
they wish to demonstrate what a community of plain labourers can achieve in 
a common effort of common ownership. The times are turbulent. Revolutions 
are erupting everywhere. Yet they know that their simple act of farming will be 
seen, and responded to, as perhaps the most revolutionary and threatening of all.
Twenty-seven miles from the second group, but just eight from the first, figures 
armed with torches march through the night, their faces lit by the flames they 
have already ignited. They must move quickly if they are to disappear again into 
the darkness before being discovered. Years of frustration have brought them to 
this. If they cannot own the land on which they are expected to work, perhaps no 
one should. With nods to one another, torches aloft, they move towards a barn.
These groups never met. They are, in fact, separated across time. The first 
event happened at Blackheath in 1381. The Peasants’ Revolt would be brutally 
crushed by the boy-King in whom they still had faith and to whom they had 
come to appeal: Richard II (Dunn, 2002). The second describes the actions 
of Britain’s revolution within a revolution within a revolution. The Diggers 
occupied St George’s Hill in 1649. They would be evicted several months later 
(Hill, 1991, pp 112-19). The third event happened near Orpington in 1830. 
The Swing Riots, infamous for the destruction of machinery, started with arson. 
Those flames would cast the 1830s into a shadow that has never entirely faded, 
inspiring the architects of the 1834 Poor Law to define as wage-labourers all those 
who had formally owned the land they worked (Hobsbawm and Rudé, 1969).
They are separated by time but united by much else. Other examples could also 
have been chosen from the history of Britain’s struggles around the first theme of 
this book: poverty. The 18th century, for instance, was often shattered with food 
riots that have now been all but forgotten (Stevenson, 1974; 1979, Chapter 5). 
Many similar events could be cited, going all the way back to the beginnings of 
recorded history. Livy (1960) observes how disputes over food and land drove the 
secession of the plebs in 494 BCE. The political system that resulted characterised 
the Roman Republic for the next 450 years.
The second theme of this book, climate change, also has a longer social 
history than you might at first appreciate. The ‘little ice age’ that lasted for half a 
millennium after 1300 created famines and altered European agriculture (Fagan, 
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2000). And we, in turn, have transformed the ecosystem. Enclosures1 created 
massive hunger which, driving waves of 19th-century emigration, facilitated the 
land clearances that had a significant effect on carbon dioxide (CO
2
) levels in the 
atmosphere (Fagan, 2000, pp 145-7). And those enclosures were an act both of 
historical theft (Gonner, 1966) and historical amnesia. You may be a thief, but if 
you hang on to your booty for long enough, your descendants may be revered 
as aristocrats, held to deserve their wealth by virtue of God, or blood, or some 
other inherent quality that everyone else thinks they lack.
Despite the subtitle of this book, therefore, the link between poverty and climate 
change constitutes a very old agenda. And throughout these histories two great 
forces have warred against one another, sometimes in a battle of ideas, sometimes 
in direct social confrontation.
Livy (1960, p  147) gave voice to one force in his history of early Rome. 
Menenius Agrippa addresses the discontented plebs in his fable of The Belly: 
you complain that we consume resources we do not produce. Yet anyone can 
farm or hunt. What we do cannot be taught. We deserve more because you need 
us more than we need you. Sixteen centuries later, Shakespeare rendered this 
speech into poetry.2 But then Shakespeare did something incredible, something 
you will not find in Livy’s account, something that few, if any, writers had done 
before him. He gave the poor a political voice:
... the leanness that inflicts us, the object of our misery, is as an 
inventory to particularise their abundance; our sufferance is a gain 
to them.3
Our hunger is not just about empty stomachs. The Patricians keep us destitute 
because the lower we are, the higher they rise. And the more we consent to this, 
the more it suits them. Our sufferance is a gain to them. 
Centuries before it was given a name, Shakespeare captured and communicated 
an idea at the heart of modern controversies about the nature of society and 
political struggles over its future: relative poverty.
Climate change and poverty: an ecosocial agenda
It feels mundane to descend from such lofty heights to the details of today’s 
political and academic debates, but descend we must.
Since poverty has been a feature of societies since societies began, isn’t it 
hyperbole to describe any discussion about poverty as a new agenda? What, if 
anything, does climate change add to the discussion?
Unless we adopt the apocalyptic rhetoric of alarmists and survivalists, climate 
change is probably more like a slope than the edge of cliff along which we 
are recklessly dancing. But even if we do face a slope, the gradient is fairly 
steep, and gets steeper the farther you fall. You do not have to be one of those 
environmentalists who is always predicting catastrophe 20 years in the future to 
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notice the extent to which the fall has already begun. You are already tumbling 
down the hill with the summit behind you. And although climate change is 
truly a global problem, unless we imagine waves of dispossessed ex-millionaires 
begging for admittance to places such as Namibia or Zambia, we all know who 
will suffer first and foremost. More than this, unless the fight to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change is a global effort – uniting rich and poor in a new ecological 
and social settlement – then it may be futile. A drowning man might take some 
comfort from the thought that the idiots who sank the ship will soon drown too.
Climate change and poverty are now irrevocably connected, and in ways never 
encountered before. How, why, to what extent and with what prescriptions for 
the future is the subject of the book you have before you. But if this is the case, 
then why not study Namibia, Zambia or dozens of other places experiencing 
the worst poverty? Why focus on developed nations? Isn’t that just more western 
self-obsession?
Well, first, let’s not swallow the bait that says that whatever else developed nations 
contain, they do not contain poverty. Your wellbeing is in large part related to 
those with whom you regularly share the social spaces of work, shopping, leisure 
and all the other activities that constitute everyday life. If your child goes to bed 
hungry, what comfort is it to learn that millions of children in Africa are even 
more malnourished? Second, the social development literature is well aware of 
the implications of climate change (Raworth, 2012). Although aspirations and 
good intentions sometimes act as a balm for the lack of real, sustained action, 
this agenda has become firmly established. Finally, unless we mobilise all sectors 
of the national community, we may fail to tackle climate change adequately. The 
carbon emissions of the richest 10 per cent of households are three times higher 
than the poorest 10 per cent (Preston et al, 2013, pp 7-8).4 Expecting those who 
typically create the fewest carbon emissions to suffer the greatest consequences 
is therefore unlikely to produce that mobilisation, here, as much as in Namibia. 
And if countries like the UK do not act effectively, developing countries will 
continue to suffer the greatest consequences of all. Helping the world’s poorest 
and engaging with the poverty to be found a few streets away are elements of 
the same common effort.
Therefore, there is a new agenda to be debated, and since developed nations 
broke the planet, they have the greatest responsibility for gluing the bits back 
together. This responsibility requires us to recognise the impacts that climate 
change is having on our poorer neighbours, and to conjoin ecological and social 
imperatives in a new kind of ‘ecosocial’ politics.5
This book seeks an ecosocial understanding of poverty in developed nations, 
with particular reference to the UK. It offers a new conceptualisation of the links 
between climate change and poverty, the extent to which the former exacerbates 
the latter and the latter has an impact on the former. It presents a theoretical 
model of causes, symptoms and possible solutions.
For several years now, valuable work has been undertaken across various 
disciplines. As Lucas (2004, p 112) puts it:
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Problems of environmental injustice afflict many of our most deprived 
communities and socially excluded groups.... In some cases not only 
are deprived and excluded communities disproportionately exposed 
to an environmental risk, they are also disproportionately vulnerable 
to its effects.
Yet all too often, research projects are separated by terminology, methodology, 
disciplinary traditions, theoretical grounding and over-specialisation. This book 
reads across a diversity of literatures, makes them speak to one another and offers a 
platform for future work. It summarises, analyses and synthesises existing research, 
data, legislative and policy developments, and other relevant evidence. The key 
questions it considers are:
• How should we conceptualise and theorise the relationship between climate 
change and poverty?
• What does an ecosocial understanding of poverty take the causes, symptoms 
and possible solutions to poverty to be?
Social and natural interdependencies
A new agenda does not necessarily mean we have to reinvent the wheel, 
however. Increasing attention has been paid to the need to reconcile social and 
environmental policies since the 1990s (Seymour, 2000, pp 97-110). For instance, 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation has run a ‘Reconciling Environmental and 
Social Concerns’ programme. (So far as my home discipline – social policy – is 
concerned, for a panoramic overview see my Understanding the environment and social 
policy, published in 2011.) Gough and Meadowcroft (2011, p 493) summarise the 
challenge effectively, saying that climate change ‘will test the ability of national 
welfare states to internationalise and recognise collective responsibility for victims 
elsewhere in the world.’ None of this work suggests that we have to radically 
rewrite existing understandings of poverty, deprivation and social exclusion.
As such, this book adopts a social democratic approach, broadly defined. This 
means interpreting poverty as caused and shaped largely by the economic system 
and the property regime within which it is found. For social democrats the 
problem is capitalism (and particularly an economic liberal version of capitalism) 
in which profit, competition, inequality and self-interest are allowed to colonise 
our social relations, economic systems, political processes and moral consciences.6 
Yet social democrats do not recommend a revolutionary upheaval in social and 
economic relations. We do not have to reinvent the wheel; we just have to repair 
the damn thing and make it run in a new direction.
Something quite essential has been lacking from social democracy: a 




Environmentalism is concerned with the natural environment, or the 
interconnecting web of organisms that exist in a symbiotic relationship of birth, reproduction, 
death, decay and renewal. You may not think of yourself as dependent on the tree 
in your garden or the earthworm burrowing in its soil, but you are. And it is 
almost certain that by affecting migration rates and natural habitats, humans have 
accelerated species extinction above its natural rate.
The natural environment would be a source of value and an object of 
responsibility even in the absence of climate change but, of course, there is no such 
thing as a non-changing climate.7 Organisms and climate are interwoven.8 Three 
billion years ago (give or take), it was rudimentary organisms that spat oxygen into 
the atmosphere. And during that time the Earth’s climate has experienced many 
oscillations of warming and cooling. ‘Climate variability’ is due to processes that 
would occur anyway in the absence of humans. When we refer to contemporary 
climate change we are referring more to the rapid global warming created by human 
activities pouring greenhouse gases (GHGs), particularly carbon dioxide (CO
2
), into the 
atmosphere and oceans. In one sense, the term ‘climate change’ feels like a neutered 
version of ‘global warming’. However, the former term more adequately captures 
the likelihood that global warming will be experienced in diverse ways across the 
planet. This book therefore refers largely to climate change.
But the ‘interconnecting web’ with which environmentalists are concerned has 
to encompass the ecological and the social. Since, obviously, human organisms 
affect and are affected by the climate, then the means by which humans organise 
themselves – their civilisation – is woven into that web of interconnections. Most 
environmentalists are social environmentalists, therefore, understanding that the 
strands of life are so enmeshed that common distinctions – social/natural, human/
non-human – are just elements along a latticework of dense intersections.
Although elements of it have influenced – and have no doubt been influenced 
by – mainstream politics, the latter continues to deny the scale of the ecological 
challenges we face, and to resist the social environmentalist critique. Consider 
three aspects of that critique.
First, since they are interconnected, the social and the natural are highly 
interdependent (Victor, 2008, pp 34-7). Social relations mediate our place within, 
and conceptions of, nature. And if humans were to disappear from the planet 
tomorrow, the ecosystem would continue to reverberate from the effects of our 
presence for many centuries. Furthermore, nature is the source and the sine qua 
non of all socioeconomic and cultural resources. This point is obvious to many, 
for example:
… society and nature are dialectically related, so that each is a 
manifestation of the other. Nature is socially produced, and what 
humans do is natural. (Pepper, 2010, p 34)
Yet all too often nature has been an invisible, taken-for-granted element of social 
interaction.
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Over the centuries, many important thinkers have appreciated that the 
natural and social are entangled, but it was not until the 1960s that such ideas 
were disseminated widely (Simms et al, 2006, pp 5-6). The recent, welcome 
recognition that ‘GDP [gross domestic product] growth does not ensure wellbeing’ 
owes much to the environmental movement. Nonetheless, the dependency of 
our economic systems on GDP growth continues apace, with a consequent, 
continuing devaluation of natural resources. In contemporary capitalism, the 
values of acquisition, consumption and competition predominate over those of 
preservation, equilibrium and renewal. For social environmentalists, by contrast, 
nature is more than just input on a balance sheet, more than the countryside, 
‘natural capital’ or that fen near the motorway with a rare species of frog. We are 
the cosmos looking back at itself, nature made self-conscious. Yet in becoming 
self-conscious, humans strove to liberate themselves from the very ground beneath 
their feet. We are communal beings who have managed to blind ourselves to 
the great diversity of communities, across space and time, to which we belong.
Second, proper awareness of this interdependence requires an ontological, 
moral and sociocultural ethos of limitations, finiteness and mortality that is 
alien to most mainstream politics. There are only so many resources that nature 
can supply, and only so much pollution it can absorb. Of course, humans are 
ingenious at extracting more from less (productivity), and most greens do not 
advocate that we switch civilisation off before retreating to the wilderness. But 
given the incredible power and capacities we possess, human activities ought to 
be driven by a renewed sense of responsibility, one that makes sustainability and 
humility central. Humans have all too often sought to transcend and deny their 
mortality by appropriating, subordinating and destroying. An ecological sense of 
how vulnerable, precious and painfully short life is requires an alternative ethos 
of the ‘three r’s’: recycling, repairing and renewing; in other words, conservation, 
stewardship, appreciation and attention to the interests of those (including non-
humans) with whom we are interdependent.
Third, this sense of responsibility is best manifested through an associative view 
of the self where the accent is on being and relating rather than merely having and 
controlling. In distinction to the homo economicus of contemporary capitalism – where 
agency is defined in terms of market choice, personal aspiration, hierarchies of 
status, competitive consumerism and short-term self-interest9 – the associative self 
finds its purpose and identity in relational projects with others. To some extent, 
it resembles the self that inhabits republican and deliberative politics. Its lineage 
also derives from the socialist emphasis on cooperation and mutualism.
The associative self never occupies a fixed social position precisely because it is 
associative; its identity is reshaped through the ever-changing relations to which it 
belongs. Its field of action is always dynamic and evolving because social relations 
are themselves fluid and plastic. This throws light on the weaknesses and strengths 
of environmental politics. Despite the fact that all humans have an interest in 
preserving nature, environmentalism has no single constituency, no unifying agent 
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of social change interested in driving forward green reforms (no one occupying 
the role accorded to the working class by socialists).
But because it does not rely on some ‘essentialist’ form of collective identity, 
environmentalism must always reconstruct itself by articulating the universal 
interests of humanity through the interests of particular communities, including 
non-human species. The task facing ‘selves in association’ is therefore intimately 
political. The negotiation of the universal and the particular is never finished. 
Take the famous injunction to ‘think global, act local’. As we think and act, 
the composition of the global and local are constantly altered, requiring new 
thinking, new activities and new interventions. This book therefore emphasises 
the always-evolving, never-finalised aspects of the ecosocial agenda.
In short, what mainstream politics and contemporary capitalism arguably lack is 
an adequate appreciation of social-natural interdependencies and the considerable 
economic, moral, social and political implications of this. Given the extent to 
which it has dominated many countries over the last four decades, we can lay 
the blame for much of this at the feet of economic liberalism. However, social 
democrats have also helped to bring us to where we are – and not only those 
who embraced the ‘new social democracy’ of Clinton, Blair/Brown and Obama. 
The environmental record of social democracies is generally better than that of 
economic liberal nations but they, too, have failed to drive the real changes that 
are urgently needed (Bell, 2014; Schaffrin, 2014). The traditional view that 
social justice requires GDP growth still dominates social democratic thinking, 
for instance (Fitzpatrick, 2003). This is one reason why I refer to the ‘ecosocial’ 
rather than to ‘social democracy’ per se. This book recommends such an urgency, 
and incorporates it into a reconceptualisation of poverty in an era of rapid and 
dramatic climate change.
Mapping injustice
An ecosocial understanding of poverty occupies a map that we do not have time 
to explore in full here. Look at Figure I.1. The top right region can be endlessly 
populated with concepts and debates. For example:
Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be 
in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, 
participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities 
which are customary ... in the societies to which they belong. Their 
resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average 
individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary 
living patterns, customs and activities. (Townsend, 1979, p 31; see 
also p 413)
Indeed, inspired in part by Townsend, this book will often talk of deprivations 
in relation to not just social but also social-natural resources.
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Similarly, we could easily fill the top and bottom left regions. Note that injustice 
is not the same as inequality. Some inequalities may be perfectly just while some 
equalities may be unjust. What matters is (1) the nature of the inequality, for 
example, whether it is characterised by exploitation, oppression or the arbitrary 
use of power; (2) its source, for example, whether it derives from circumstances 
over which people have little or no control, such that the distribution of advantages 
and disadvantages is undeserved; and (3) its consequences, for example, whether 
the less well-off are significantly disadvantaged in terms of jobs, income, housing 
and all other elements that people need if their lives are to go well.
As such, Miller (2005, p 5) defined social justice in terms of equal citizenship 
(civil, political and social rights), a social minimum (to resources that meet 
essential needs), equal opportunities (so gender, class and ethnicity are irrelevant 
to a person’s life chances) and fair distribution (inequalities should derive only 
from choice and desert). And Walker (2012, p  1; see also Gardiner, 2011; 
Bulkeley and Fuller, 2012) is one of many exploring the links between nature 
and justice in attempting to elaborate ‘environmental justice’ or what might be 
called ‘ecologically sustainable social justice’:10
... for some people and some social groups the environment is an 
intrinsic part of living a good life of prosperity, health and well-being, 
while for others the environment is a source of threat and risk, and 
access to resources such as energy, water and greenspace is limited or 
curtailed.(Walker, 2012, p 1)
Populating the bottom right region, however, is much more difficult (Boardman, 
with Bullock and McLaren, 1999). Dominelli (2012, p 29) has said that,






Poverty is usually accompanied by the lack of environmental rights, 
with poor people living in the most degraded environments, in the 
poorest housing and being disproportionately affected by industrial 
pollution and natural disasters.
Yet most of the work that has been done in this respect is understandably focused 
on the developing world. So far as developed countries are concerned, discussions 
of poverty tend to borrow from the lower left region (see, for example, Seymour, 
2000, pp 12-18). Although I make use of Walker’s (2012) recent book, it has 
little to say about poverty per se, as a distinct form of injustice.
Defining poverty
The premise of this book is that theories and models occupying the lower 
right region of Figure I.1 are urgently needed. Fortunately, other regions have 
sometimes equipped us with the tools we require. Thus Townsend (1979, 
Chapter 14) incorporates ‘environmental deprivation’ into his research in terms 
of outdoor space and facilities, gardens, transport, air quality and play areas for 
children. In short, this book is rooted in the lower right region of Figure I.1, but 
roams around wherever necessary.
Injustice and poverty are clearly related, then. By borrowing from the brief 
overview of injustice and inequality just presented, we could define poverty as 
(1) an oppressive form of inequality which (2) derives largely from circumstances 
over which people have little or no control and which (3)  significantly 
disadvantages the least well-off, excluding them from full participation in the 
activities that characterise their society, so preventing their lives from going as 
well as they might.11 Poverty is therefore a form of injustice which is interrelated 
with, and has an impact on, other forms of injustice. The problem is in deciding 
where and how to expand on this basic definition.
It has been common to think of justice in materialist terms, as concerning the 
fair distribution of property, resources and capital. This is tantamount to claiming 
that ‘justice is the fair distribution of material goods through economic systems’. 
However, this material-distributive approach is limited for two reasons. First, 
material goods always carry symbolic meaning of some kind. The meaning of 
wealth and accumulation for early Protestants helped to distinguish them from 
Catholic traditions and practices (Weber, 1990). Second, economic relationships 
are saturated with cultural contexts and understandings. A gift in a ‘gift economy’ 
has a social significance and value different to a gift in other contexts (Mauss, 
2002). In this sense, ‘justice is that which members of the same cultural and 
communal context render towards one another qua membership’. Justice is about 
procedures (opportunities, openness, mutually respectful representations) as well 
as specific outcomes.
This friction between material-distributive and cultural-procedural approaches 
continues.12 For Nancy Fraser (see Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Fraser, 2008; Olson, 
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2008), economistic categories and concepts are fundamental for any understanding 
of cultural injustices. But for Axel Honneth (2007), justice consists primarily of 
respect for people and recognition of the worth of cultural identities, requiring 
us to open political institutions to the agents and diverse identities through which 
communal solidarities are sustained.
Although some prefer one paradigm to the other, few propose that either is 
entirely sufficient on its own. Material distributions may fail to effect justice unless 
we also value those to whom the relevant goods are distributed, acknowledging 
their right to influence the procedures through which distributions are made. 
Conversely, democratic participation and respectful representations may 
nevertheless remain thin and insubstantial without the equitable distribution of 
economic resources.
This distinction surfaces in poverty debates (Bulkeley and Fuller, 2012; Lister, 
2013; cf Townsend, 1979, p 249). Who would deny that poverty implies a lack of 
income, wages, property, jobs, savings and so forth? Yet the poor are also subjected 
to forms of cultural devaluation, as having nothing to say worth listening to. The 
vocabulary continually applied to impoverished individuals – from lumpenproletariat 
to scrounger to skiver – is one that dismisses their humanity, misrepresents their 
social position in terms of some ingrained moral defect and so excludes them from 
political processes and public debate. Poverty therefore implies both material-
distributive and cultural-procedural forms of injustice.
This being the case, why pick sides at all? Yet we must tread carefully here. A 
materialist approach might only lead to a ‘mechanical’ organisation of resources 
that does not attend to agents and their identities, that is, why people do what 
they do. But aspects of the culturalist framework are equally unpalatable.
For instance, Lister (2008, pp  111-14) advocates acknowledging the 
psychological impact of poverty – the stress it produces for those who know 
how much they are devalued – without subscribing to a ‘psychologised theory’ 
in which low self-esteem is treated as innate. Psychological effects are created by 
the poor being ‘othered’ by the non-poor, she observes. Lister (2004, pp 166-74) 
therefore wishes the voices of the poor to be incorporated into policy procedures.
Yet this distinction itself presupposes acceptance of the idea of poverty as a 
lack of material-economic resources. What if you don’t accept this? If you reject 
relative, structural explanations of poverty, and if you allow that those with low 
self-esteem act accordingly (that is, they lose hope and motivation, succumbing 
to addictive and self-destructive habits), then presumably we are entitled to devise 
anti-poverty policies that emphasise counselling, behavioural modification and 
moral-psychological reconditioning. For some, the weight accorded to communal 
and psychological factors by a culturalist paradigm is a godsend that does allow us 
to ‘blame the victim’. To believe that poverty is about malfunctioning families 
and dangerous neighbourhoods you don’t have to believe that low self-esteem 
is innate; merely that it is encultured and socialised in communities that exclude 
themselves from normal society. Those with an alternative interpretation of 
agency to Lister’s occupy a space in which poverty is attributed to laziness, 
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welfare dependency and deficiency in cultural and communal values. In short, a 
culturalist emphasis may help us to mobilise impoverished individuals, amplifying 
their voices in the media and political process, but only if the fair distribution 
of economic resources is already the aim. Without such an aim, an emphasis on 
cultural values and psychological characteristics risks surrendering ground to 
those who pathologise poverty.
We should therefore balance the material-distributive and the cultural-
procedural, but not collapse them together (see Figure I.2).
The concept of poverty can make room for fair procedures, participative 
deliberation and voice, recognition and respect (Walker, 2012, pp 42-51), so long 
as these are grounded firmly in an emphasis on structural inequalities, inherited 
dis/advantages, market failures and political-economic strategies. Resources are 
thus both material (property, income, wealth) and also cultural (the capacity to 
be heard). Our discussions in the chapters to follow reflect this understanding.
On this basis:
Poverty is a form of injustice, denoting a relative lack of those resources needed to ensure 
a minimal standard of living, equal opportunities, mutual social respect and participative 
inclusion in a society’s way of life, and without which it is difficult to flourish, to fulfil one’s 
potential and to achieve or sustain a decent level of wellbeing. Poverty is characterised 
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by socioeconomic conditions that empower those who monopolise key resources at the 
expense of those who do not, such that poor individuals are disrespected by, for instance, 
being held responsible for social circumstances they did not create and over which they 
have limited control.
The task of the chapters ahead is to elaborate and build on this definition.
Three points
Several issues are worth highlighting before proceeding.
First, the term ‘poverty’ sometimes refers to those who experience deprivation. 
For the sake of convenience, and at the risk of simplification, this book makes 
reference to ‘poor households’ and ‘poor individuals’ as shorthand terms until 
debates and data require us to say more. But ‘poverty’ sometimes also denotes 
wider social conditions and contexts (Tawney, 1964, p 102). The view that such 
conditions damage not only the poor but the non-poor too – such as the ‘spirit 
level’ hypothesis that the wealthy would also benefit from reductions in poverty 
levels – has re-entered public debates (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Lansley, 2012; 
Stiglitz, 2012). Poverty impoverishes everyone, to some extent.
Second, this book is not offering a comprehensive theory of poverty. Nor am I 
trying to operationalise the concept of ecosocial poverty, that is, to offer something 
that can be immediately translated into the methods of social researchers, although 
I hope that such an operationalisation will follow in the future.
Third, because this account lacks comprehensiveness, it does not offer an 
extended discussion of class and capitalism.
We could decide to detach ‘poverty’ from ‘class’. Poverty is associated with a 
range of identities and vulnerabilities (age, gender, disability, ethnicity and so on), 
some of which are more class-specific then others. But even in terms of strict 
economic categories, ‘there is no fixed and unchanging group who constitute 
“the poor”’ (Jenkins, 2011, p 237). In Europe and North America there is a 
substantial turnover in the low-income population, with many experiencing 
poverty no more than once, and many others moving frequently in and out of 
the low-income zone from one year to the next. That said, unless we pretend 
that white-collar professionals are as likely to experience debilitating periods of 
low income as cleaners and classroom assistants, then it would be ridiculous to 
detach poverty from class altogether.
Alternatively, then, we might imagine that ‘poverty’ and ‘class’ correspond neatly, 
such that debates about the one give us immediate, clear and unproblematic access 
to the other. But this only becomes true if your conceptualisations are sufficiently 
narrow. If poverty is a cultural injustice, then we ought to avoid such narrowness 
because ‘the cultural’ is always complex, subjective and messy, requiring ‘thick’ 
description of particular contexts.
Therefore, poverty and class each denote a series of overlapping relations, into 
and out of which a host of economic and cultural dimensions travel. Vulnerable 
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groups, including but not limited to low-income groups in the working class, 
are those with a higher risk of experiencing poverty more frequently, for longer 
periods, with greater severity and with more substantial consequences for their 
long-term prospects across the life course. But that is probably as much as we 
can say without looking at specific instances.
One implication is that the fight against climate change and the abolition of 
capitalism are not one and the same (cf Clement, 2010; Foster et al, 2010). No 
doubt we need to transform our economic structures, and this book is particularly 
scathing about the economic liberalism that has dominated mainstream western 
politics for the last four decades. However, I don’t pretend to know exactly 
where this will or should take us. Either a green society has to abolish capitalism 
in its entirety, or it has to incorporate multiple forms of ownership and diverse 
economic instruments that can make the ‘capitalism versus ...’ debate (fill in 
the blank yourself) a distracting exercise. If green societies must be genuinely 
associative, deliberative and dynamic (as proposed above), then closing the 
conversation at the outset against those who defend the greening of capitalism 
seems like a contradiction. I hope that environmentally sustainable societies will 
be open, creative and diverse, and I suspect that they need contain more social 
equality and more genuine social ownership than most countries have so far 
achieved. But, beyond that, since all past attempts to make humanity sing with 
one voice have been disastrous, I feel uncomfortable with those who insist that 
they, at last, have found the correct song.
A further note about terminology
Two terms or phrases occur throughout this book: ‘ecosocial poverty’ and ‘an 
ecosocial understanding of poverty’. They do not quite mean the same thing (see 
Figure I.3). ‘Ecosocial poverty’ describes the specific characteristics that pertain 
within the smaller circle, that is, deprivation and exclusion in relation to what 
I call ‘socionatural resources’. An ‘ecosocial understanding of poverty’ is the 
attempt to understand the smaller circle and how it relates to the bigger one or, 
in other words, how deprivation of and exclusion from socionatural resources 
intersects with traditional notions of poverty as conceptualised and measured 
in terms of jobs and labour market opportunities, income, benefits and wages, 
class, education, and so forth. (Bearing in mind what has just been said, that no 
attempt at comprehensiveness is being made here.) In short, there is the thing 
that people experience (ecosocial poverty) and the ways in which researchers, 
activists and others must try to understand the thing.
We might add that if an ecosocial approach is accurate, we can expect the smaller 
circle to grow larger in the years and decades to come, so that the social policy 
and ecosocial policy agendas coincide more and more. Many social deprivations 
are increasingly becoming socionatural deprivations. For instance, food poverty 
has no doubt always existed, but contemporary food poverty isn’t simply about 
inadequate nourishment or income but also about the pressures on, and the 
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pressures created by, food chains in a world of rapidly increasing population, where 
developed countries consume a disproportionate amount of the planet’s resources.
Synopsis
In short, we need synergies between social policy and environmental policy. A 
poverty-less society is desirable yet will not endure for long unless global warming 
is fought. Reducing poverty is an important element of that fight, but it is not a 
sufficient condition for addressing climate change since some anti-poverty policies 
are more sustainable than others. Similarly, a green society still characterised by 
poverty is feasible but surely less sustainable than one that has eradicated poverty, 
or is at least attempting to do so. As indicated earlier, since climate change is 
everyone’s business, the benefits and burdens of tackling it must be shared fairly 
and proportionately. Addressing climate change will benefit the poor, but not as 
much as if we accommodate their particular needs, interests and voices within 
the political and policy process.
This book tries to facilitate those synergies. It is not an introduction to the 
climate science (see Eggleton, 2013), or to environmentalism per se, and it is 
not a textbook. So a certain familiarity with both climate science and social 
science is assumed. The book therefore ranges quite widely across territories that 
specialists spend decades exploring and defending against those – like myself – 
who fly through at whistle-stop speeds. The 21st century needs its specialists. 
Yet because the problems we confront transcend boundaries –intellectual and 
geographical – we also have to cross them if we are to address those problems 
effectively. In short, the 21st century needs greater interdisciplinarity, not less. 
The following topics were chosen accordingly. Chapters One to Four constitute 
the more theoretical and conceptual parts of the discussion, while Chapters Six to 
Ten are more empirical, offering summaries, analyses and synthesises of existing 
research and data.
Chapter One critiques the ‘capabilities approach’ since this has become such 
a key point of reference in debates about poverty and (for some) humanity’s 






place within and obligations towards the natural world. Although not wanting 
to reject the capabilities approach, I do argue that it has some limitations, 
especially regarding the basis for its claims and its tendency to reify wealth and 
capital. Chapter Two therefore pursues a resources-based approach, exploring 
concepts such as natural assets and intrinsic value. It explores the links between 
socioeconomic and natural resources, introducing key principles enabling us to 
understand the characteristics of socionatural resources. Since all resources exist 
across space and through time, Chapter Three examines the former, proposing 
that within contemporary capitalism social spaces are highly fragmented and 
antagonistic. An ecosocial politics enjoins more solidaristic spaces, for which new 
understandings and distributions of socionatural resources are required. Chapter 
Four then performs a similar exercise regarding time, making the case that a re-
socialisation of time is needed to overcome the dislocations and short-termism 
to which market-dominated societies are prone.
Chapter Five offers a summary of Chapters One to Four, and extracts the key 
principles and categories that Chapters Six to Ten then apply to discussions of 
poverty in the context of the key socionatural resources: energy, food, land, air 
and water. In each case we investigate the causes, symptoms and possible solutions 
to ‘ecosocial poverty’.
Chapter Six asks how we can protect the incomes of the poorest and ensure 
that all people can access sufficient household energy, while achieving reductions 
in carbon emissions. It concentrates on debates in and around the subject of fuel 
poverty. Chapter Seven explores food poverty, the dominance of corporations and 
supermarkets within the food chain and the ecological destructiveness of modern 
habits and practices. It critiques what some key authors term the ‘ecological public 
health’ approach. Land is such a vast subject that it is split into several sub-themes. 
Chapter Eight reviews debates concerning housing and urban densities, looking 
at how the recent decline in social housing and the rise of urban sprawl – with 
all of its attendant ecological impacts – have been driven by under-regulated 
housing markets. It seeks an understanding of such developments in terms of 
rent-seeking, positional competition and positional externalities. Chapter Nine 
applies that framework to three more land-related subjects: transport, flooding and 
waste facilities. For instance, against a background of welfare state retrenchment, it 
understands the rise in transport poverty as both cause and consequence of housing 
markets and low urban densities. Chapter Ten concentrates on air pollutants in 
relation to health, carbon emissions and deprivation, before discussing the nature 
and relevance of water poverty.
My thesis throughout these later chapters is simple: the ecologically excessive, 
careless and destructive use of key socionatural resources is closely connected to 
the social deprivations that characterise that usage for millions of those on low 
incomes. The overuse and misuse of socionatural resources are intimately linked. 
In essence, this is what constitutes an ecosocial understanding of poverty.
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Notes
1 This is the transformation of what had been common land into private estates, initially 
made through communal agreement (Hoskins, 2013, pp 141-2). Goldsmith gives an 
account of its consequences for rural households in an epigraph to this book (p v).
2 Coriolanus, Act 1, Scene 1, 95-154.
3 Coriolanus, Act 1, Scene 1, 18-21.
4 Please note that I am aware that ‘carbon’ and ‘carbon dioxide’ (CO
2
) are not the same. 
However, I use ‘carbon emissions’ as shorthand for the latter and refer to greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) when referring to methane, water vapour and CO
2
.
5 ‘Ecosocial politics’ is a social environmentalism that is allied to (but not quite the same 
thing as) a social democratic environmentalism (see below).
6 I refer throughout to ‘economic liberalism’ rather than ‘neoliberalism’. There are 
many forms of liberalism: some are old, some new, some good, some bad. The term 
‘neoliberalism’ risks collapsing them all together. Both terms, however, denote a 
paradoxical combination of free markets and corporate dominance – paradoxical for two 
reasons. First, because tending to serve a corporate agenda, these ‘free’ markets are more 
free for some than for others; and second, because the capitalist state regulates whatever 
and whoever it needs to in order to secure that agenda.
7 One of the reasons – apart from greed, of course (Oreskes and Conway, 2011) – why the 
climate change agenda is still resisted by many is because if God created the world then 
surely it must have reflected His perfection. To posit changes to the world is tantamount 
to saying that it wasn’t perfect originally. And if it wasn’t perfect originally, then perhaps 
God isn’t perfect. Perhaps God doesn’t exist. That reasoning may also explain much of 
the resistance encountered by Lyell when studying geological development, by Darwin 
when promoting biological evolution, and by Wegener when theorising continental drift.
8 The climate includes the atmosphere, hydrosphere, land surface, biosphere and cryosphere.
9 An ethos centred on the ego where we are constantly flattered into self-importance by 
companies hungry for our money, desires, energy, debt and time: a you-topia.
10 Some hate this association. For Scruton (2013; see also Gray, 2007, pp 200-3), our 
instincts spread out from a love of home and family to encompass a country and its culture. 
By appealing to such motivations (the need to preserve what one loves from destruction), 
environmentalism and conservatism can converge. It is because it has been dominated 
by leftist wishful fantasies that environmentalism has failed. The counterargument is that 
without some appeal to abstract and universal principles, we have no yardstick against 
which to assess our provincial habits and no protection against the occasional descent of 
those habits into prejudice, small-mindedness and violence against anything perceived 
to be strange, new or other. ‘Home’ and ‘country’ are constructs – albeit powerful ones 
– and we should not hesitate to ask whether what people value is indeed worth valuing.
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11 Social exclusion is therefore incorporated within (3). It is possible to experience social 
exclusion without being in poverty – a wealthy pensioner may lack mobility, family and 
other social connections, but not the oppressive relations of (1) or the adverse circumstances 
of (2). It is also the case that some people on low incomes will experience less social 
exclusion than others. Within this book, however, we treat poverty and social exclusion 
as similar manifestations of injustice, such that one regularly accompanies the other.
12 I am content with a twofold distinction. If we had more time we could disentangle 
the terms further, for example, the material-procedural and the cultural-distributive. 
Schlosberg (2007), for instance, regards ‘recognition’ as distinct to ‘proceduralism’. For 
the purposes of this book, however, I am wary of slicing concepts too thinly.

RETHINKING POVERTY: 





The capabilities approach is arguably the most influential, recent innovation in 
debates about justice and poverty. Does it offer a convincing basis for an ecosocial 
understanding of poverty? This chapter explores three subjects – philosophy, social 
policy and environmentalism – in response to that question. My view is that for 
all its virtues, the capabilities approach contains serious flaws. First, it is not clear 
that it offers a secure enough grounding for ecosocial principles; and second, 
it has been too dismissive of the material-distributive paradigm (with specific 
reference to resources such as income and wealth), with all the attendant dangers 
we warned against in the Introduction earlier. That said, since the capabilities 
approach represents a broad church of opinion, offering a variety of perspectives 
on and responses to the ‘distributive paradigm’, neither should we reject it entirely. 
To this end, I adapt the concept of a meta-capability that will lead us into the 
discussion of resources that follows, in Chapter Two.
Philosophy
Outline
The central claim of the capabilities approach is that there is no straightforward 
metric of justice and wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2006, 2011; Sen, 2009; Anderson, 
2010, pp 87-95). Those who focus on an ‘equality of welfare’ or an ‘equality 
of resources’ are being insufficiently comprehensive. The basic argument is this.
We can know approximately what it means to be well and to fare well. All 
humans (indeed, all living creatures) require adequate levels of nourishment, 
shelter, health, communal interaction, and so forth. But the capabilities required 
to realise these basic ‘functionings’ are highly diverse. Capabilities must imply 
some notion of substantive freedoms and opportunities, but what these mean 
will vary from context to context. The capabilities that you need in order to 
achieve a decent life will not be entirely identical to those in other geographical 
places and historical eras.
The originators of the capabilities approach part company at this point. Sen 
(2009, pp 231-47; see also Levine and Rizvi, 2005) believes that the best we can 
do is to mark out a ‘space of capabilities’ that equips people with the freedoms 
they need to live their lives as best they can. By contrast, Nussbaum (2006, 
pp 392-401) offers a list of capabilities that she holds to be universally applicable:
• live a life of normal length;
• possess bodily health and integrity;
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• cultivate and express imagination and thought;
• form emotional attachments;
• form and pursue a conception of the good and engage in critical reflection 
about one’s life;
• interact and be respected by others;
• relate to the natural environment and other species;
• play and enjoy;
• have some control over one’s political and material circumstances.
Peoples and communities must be empowered to shape and control the social, 
political, cultural and economic institutions that translate these abstractions into 
concrete social realities. Therefore, both Sen and Nussbaum reject any attempt 
to be over-prescriptive and top-down.
The implications of the capabilities approach are wide-ranging and profound. 
For instance, recent research has shown that affluence does not necessarily translate 
into wellbeing (Offer, 2006). You may have a higher income this year, but you 
are not necessarily better off in other, non-monetary terms than you were last 
year. Such findings chime with the view of the capabilities approach that the 
characteristics of wellbeing are highly diverse (Massey, 2005). As such, income 
is only one of a range of relevant indicators. The value of £1,000 to a person 
with a disability will not be equivalent to its value for a non-disabled person, 
since the former will typically have to spend more of that £1,000 on basic living 
costs (Burchardt, 2004, pp 739-44; Terzi, 2010). We therefore need not a single 
metric but a much wider range of indicators that take into account the many 
factors – the personal and social endowments – that enable a life to go well or 
badly. Since the 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has published an annual ‘human development’ report that gives figures for literacy, 
participation in education, gender and racial equality, life expectancy, and so forth.
Yet the implications of this go beyond the methodologies of economists and 
statisticians; they are also political. For example, the Left has often seen the 
redistribution of income and wealth as essential to improving social justice. But 
for the capabilities approach, income and wealth merely enable people to do 
certain things; whether people are actually able to do them depends on a host of 
other factors, as in the example of the £1,000 above. Just distributions are only 
one facet of social justice.
For those interested in understanding and alleviating poverty, the implications 
are therefore both methodological and political (Grusky and Kanbur, 2005). The 
capabilities approach agrees – and is in many respects related to – the emphasis on 
social exclusion that emerged in Europe in the 1980s. It is not enough to offer 
a snapshot of poverty since poverty is complex and dynamic. It helps to have a 
poverty line that everyone can understand, yet it is also wise to develop a range of 
poverty thresholds and indicators that try to capture the multifaceted characteristics 
of what poverty and exclusion really mean. The politics of reducing poverty, and 
the social policies needed to make this happen, are much more complex than we 
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used to think. For instance, unlike generations of Marxists, we cannot imagine 
that poverty is caused merely by capitalists extracting surplus value from workers 
through wage exploitation. Workplace relations and contracts may be important 
but they, by themselves, do not explain why women are typically poorer than 
men and black people typically poorer than white people. Instead, we need to 
conceive of a ‘poverty of capabilities’ that encompasses both absolute definitions 
and relative ones (Burchardt, 2008; see also Townsend, 1993). Poverty is what 
Sen (2009, pp 254-60) calls ‘capability deprivation’. Ultimately, what poor people 
are deprived of is the right to live lives of dignity, freedom and respect in which 
they possess the opportunities to fulfil their potential.
So how should we assess the capabilities approach? How much of it should 
influence an ecosocial understanding of poverty? There are two critiques I wish 
to offer here (cf Brighouse and Robeyns, 2010).
First critique
While the capabilities approach is a stimulating ‘broad church’ of perspectives, 
this can also make it seem fuzzy and indistinct. ‘Sen’s capabilities have never been 
operationalised satisfactorily’, says Bradshaw (2011, p 94). In particular, although 
it refers to something as fundamental as ‘beings and doings’, we may worry about 
the foundations on which the approach is meant to rely.
This, after all, is something that Nussbaum and Sen also appear to worry 
about. For Nussbaum (2011, pp 70-6), Sen is both too diverse and not diverse 
enough. She views him as not being diverse enough because, for Sen, freedom 
is the overarching social good. But, according to Nussbaum, not everything that 
we should define as good can be included under the heading of ‘freedom’. Some 
freedoms are more important than others and some freedoms conflict with others. 
We have to prioritise freedoms, she argues, and therefore need additional principles 
and concepts if we are to do so effectively. A simple appeal to ‘freedom’ cannot 
provide a sufficient framework when what that framework has to do is adjudicate 
between competing freedoms. Nussbaum acknowledges Sen’s commitment to 
democratic deliberation, but argues that this then risks being too diverse since 
conversations must be shaped and directed by formal mechanisms (political 
institutions, constitutions, legal procedures) if they are to be efficacious. If we 
allow majority opinion too much power, there is a danger that the capabilities 
of unpopular minorities may be undermined. Finally, Nussbaum (2011, p 76) 
argues in favour of political liberalism and against using ‘the idea of capability as 
a comprehensive theory of the value or quality of life.’
We consider Sen’s response shortly. For now, it is important to appreciate that 
while at first glance the disagreement between Nussbaum and Sen appears fairly 
trivial, should we develop a list of capabilities or not? The difference is actually 
quite substantial because it goes to the heart of what, for decades now, has been 
a central problem for philosophies and politics of justice.
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To what extent is justice a universal principle? Anti-universalists have contended 
that universalist accounts are too insensitive to social constructions, cultural 
traditions, contextual meanings and local understandings of how and why people 
interrelate (Flyvbjerg, 2001) – Kantianism is often the exemplar here (Fitzpatrick, 
2008a, Chapter 3). Universalists have replied that without some shared, common 
denominator, there is no basis for human rights, social progress and communication 
across cultural-national contexts (Habermas, 2005, pp 104-08, 260-6). Much of 
the sound and fury that characterised these debates in the 1960s-1980s has abated, 
with many theorists content to accommodate a spectrum of alternative ways of 
balancing the universal and the particular. This also seems true of the capabilities 
approach. The approach, however, risks offering a paradoxical embrace of both 
excessive universalism and excessive particularism.
For this, essentially, is the accusation which Nussbaum and Sen both level against 
one another!
Nussbaum’s critique runs as follows. Sen prefers an account of the good that 
is so comprehensive that it risks eclipsing other, distinct understandings of the 
good (such as ‘care’). But as well as being too universalist, Sen is also too much 
of a particularist. Without a cross-contextual set of liberal institutions there is no 
guarantee that freedom will prevail. Although ‘freedom’ can accommodate diverse 
models of social and political interaction – in short, there are many different 
ways of ‘living reasonably’ – for liberals like Nussbaum there must come a point 
when a community ceases to be free and therefore ceases to be just. Sen does not 
specify what that point is, and so does not consider what happens when freedom 
is undermined by those who either reject freedom outright or who subvert it 
while claiming to support it. In short, Sen gives too much prominence to freedom 
and to the capacity of communities to respect and institutionalise those freedoms. 
He is both too universalist and too particularist. To avoid the possibility of the 
capabilities approach becoming all things to all communities, Nussbaum offers 
a list designed to anchor cross-cultural debates about desirable social reforms.
Yet Sen throws a similar accusation back at Nussbaum. For Sen (2006, pp 49-
50, 92-3), it is liberalism that is too universalist, leaving liberals deaf to their 
specific western accent, overestimating their record as champions of tolerance, 
democracy and progress, while underestimating the extent to which the values of 
freedom have been advanced by non-western and non-liberal traditions. Western 
liberalism has enabled the west to claim ownership of, and therefore expropriate, 
ideals and values that are actually global in origin. We should therefore enter into 
a dialogue with a multiplicity of global voices rather than reaching prematurely 
for a transcendentalist universalism that offers closed, limited models of public 
reasoning. Sen (2009, pp 388-415) advocates ‘open impartiality’ which rejects 
parochial assumptions. So, in accepting Rawls’ (1999) view that we should seek 
an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines, Nussbaum risks allowing a 




Therefore, according to Sen, it is Nussbaum’s list of capabilities which is 
too particularist. It does not offer a sound basis for making cross-contextual 
judgements because the content and the boundaries of human capabilities should 
always be open to question, contestation and revision by communities. Even a 
skeletal list of capabilities risks closing down legitimate debate. In short, liberalism 
needs to de-westernise itself through a truly global, pluralist ethic rather than a 
static universal one. Thus it is Nussbaum who risks an excessive particularism, 
closing the door on a genuine cross-cultural discourse. For Sen, suspicious of 
those with lists of ‘dos and don’ts’, the capabilities approach should merely offer 
a tool for ranking different sets. The capabilities approach tell us,
• If you want x, y and z, then do 1
• If you want y, z and x, then do 2
• If you want z, x and y, then do 3
and leaves communities to make decisions about which of these to prefer.
In short, the dispute between Sen and Nussbaum is actually considerable 
since it concerns fundamental disagreement about the extent to which justice 
is universal, about the nature of liberalism and so about the role of liberalism in 
trying to promote justice.
Now perhaps I am overstating the problem here. It may well be that further 
thinking and discussion will resolve the disagreement between Sen and Nussbaum. 
(They each acknowledge this possibility.) Or, even if this does not happen, perhaps 
it does not matter. Maybe the capabilities approach is simply a wide field of debate 
that usefully directs us away from simplified accounts of justice.
Perhaps. Yet it may also be that the capabilities approach introduces 
indeterminacy into debates about justice and, by extension, the injustices of 
poverty. If both Sen and Nussbaum have a point in their criticism of the other, 
it may be that each has identified something about the capabilities approach that 
makes it insufficiently grounded: vague, generic, slippery, indefinite, indistinct 
and overextended in both scope and ambition. This is not to reject the capabilities 
approach necessarily, but it may be better to regard it is an adjunct to existing 
politics rather than something which is radically distinct (see also Daniels, 2010). 
This takes me to my second critique.
Second critique
Capabilities theorists demonstrate varying degrees of scepticism towards the 
idea that the just distribution of material and economic resources is a central 
component of social justice (see Fitzpatrick, 2008b). To a large extent this involves 
rejection of Rawls’ emphasis on primary goods, especially the prominence he gives 
to income and wealth. Rawls, they insist, concentrates too much on what people 
possess and not enough on what people can substantively achieve. For instance,
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Sen and I both argue that Rawls’s theory would be better able to give 
an account of the relevant social equalities and inequalities if the list 
of primary goods were formulated as a list of capabilities rather than 
as a list of things. (Nussbaum, 2006, pp 50-1)
A woman may be as well off as her husband in terms of income and 
wealth, and yet unable to function well in the workplace, because of 
burdens of caregiving at home. (Nussbaum, 2006, p 53)
Sen proposes that we should pretty much reject Rawls; Nussbaum argues that 
we can and should adapt parts of the Rawlsian system (cf Iversen, 2003). The 
sentiment of the second quote recurs often in the capabilities literature and, 
in response to it, Pogge (2010, pp  20-1) observes that those who focus on 
resources do not overlook intrafamily distributions; they merely conceptualise 
them differently.
But it is the first quote that captures something quite common in the capabilities 
literature, that is, reference to income and wealth as static ‘things’. As such, some 
argue that it is better to relocate income and wealth so that they occupy a more 
marginal place within a wider formulation of capabilities:
If people were fully able to realize their capacities as human beings, 
the matter of riches and poverty measured in terms if commodities 
and incomes would become secondary. (Levine and Rizvi, 2005, p 47; 
see also Levine, 2004)
Thus, the allegation is that because income and wealth are a ‘means to an end’, 
and not the end itself, we should not fetishise economic resources, material objects 
and goods into something more important than the humans who either possess 
or lack them (Nussbaum, 2003, pp 50-1, 53; 2011, pp 41, 57-8).
Are the capabilities theorists on to something here? Should we displace income 
and wealth from the central position they have long occupied within a politics of 
justice? Two arguments suggest that we do not have to be so drastic.
First, Pogge (2010, p 21) proposes that resources-based and capabilities-based 
accounts both concur about the importance of relational holdings:
...the value of any level of income depends in part on what incomes 
other participants enjoy and that, partly for this reason, an institutional 
order may be unjust because the incomes it makes available to some 
are too low relative to the incomes it makes available to others ... the 
relative size of incomes should be incorporated into an appropriate 
resource metric.
Similarly, those committed to the capabilities approach might accept that 
capabilities are bound up with the relational holdings regarding income and 
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wealth. In opposition to Levine and Rizvi, it could then be claimed that people 
would only be fully able to realise their capacities once the basic structure of 
society (and therefore the just distribution of riches, commodities and incomes) 
has been established.
This critique is more positive than a second possible response, one made 
by a capabilities advocate. Bourguignon (2005, p 77) proposes that systems of 
redistribution and social insurance ‘aimed at reducing inequality or “relative” 
income poverty’ are not enough to eradicate social and economic hindrances. 
Instead, the ‘income poverty paradigm’ should give way to a focus on endowments, 
or the multiple assets, attributes and opportunities that characterise individuals 
in their social environments. However, since endowment redistribution is not 
easy, equalising the distribution of income and wealth is an approximate way of 
ensuring that assets and endowments are distributed more equitably. Bourguignon 
(2005) therefore suggests that the poverty paradigm be extended and made 
complementary with the endowment paradigm (cf Fitzpatrick, 2011a).
Although it still begrudges income, wealth and the poverty paradigm as a 
‘second-best’ approach, Bourguignon’s suggestion at least establishes some clear 
water between those (such as Levine and Rizvi) who are quite dismissive of the 
paradigm of income poverty, material resources and distributive justice.
If there is a risk of fetishising income and wealth (of allowing them to occupy the 
place that should be reserved for human attributes), there is also a risk of reifying 
them (of making them appear less human than they really are). This is arguably 
the mistake that those who characterise income and wealth as ‘things’ make (for 
a longer analysis see Fitzpatrick, 2008b). Sen et al cite no evidence that Rawls 
objectified income and wealth. But, whether he thought in such terms or not, 
capabilities theorists then risk adopting this caricature as their own. Income and 
wealth become fixed in their arguments either as objects (notes, coins or numbers 
in an account) or as a rigid tool of statisticians and economists. Yet income and 
wealth are not ‘things’, as Pogge observes – they are social relations, symbols of, 
and weapons deployed within, structured systems of social class power that shape 
not only external endowments (opportunities and liberties) but also our internal 
sense of worth in relation to others.
It is the displacement of income and wealth (my second critique) that perhaps 
feeds the indeterminacy of the capabilities approach (my first critique). In the 
decades since Sen gave his 1980 Tanner Lectures, ‘capital’ and ‘class’ have, if 
anything, become more important than they were during the heyday of state 
welfare in the 1950s and 1960s, when Rawls and other resourcists were developing 
their ideas. Free market capitalism has become virulent and class inequalities 
have generally deepened. Yet ‘capitalism’ and ‘class’ are rarely to be found in the 
indexes of the key texts of the capabilities approach.
Perhaps they just haven’t got around to it yet. Hick (2012, p 304) observes 
that, ‘a capability assessment should provide information for such a critique 
to be constructed.’ Hick repeatedly distinguishes means (resources) from ends 
(capabilities), saying that the latter has priority over the former (2012, p 301, cf 
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p 304). But capitalism is not only about outcomes; it is a system in which ends 
(unjust inequalities) are reproduced systematically according to the inequalities 
of power conferred by the ownership of key resources. In separating ends from 
means and then downgrading (and perhaps even dismissing) the latter, Hick 
himself demonstrates the emptiness of the ‘haven’t got around to it yet’ excuse.
This obviously leaves hanging some big questions over how we should continue 
to theorise class and capital,1 yet the capabilities approach seems curiously reluctant 
to engage with that debate at all, even though simple invocations of human 
rights and dignity sound directionless without at least broad answers to them 
(Feldman and Gellert, 2006). For instance, Nussbaum (2006, pp 315-24) criticises 
multinationals for exploiting their workers, but it is not clear how far she imagines 
reforms of the socioeconomic system must go for this to be rectified – as opposed 
to merely encouraging multinationals to be ‘nicer’. We can all advocate a rise in 
wages for the low paid, but without a firm grounding in a materialist reading of 
economic distributions (for example, one that identifies wages as subservient to 
profits, shares and short-term market values), such a demand risks taking on the 
quality of a cry for humanitarian charity rather than a demand for justice and 
real empowerment.
Therefore, while we should be grateful to it for offering a complex, diversified 
understanding of wellbeing, it is far from obvious that the capabilities approach 
should dislodge more traditional thinking (Kelly, 2010, p 78), as some of its most 
enthusiastic adherents claim.
Social policy
Where do these critiques take us? To what extent should social policy 
commentators embrace the capabilities approach?
Some deny that it has much to offer. Dean (2009, 2010, pp 85-9) has expressed 
scepticism towards what he calls the approach’s abstract liberal individualism for 
three reasons.
First, although the approach enjoins public deliberation as a means of exercising 
and guaranteeing our freedoms, democratic deliberation requires attention to 
‘social conflicts and hidden forms of oppression’ that a concern with freedom per 
se may be incapable of recognising and repairing. Second, although the capabilities 
approach speaks the language of interdependency and interconnection, it still 
works with a notion of the self as ‘abstract bearer of capabilities’. The ‘space 
of capabilities’ is one of disconnection (of selves coming together) rather than 
substantive connection (in which they already are together). Finally, the capabilities 
approach is silent on the impediments to freedom created by capitalist markets, 
for example, the extent to which capitalist wage labour alienates us from our 
social humanity. Indeed, its liberal individualism may make it unable to offer a 
proper critique of market capitalism. Dean’s conclusion seems to be that while the 
capabilities approach can enrich our understanding of substantive freedoms – and 
of the social reforms needed to deliver them – it rests on a ‘thin’ conception of 
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the self which fails to embody a sufficient ‘critical autonomy’ to prevailing ways 
of thinking, acting, being and relating.
The third of these criticisms corresponds, at least in part, to the point made 
at the end of the last section. Whether we should accept Dean’s other critiques 
depends on fundamental social and moral philosophical issues. There is no 
coherent, one-size-fits-all school of liberal individualism. Some identify choice 
with ‘consumer choice in a free market’ while others believe that agents are 
always social agents whose beliefs and practices are interconnected and whose 
cultural communities help to configure who they are. The former is committed 
to a Robinson Crusoe version of the self that obscures oppressions by treating 
them as ‘natural’. But is this true of all forms of liberalism and individualism? 
At its best, liberalism represents a diverse philosophical tradition that can offer 
a perspective on these issues that is reasonable, capable of improvement and 
broadly consistent with at least some aspects of the more solidaristic outlook 
that Dean prefers. If we abandon the liberal tradition, then we surrender it to 
those who would identify liberalism with what is just one of its elements, that is, 
‘negative’ free market liberalism and right-wing libertarianism. So far as justice is 
concerned, neither liberal nor solidaristic politics are served by pitting the one 
in opposition to the other.
Other commentators have indicated that social policy has much to learn from 
the capabilities approach.
Wolff and de-Shalit (2007, pp 36-73; see also Burchardt, 2008) argue that 
a just society is one that gives priority to the least advantaged, that is, those 
who experience and become trapped within a ‘cluster’ of disadvantages. To be 
disadvantaged is to lack ‘genuine opportunities for secure functionings’, they say. 
Someone is disadvantaged when their functionings become insecure involuntarily, 
or when they can only secure some functionings by making others insecure ‘in a 
way that other people do not have to do’. What matters is an individual’s level of 
functioning and their prospect of sustaining that level. Such disadvantages are likely 
to be corrosive in that one will often create or intensify others. For instance, a lack 
of access to social networks may affect access to job opportunities, reducing that 
person’s income and so having knock-on effects on health. The job of government 
should be to ‘de-cluster’ those disadvantages so that it gradually becomes harder 
for us to identify who the least advantaged are. The corrosive interaction of 
disadvantages needs to be challenged through pluralist, multidimensional social 
policies, since it is unlikely that just one redistributive method will suffice.
Poverty should therefore be understood as a corrosive disadvantage: ‘... what 
primarily matters is not how much money or resources one has, but what one is 
able to do and be’ (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007, p 147). This is because what matters 
is not just lack of money but also anxieties about money and the possibility that 
taking steps to increase income can make things worse through exposure to risk. Thus, 
adding money is not always the way to rectify the corrosive disadvantage of lacking it. This 
is most likely to occur when people have little sense of the future being better than 
the present, when they are pessimistic about their future prospects and so more 
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likely to fritter away any gains that come their way. In short, although money 
is important, giving Rawlsian priority to the worst-off will not, by itself, erode 
the distance between the bottom and the top. Addressing disadvantage instead 
implies policies which:
• develop internal resources (personal enhancement effected through 
education and training)
• improve external resources (cash compensation where people are 
given money, as well as targeted resource enhancement through 
in-kind goods and services)
• reorganise social structures (improving people’s status by changing 
social environments and the rules through which institutions 
operate). (Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007, pp 173-4)
The potential problem with this argument, however, resembles one we have 
already encountered. While Wolff and de-Shalit acknowledge the importance of 
income and wealth, this falls short of a critique of capital.2 Their position probably 
dovetails with some notion of asset-based welfare, since long-term security is 
crucial to the ‘de-clustering’ of disadvantages. However, the links between asset-
based welfare and their policy recommendations are not made clear, and they 
offer no critique of capitalism. To what extent, for instance, would the reduction 
of disadvantage genuinely alter the stratifications of social classes? Furthermore, 
money is purchasing power where the purchasing power of one person is relative 
to, and indirectly shaped by, the purchasing power of others. The power one has 
to do and to be is closely dependent on the power others have to do and to be. 
A lack of money is equivalent to a lack of power to shape one’s destiny. Without 
this realisation, like Sen and Nussbaum, Wolff and de-Shalit risk treating ‘income 
and wealth’ into a reified, thing-like, technocratic category. Giving people more 
money may not ensure that corrosive disadvantage is rectified, but a material-
distributive politics is concerned not with raising wage levels or benefit levels 
for the sake of it, but with redistributions of the socioeconomic power which 
capital confers. For instance, sometimes the distribution of money will itself 
drive forward the distribution of socioeconomic power. This is the case when 
generous pension provision strengthens the bargaining hand of organised labour.
In short, enabling people to control principal socioeconomic resources is 
crucial to rectifying disadvantage; this means shifting key resources from private 
into public hands (not equivalent to state ownership, please note), and equalising 
access to and control of those resources so that what an individual lacks relative 
to others is reduced.
As we saw earlier, then, even sophisticated versions of the capabilities approach 
risk conceptualising money as a statistical abstraction, ignoring the role played by 
socioeconomic resources such as capital. Injustice in the distribution of income 
and wealth does not account for everything, and the capabilities approach remains 
important by drawing attention to this fact. Yet, in a capitalist society, economic 
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resources and capital account for much. The anxieties about long-term security 
that help to corrode capabilities are less likely when one commands or has access 
to the requisite resources. Money is not a ‘thing’; it is that which shapes, enforces 
and helps to distribute power across the social field.
Environmentalism
Let us turn finally to our third topic. How might the capabilities approach relate 
to debates about climate change and environmentalism?
Schlosberg (2007, pp  29-37; see also Agyeman, 2013, pp  38-40) makes 
capabilities central to his theory of environmental justice. He does so for the now 
familiar reason that, while it remains important, the distribution of economic 
goods alone cannot ensure that those to whom those goods are distributed are 
valued (recognition), nor that such goods will enable individuals and communities 
to flourish (capabilities). Justice depends not just on receiving goods, but also on 
the freedom and opportunity of agents and communities to shape their social 
meaning and the institutional processes through which they are distributed. 
But although we may recognise their value, can non-humans be the agents of 
procedural justice? Schlosberg insists they can, but only over time, as an alternative 
ecological ethic is developed.
Schlosberg (2007, pp  142-58) performs a particularly valuable service in 
showing how the scope of the capabilities approach may be extended to the 
non-human world. Indeed, he makes the point that a human/non-human 
distinction should not be overdrawn since flourishing within one’s context is 
integral to the life process.3 We therefore need to go beyond the limited ambition 
of Sen and Nussbaum, the former focusing on future generations and the latter 
on the sentience of individual creatures. Instead, we should raise our sights to 
the ‘macro’ level of species and ecological systems, he argues, recognising how 
these too can either flourish or fail to flourish. Systems are themselves agents 
that enable their parts to function. So, rather than Nussbaum’s reliance on an 
anthropocentric language of dignity, a notion derived from human psychology, 
we ought to ally capabilities to a conception of ‘integrity’, something which 
all life requires, sentient and non-sentient. In short, Schlosberg’s critique is that 
the capabilities approach has been anthropocentric but can be reworked in an 
ecocentric direction.
Schlosberg’s defence is thus highly ecocentric and anti-universalist. In fact, it 
is anti-universalist because it is so ecocentric. Universalism, he claims, only seems 
possible and desirable if we either (1) limit our attention to humans or (2) apply 
human categories (such as dignity) to those non-humans that share some vital 
human characteristic (such as sentience). But if we ought to extend our ethic 
more fully to the non-sentient world, including holistic entities such as species 
and ecological systems, then universalism breaks down, he believes. We cannot 
(yet) speak meaningfully of that which applies to all forms of life. Instead, we 
need to develop capabilities sets for each species and ecological system, while 
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also exploring the extent to which these sets overlap, so that we may eventually 
come to appreciate what flourishing might mean for all forms of life. Over the 
course of time, this implies altering humans’ understanding of what it means to 
be human. Developing an overlapping consensus of capabilities sets is a long-
term, interdisciplinary process (and not one that can occur by plucking narrow, 
anthropocentric concepts from the human context and treating them as universals). 
For now, it means making much greater room for non-humans and nature in 
our decision-making processes.
Schlosberg’s account therefore splits into two directions. On the one hand, he 
enjoins us to develop an ecocentric ethic, which will involve allowing capabilities 
sets to overlap and merge. On the other, we need to attend to the practical business 
of reforming existing institutions. These two directions may well converge in the 
far future, as Schlosberg anticipates. However, since he himself acknowledges that 
we are limited to a human frame of reference, some degree of anthropocentrism 
seems unavoidable. Like Nussbaum, Schlosberg (2007, pp 154-7) admits that 
paternalism is inherent to how humans think about and act towards non-humans.
This is a rather grudging concession, an admittance that the two roads Schlosberg 
would have us walk down may never converge perfectly. Does this schism in 
Schlosberg’s analysis occur because he is irrevocably committed to the view that 
anthropocentrism is too narrow and unreformable? If so, then is it worth starting 
from another premise, one which is not so pessimistic about anthropocentrism 
and which sees little need to allow the ethical to diverge from the practical? We 
could then speak a language of universals while also acknowledging that the 
language can improve over time as our relationship to non-human nature changes. 
Indeed, Schlosberg (2007, Chapter 8) makes room for liberal individualists in his 
account of ‘ecological reflexivity’. As such, universalist values and categories may 
be indispensible, even ones limited to humans and human-like frames of reference. 
After all, the human context is our context, implying that while the human/
non-human distinction can be reconfigured, it can never be entirely dissolved.
In contrast to Schlosberg, Holland has also applied the capabilities approach to 
questions of environmental justice while being more comfortable with a revised 
anthropocentric framework.
Holland (2008, p  320) argues that the environment is a ‘meta-capability’ 
because it consists of the material properties (for example, shelter, nourishment) 
that enable us to flourish. The environment is the capability that makes other 
capabilities possible:
Being able to have good health and nourishment requires that 
ecological systems function at a level that can sustain the provision 
of soil, water, and atmospheric temperature that enable agricultural 
production and the absorption of human produced waste (pollution). 
Similarly, the adequacy of human shelter is partly contingent upon the 
extent to which whole ecological systems can maintain the chemical 
composition of the atmosphere in a way that stabilizes temperatures 
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and ensures environmental change occurs on time scales to which 
humans can adapt. (Holland, 2008, p 323)
A just society is that which maintains those ecological systems at a level that 
enables people to achieve a threshold level of the central capabilities. The 
functioning of ecological systems is therefore more essential than the ‘human-
created environments’ of social, political and economic systems,
For it is possible to exercise at least some of the central human 
functional capabilities outside or independent of social, political, 
and economic systems, while it is not possible to exercise the central 
human capabilities outside or independent of functioning ecological 
systems. (Holland, 2008, p 324)4
There are limits to Holland’s approach. Importantly, Holland follows Nussbaum 
and many other capabilities theorists in downgrading the importance of income 
and wealth. As the quote above reveals, she divides ecological systems from what 
she calls ‘human-created environments’ in the course of making the former central 
to her ‘meta’ account of capabilities. In order to prioritise the natural environment 
as a meta-capability, social, political and economic systems are effectively relegated 
– the former needs the latter more than the latter needs the former.
Holland’s categorical dualism is overstated, therefore. In some primitive state 
of nature we can just about imagine humans achieving capabilities without 
accompanying social, political and economic systems, but this hardly provides 
meaningful guidance for the promotion and operation of justice in contemporary 
societies. Thus, if the natural environment is a meta-capability, it is not one that 
we can afford to separate from so-called ‘human-centred environments’, if only 
because the social and the natural are highly interdependent (see the Introduction 
earlier).
Additionally, if income and wealth are central, and if they point us towards 
a critique of capital, as argued in previous sections, then such a critique is 
indispensible to the convergence of social and ecological justice. Perhaps what 
Bangladesh needs are enforceable property rights to prevent the violations of 
its ecological space made when other countries exceed the threshold level of 
capabilities. In less rarefied language, this is equivalent to not allowing your 
neighbour to extend their home at the cost of your property. And if such rights 
are available to all on an egalitarian and democratic basis, the Bangladeshi poor 
would be less vulnerable to the infringements of their ecological space and 
capabilities made by others, including the Bangladeshi rich.
To sum up, Holland’s approach to the capabilities approach therefore seems 
more immediately persuasive than Schlosberg’s since it envisages the development 
of capabilities through the meta-capability (that which makes other capabilities 
possible) of the natural environment. However, Holland’s notion of a meta-
capability assumes an overdrawn distinction between ecological systems and 
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human-centred environments, in the course of repeating what I have repeatedly 
insisted is a mistake of the capabilities approach: the downgrading of income and 
wealth (including capital and property), material resources, economic power and 
the distributive paradigm.
In short, if human capabilities are made possible by the web of human/non-
human, social-natural interdependencies to which we belong, we should not be 
so quick to dispense with a distributive, resources-based account.
Conclusion
The capabilities approach is valuable. A distribution of material resources does 
not, in and of itself, say anything about substantive freedoms, that is, what people 
are able to do and to be, but does this mean abandoning a material-distributive 
framework? Few capabilities theorists probably believe as much, although some 
come closer to doing so than others (Sen, 2009, pp 6-27).5 As such, the capabilities 
approach risks a certain indeterminacy and slipperiness. Resources such as income 
and wealth are not ‘things’ but social relations of power that significantly enable 
and constrain doings and beings. If we displace the distribution of resources 
too far from our account of justice, we displace something crucial to the very 
substantive freedoms held to be important.
So far as poverty is concerned we can agree with those such as Burchardt (2008) 
when she argues that we should conceive a ‘poverty of capabilities’. This suggests 
a plural, multidimensional framework that, in developing the list of capabilities 
by asking people what they value, invites participative democracy into the policy 
process. However, poverty also implies a deficiency in the meta-capabilities that 
make capabilities possible. Holland is no doubt correct that this makes ecological 
systems central but, as argued above, we should not thereby downgrade the 
centrality of human-centred ones.
The conclusion to this chapter is simple: we ought to focus on the socionatural 
conditions underpinning the multiple dimensions of poverty. A poverty of 
capabilities implies deprivations in those resources central to both ecological and 
human-centred systems: socionatural resources, in other words. Thus, an ecosocial 
understanding of poverty defines it as the deprivations resulting from an inadequate 
distribution of, and participative access to, those resources that are essential to 
both natural and social environments.
Notes
1 As acknowledged in the Introduction earlier, I bypass such questions myself.
2 Whether such a critique could be accommodated under their third policy about social 
structures is not a question we can tackle here.
3 The notion of integrity – of flourishing within one’s context – resembles what others 
would term ‘needs’. This book offers no systematic analysis of needs, interests, and so 
on, but such an account could be developed from what I say in Chapters Two to Four, 
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for example, the deprivation categories can be re-articulated in such terms. See the work 
of Hartley Dean (2014) and Ian Gough (forthcoming).
4 The same is presumably true in a distributive framework: the environment is that 
which makes social distributions possible. Reciprocally, if distributions do not observe 
some baseline of social and environmental justice, they undermine their own ecological 
conditions.
5 If anything, they may even take the framework too much for granted. In their rush to 
demote the importance of income and wealth (and capital and property), they risk leaving 
a political vacuum into which those who would dismiss the distributive aspects of justice 
altogether are all too eager to step – ‘See, the poor don’t need money, they need moral 





The last chapter ended with two observations: we should not downgrade the 
role played by resources in the distribution of social and economic power; and if 
capabilities are important, it is against a background of what makes them possible, 
that is, the interaction of ecological and human-centred systems. By placing 
these observations together we arrive at the idea that ‘socionatural resources’ are 
crucial. This chapter uses this idea to develop a set of basic principles on which 
an initial definition of ecosocial poverty can be built.
Some propose that existing institutions and practices are largely sufficient: 
‘ecological modernisation’. I argue, however, that making sufficient room for the 
intrinsic value of nature requires us to subject our social and economic systems 
to a more radical critique. This means exploring concepts such as exclusion and 
alienation, ‘domainship’ and socialisation. The chapter ends by offering the initial 
definition just mentioned. Our first task, however, is to understand what we mean 
by ‘resources’. As one of the most recent debates on this theme has concerned 
‘assets’, for reasons that will become clear, I wish to start there. 
Assets
Assets include external goods (home equity, property, savings, shares, inheritances 
and arguably jobs) and internal goods (education and training qualifications, skills 
and talents, confidence and motivation, work experience, cultural capital). Assets 
are thought to improve economic security, facilitate financial literacy, enable 
individuals to cope with risks, enhance personal development, encourage savings 
and other responsible habits, provide everyone with a stake in their society and 
invigorate social networks (Belsky and Retsinas, 2005; Paxton and White, 2006; 
Fitzpatrick, 2007, 2011a; Prabhakar, 2008).
Over the last quarter of a century assets have become crucial to many discussions 
of poverty (Oliver and Shapiro, 1990; Sherraden, 1991, 2002; Kober and Paxton, 
2002; Schreiner and Sherraden, 2007; McKernan and Sherraden, 2008), because 
purely income-based approaches have been increasingly regarded as inadequate 
measures of deprivation. Resource ‘flows’ (income) may not fully capture a 
person’s circumstances, that is, the overall ‘stock’ of resources they have available. 
In arguing for a broader conceptualisation of wellbeing, the capabilities approach 
converges with the view of those who defend ‘asset-based’ models (Sherraden, 
2003, p 28).
‘Asset poverty’ is therefore a compelling concept that carries many implications 
for social policy (Haveman and Wolff, 2005, p 64). Most of those who recommend 
asset-based solutions to poverty do not advocate the dismantling of income-based 
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policies. Wages, income supplements, benefits and tax credits remain crucial 
sources of wellbeing and social participation, such as, for example, collective 
bargaining, employment rights and broader labour market reforms. Indeed, as 
Bernstein (2005, p 357) notes, since the Right often wish to take the emphasis 
away from redistributive cash transfers (Niemietz, 2011, pp 124-8, 167), asset-
based strategies may give them the perfect excuse. In the UK in the 1980s, the 
privatisation of public utilities, the Poll Tax and the revolution in council housing 
were introduced by the Conservative government as a means of spreading wealth 
and ownership, yet each reform helped to exacerbate social inequalities.
In short, there is already plenty of evidence that asset-based strategies can 
generate inequalities. By contrast, if assets were deployed to complement other 
measures designed to implement distributive justice, then their potential may still 
remain untapped. Assets might revive elements of mutualism that, emphasising the 
importance of savings and insurance through friendly and cooperative societies, 
predated the welfare state, without having to lose the progressive, universalist and 
comprehensive aspects of the latter. Such reforms could even revitalise a politics 
of social ownership (Blackburn, 2002; cf Paxton, 2003, p 3).
Whatever the strategy adopted, the ecological dimensions of justice are surely 
relevant, it being clear that the natural environment is replete with assets. It is the 
store, the treasury, the stockpile from which all forms of wealth ultimately derive 
and on which they depend (Sarkar, 1999, Chapter 4). Yet social policy debates 
about assets have not yet taken sufficient account of the natural environment.
One possible exception comes in the form of ‘natural capital’ which is sometimes 
added to ‘social capital’ (networks, contacts, reciprocity, trust) and ‘economic 
capital’ (qualifications and skills, work experience, education) as that which is 
essential to social inclusion and wellbeing.1 However, there is a question mark 
– first, over whether it is appropriate to bolt nature on to social and economic 
capital in this fashion, as in Figure 2.1. Does Figure 2.2 offer a more accurate 
model of our reliance on natural capital? Furthermore, should we even be using 
the vocabulary of ‘capital’ when we speak of nature at all? We consider such 
issues shortly.
There are two debates that substantiate my basic claim about the neglect of 
the natural environment.
Asset poverty
A scope of the asset poverty literature (see, for example, Sherraden et al, 2004) 
suggests that its authors have failed to explore a connection between poverty and 
natural resources. As a typical example, Lerman and McKernan (2008, pp 182-
200) detail at some length a range of financial assets (bank accounts, stocks and 
bonds, pensions) and non-financial assets (homes, cars, small businesses and 
self-employment) that they link to various forms of wellbeing (see Table 2.1).
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The interdependencies of society and nature certainly lurk within these 
categories. It is hard to conceive of physical, mental and emotional health 
being achieved in an environment of pollution and scarce, depleted resources, 
for instance (Verrinder, 2011). The argument of the environmental justice 
movement is precisely that the poorest do not achieve a sufficient and equitable 
state of wellbeing because the quality of their lived environment is degraded due 













Table 2.1: Wellbeing and assets
Wellbeing Examples of assets
Economic Income, consumption and self-sufficiency
Social and civic Household and residential stability, social capital, political 
membership
Child Gifts and bequests, educational and extracurricular, emotional, 
cognitive and behavioural development
Health and psychological Health, future-orientation, feelings of security and satisfaction
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to social inequalities and policy processes that disadvantage them. Nonetheless, 
the literature on asset poverty has remained largely deaf to that dealing with 
environmental justice.
This allegation is perhaps less fair when applied to development studies. Those 
who advocate microfinance and microcredit schemes sometimes argue that in 
addition to enhancing personal savings and aiding social projects, they enable the 
poor to exert greater control over their natural environment (Mahajan, 2007). 
Thus, Moser (2007, pp 92-4) proposes the ‘financialisation’ of natural capital 
(forests, air and pollution).2
Development studies aside, however, the literature on asset poverty in the 
developed world seems to have paid insufficient attention to the ecological 
dimensions of poverty.
Social justice
Philosophical debates about social justice and the natural environment are more 
developed (Dobson, 1998, 1999; Bell, 2004; see also Nussbaum, 2006). Interest 
has centred on whether nature is substitutable, whether it possesses intrinsic value 
and how humans should relate to the rest of nature. We investigate some of these 
themes below. Social policy debates concerning social justice and nature are less 
advanced, however – for example, Rowlingson and McKay’s (2012) research 
on wealth and assets barely mentions environmental resources. Some academic 
research is only gradually developing (see Aldred, 2011; Fitzpatrick, 2011b).
Certainly, at the level of government there has been little work on how and 
why natural assets might shape the social policy agenda. For instance, in 1998 
the New Labour government specified 15 ‘headline’ indicators from a wider set 
of sustainable development indicators, data about which would be published 
each year (Hewett and Rayment, 2000). These signalled that recognition of 
environmental concerns – including river quality, bird numbers and air pollution – 
deserve to sit alongside familiar issues of health, education and economic growth. 
However, although such initiatives were welcome, they were never properly 
integrated, and New Labour never provided an answer to the sceptic wondering 
what bird numbers had to do with jobs and wages. Furthermore, most of its 
initiatives emerged at the tail end of its period in office – the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was only established in 2008. New Labour 
also tended to think in technocratic and consumerist terms that avoided making 
the political connections between environmental and social policies.
Overall, then, New Labour’s approach was one consistent with what has been 
called ‘ecological modernisation’. Does ecological modernisation nonetheless 
offer a way of bringing together various issues – assets, social policy, justice and 




Ecological modernisation is the idea that economic growth and environmental 
damage can be decoupled using new technologies, market incentives and reforms 
to existing institutions, thus transforming growth into decarbonised ‘green growth’ 
(Mol et al, 2009). A key assumption is that we are permitted to conceive of natural 
assets as natural capital to be bolted on to other forms of capital, as in Figure 2.1. 
There are various reasons for defending this strategy.
First, there is a pragmatic consideration. We have to start from where we are, 
and that means acknowledging the extent to which market exchange dominates 
current social and economic thinking. We cannot preserve what we have not 
measured. Certainly, we may value it for additional reasons and in additional ways, 
but unless we first render nature into calculable dimensions, we cannot incorporate 
it to our socioeconomic practices. Natural capital is thus the stock of environmental 
assets, including land and soil, forests and jungles, oceans, rivers and wetlands, potable 
water, minerals and the atmosphere.
Second, there is a more principled, philosophical consideration. If humans 
are indeed woven into the web of natural interdependencies, there is nothing 
inherently objectionable about the desire to develop and improve nature. What 
humans do is merely a more sophisticated version of what ants do when they 
construct a lair, or what beavers do when they build dams and lodges. All species 
alter and adapt their environment in order to serve their needs and interests. Just 
as nature has worth for non-humans, so ‘natural capital’ captures the worth that 
the rest of nature has for us (HM Government, 2011, pp 35-43). Nature is a 
resource for humans that we are perfectly entitled to utilise, it being legitimate for 
us to consider productive capacity of natural capital (see UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment, 2011).
The implication is that we can bring issues of poverty, justice and sustainability 
together without a major revolution in our thinking. The causes of and solutions 
to poverty in a green society will largely be similar to those in a non-green one. In 
short, the equitable distribution of green growth will be the means of addressing 
poverty in an era of climate change. If assets (including natural capital) are a means 
of ensuring such equity, then useful synergies between ecological modernisation 
and an asset-based approach can be developed.
Intrinsic value
Are such arguments persuasive?
The pragmatic consideration is seductive but risks allowing business-as-usual 
assumptions to overwhelm moral considerations. If we stray too far away from 
today’s realities, our utopian dreams may be so powerful that they lull us to sleep. 
Yet if we do not imagine a future different from the present, we only populate 
that future with endless replicas of today’s errors. Social democratic politics has 
trapped itself in that loop for far too long.
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The principled consideration is harder to challenge. All living beings do indeed 
use their natural environments in ways that serve their needs. Yet are humans 
limited to such instrumentalism? Is there something to nature beyond ‘natural 
capital’? What about the intrinsic value of nature (Sandel, 2012, pp 72-84; see 
also O’Neill, 1993: Chapter 2)? Are we capable of recognising and protecting 
intrinsic value, even when doing so does not serve, and may sometimes even harm, 
our interests? To what extent should intrinsic value be part of our moral, social 
and political thinking? Let me make two points in response to these questions.
First, although they may sometimes conflict, we should not imagine that 
intrinsic value and instrumental value are always and necessarily in opposition to 
one another. The argument was famously made by Kant (1991, p 91):4
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end. (emphasis added)
We are allowed to treat others as a means to our own ends so long as, first 
and foremost, we also respect them as ends-in-themselves (Fitzpatrick, 2008a, 
Chapter 3). Therefore we could follow Kant in giving moral priority to intrinsic 
value. The value of x is instrumental in so far as it serves y in some capacity, but 
it is intrinsic in so far as x’s essential worth persists regardless of the extrinsic 
presence of y. Thus, it is both the case that (1) synergies between the intrinsic 
and the instrumental can be imagined, yet (2) intrinsic value is more important 
because it expresses the essential qualities of x.
If so, what about instances where they do conflict? Should intrinsic value always 
have priority? Are we always required to sacrifice our instrumentalist interests 
when something of intrinsic value is threatened? In one sense it seems ridiculous 
to imagine so. An ant may have intrinsic value, but if an ant colony prevented 
the development of a building project that would provide jobs to thousands, then 
would we allow that intrinsic worth to stand in our way? One possible response 
to such dilemmas is to ponder why such conflicts would exist in the first place.
Nature is the source of life because it transforms solar energy into the plants 
on which humans and non-humans depend for food and oxygen (Soper, 1995, 
pp 130-45, 149-60; Franklin, 2002, pp 39-47). By eating food we are using those 
natural resources without thereby disrespecting their intrinsic value, for in the 
absence of humans and non-humans, plants would either have no value, or at best, 
a value that lies inert and unactivated.5 Certain forms of use will activate nature in 
ways that respect and preserve its intrinsic value, while others will not. Therefore, 
the extent to which instrumental value does or does not conflict with intrinsic 
value depends on the means and the justifications by which nature is transformed 
by living beings, not the fact of transformation itself (Barry, 1999, pp 114-15).
For instance, imagine that you are the last human left alive (see Carter, 2004). 
Would it be morally acceptable for you to burn down the forests and slaughter 
millions of animals for sport because there is no human left to reproach you? One 
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reason for thinking otherwise is because nature continues to consist of non-human 
beings to whom we possess obligations as members of the interconnecting web 
to which even the last human continues to belong. As such, we must be able to 
legitimate our actions within any moral court in which they (and not just other 
humans) were judge and jury.6 According to this view, you have an obligation to 
leave the Earth in at least as good a state as you found it, regardless of whether 
any human inhabits it after you. You can use and transform the forests so long 
as you recognise that they belong to non-humans too.
Therefore, the uses that respect and preserve nature’s intrinsic value are those that 
do their best to recognise and nurture that interconnecting web. In other words, 
life has a responsibility to life. Animal a attacks animal b because it sees animal b 
as food. Yet the drive to eat or be eaten still respects the interconnecting web of 
nature in a way that is not true if animal a killed for no purpose or for frivolous 
reasons (sport or fun) or in ways that were predominantly cruel, or if species b 
risked becoming extinct. Of course, given our status as highly developed social 
beings who must make often complex value judgements, there is no easy way 
of distinguishing activities that recognise and nurture life’s interconnecting web 
from those that do not. Does a meat-eater respect intrinsic values by only eating 
animals that died of natural causes or were killed painlessly? Do vegans occupy 
a stronger moral position than vegetarians?
That is why I added the modifier ‘do their best’; there is no guarantee we will 
always get it right. Respect for intrinsic values and for life’s interconnecting web is 
a guide, not a guarantor. It is difficult to judge which bits of nature to leave alone, 
which bits to transform and which bits to sacrifice. No credible environmental 
ethic can pretend otherwise.
Nonetheless, my first point is that where intrinsic and instrumental values 
conflict, our main duty is to alter our activities and interventions – to debate 
how that conflict can be reduced – rather than to treat non-intervention and the 
withdrawal of human activity as the default response. As argued below, rather 
than withdrawing from the non-human realm and sacrificing human wellbeing, 
we ought to rethink the types of interventions we make, the features of human 
wellbeing and the methods of enhancing that wellbeing.
My second point, therefore, is that our economic systems must be judged and 
reformed accordingly. Debates about intrinsic value are vitally important, yet 
these are debates that our market-dominated societies, based on self-interest, the 
maximisation of preferences, competition and possessive, acquisitive forms of 
individualism, have been very poor at initiating. Humans do indeed use nature, 
as do ants and beavers. But some activities are undoubtedly more consistent with 
the intrinsic value of life’s interconnecting web than others. The building project is 
easier to justify if unemployment can be shown to be environmentally destructive 
and if there are no other ways of creating jobs. And it is easier to justify if they 
are green jobs designed to enhance environmental sustainability.
Thus, by attaching itself so firmly to prevailing orthodoxies, ecological 
modernisation may fail to subject existing systems to the required amount of 
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critical attention, that is, to base our ethical principles and judgements around the 
notion of intrinsic value. As I demonstrate throughout this book, tackling poverty 
is not simply a case of mechanically redistributing resources, but of encouraging 
new relations between humans and their natural world, ones that embody new 
social habits, practices and perceptions.
Of the possible objections to my argument, let me mention two. First, there 
are some who will object that instrumentalist values distract us from what is truly 
significant about humanity and natural life in general (see Lu, 2010). My reply 
is to acknowledge that there is a danger here, but to insist, as noted above, that 
forms of instrumentalism are permissible in so far as they serve intrinsic values. 
If it can be demonstrated that intrinsic values are served more by the presence 
of instrumental values than they are by the latter’s absence, we would only be 
damaging intrinsic values by ignoring them.
A second, related objection is that my entire position (as defended here and in 
Chapter One) is too anthropocentric. Take the following possibilities:
(1) A world without any life whatsoever possesses intrinsic value.
(2) A world with life but without conscious life possesses intrinsic value.
(3) A world with conscious life but without sentient life possesses intrinsic value.
(4) A world with sentient life but without human life possesses intrinsic value.
(5) Only a world with human life possesses intrinsic value.
A strong anthropocentrist will prefer (5), while a strong biocentrist will prefer 
(2).7 I see no way of resolving the issue here except to state that most of us would 
locate ourselves somewhere between (2) and (4). This reflects back on the last 
human argument (and see note 4). Would the last human have an obligation to 
sentient life, to non-sentient conscious life or to life per se? My view tends towards 
(2), but the debate is far too complex to be settled here.
To sum up: the principled justification for ecological modernisation is strong 
but can be challenged by arguing that our approach should be framed more firmly 
around the intrinsic value of nature, the value of life’s interconnecting web and 
the interdependencies that flow from it. Therefore, neither the pragmatic nor the 
principled consideration entirely succeeds. Debates about intrinsic value should 
be at the heart of social reforms to an extent that the technocratic, business-as-
usual tendencies of ecological modernisation ignore. So yes, humans alter their 
environment just as non-human animals do, but this does not mean that all forms 
of alteration are justified, or that natural capital is morally equivalent to economic 
and social capital.
Where might such considerations take us?
Beyond ecological modernisation?
The above claim that we ought to respect both intrinsic and instrumental 
values resembles and inspires the view that nature can be both decommodified 
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and commodified. The idea here is that respecting nature is not the same as 
withdrawing from nature. If our economic system is degrading nature, we ought 
to improve the system rather than adopt a philosophy of non-intervention. Let 
me explain why.
As traditionally understood (see, for example, Marx, 1976, pp 128-31), x is 
commodified if the meaning, identity, value and status of x is defined exclusively 
or largely in terms of its exchange-value, that is, its capacity to be transformed into 
money, or equivalents, and circulated within a market system whose overriding 
purpose is the accumulation of more exchange-value. This is in contrast to the 
use-value of y, where y is subject to use (consumption, gifting, enjoyment) 
without it being dependent on circulatory exchange or market systems. In this 
sense, y is decommodified.
One problem with this distinction is that it tempts us to contrast commodification 
and decommodification as stark, dichotomised opposites. This easily misses the 
extent to which they may coincide. The photos I ask a professional photographer 
to take of my wedding have use-value for me but exchange-value for him. 
He earns a wage which on that day he could have earned by taking photos of 
something else; by contrast, the meaning of those photos to me resides in the 
fact that they are of this specific event, one that cannot be substituted. By being 
both ‘price-less’ and yet also the objects of a market contract, the photos are 
simultaneously decommodified and commodified. Therefore, it may be that 
commodification and decommodification are often concurrent. Furthermore, 
it is all too easy to idealise decommodification as superior to commodification. 
This, too, assumes that the terms have a water-and-oil quality, with all of the 
virtues residing in the former.
This is why we should be cautious about how we map the two sets of concepts 
discussed above. It is tempting to propose the following. If decommodification 
implies use-value where the value of p resides within itself, then surely that implies 
it is equivalent to intrinsic value. And if commodification implies exchange-
value, or treating q as a commodity whose value is only circumstantially related 
to its innate qualities (other objects could potentially substitute for q), then that 
surely implies it is equivalent to instrumental value. Accordingly, the conceptual 
map would resemble Figure 2.3. But if, as argued above, the intrinsic and the 
instrumental are more intricately related than this, and if commodification 
and decommodification are not necessarily in opposition to one another, this 
complicates the picture. It could imply a more intricate series of interrelationships, 
as in Figure 2.4.
Here the vertical relationships are potentially as important as the horizontal 
ones. Of course, we lose something by making this move; namely, the idea that 
we should regard nature as somehow morally and spiritually ‘higher’ than the 
corruptions and compromises of our all-too-human economies. A vision of nature 
as being beyond markets, profit, money, competition and consumerism is deeply 
alluring. Nonetheless, as already argued, we do not necessarily serve nature by 
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treating it as a no-go area into which the language of instrumentalism (and so of 
commodification and exchange) is necessarily unwelcome.
Therefore, rather than emptying the natural of socioeconomic concepts and 
principles, we ought to be revising those concepts and principles so that they are 
less threatening to the present and future wellbeing of the natural environment. 
According to ecosocialism, for example, the problem is not economic relations 
per se, nor even ‘the market’ necessarily, but a capitalist system whose ‘creative 
destruction’ has eroded the natural foundations of social and economic life (Pepper, 
1993, 2010; Benton, 1996; Sarkar, 1999, 2010; Huan, 2010). Sustainability 
therefore requires a new system of social ownership, social economy and 
community property. We should not shrink from conceiving of nature as a set 
of assets and resources so long as we also do our best to respect its intrinsic value.
The choice is this, then. If we adopt an ecological modernisation approach, 
particularly in the context of deregulated, hypercapitalist economies, we risk 
conceiving of nature largely in commodified, instrumentalist terms. But rather than 
stripping economic concepts away from nature, the best alternative is to revitalise 
social understandings of the economic. Only through an economy that stresses 
our social interdependencies can the interconnections and interdependencies of 
society and nature be developed in a way that is both mutually advantageous 
and morally desirable.














Drawing in part from the ecosocialist account, the social interdependencies I 
have in mind make reference to concepts of alienation, exclusion, stewardship 
and ownership. We now explore these in order to formulate the principles 
underpinning an ‘ecosocial understanding of poverty’, that is, poverty understood 
as a malfunctioning of our social-natural interdependencies.
Towards an ecosocial understanding of poverty
Exclusion and alienation
The current system of property and resource ownership generates a ‘dual injustice’: 
(1)  the exclusion of the poorest from possession of, and the opportunity to 
accumulate, social wealth, and (2) the alienation of most of us from the main 
source of social wealth, that is, the resources of the natural world.
By (1), I mean what commentators on the Left have traditionally meant. Free 
market capitalism:
• condemns millions at the bottom of the income and wealth scales to poverty, 
squalor, disrespect and the inability to participate fully in their society;
• demands that we think of wealth, growth and progress largely in individualistic 
and materialistic terms, for example, as purchasing power, the consumption 
of private goods and private affluence;
• estranges social groups from one another, so that others are regarded as 
competitors for scarce resources (although this is a ‘manufactured scarcity’ 
since capitalism thrives best when people chase positional goods, as we shall 
see later in Chapter Eight).
It inhibits people from flourishing, both as individuals (capitalist societies are not 
as free as they think they are) and as members of shared, cooperative enterprises, 
nurturing relations of solidarity and mutuality away from the market’s relentless 
treadmill.
By (2) I mean that we miss the extent to which the sources of social wealth 
reside ultimately in a natural environment with which we are interdependent 
and interconnected. Modernity has encouraged us to regard nature as both an 
account to which an endless overdraft is attached and as a bin that will absorb 
anything we throw into it. Nature is constructed largely as a site of profits to be 
exploited. Stiglitz (2012, pp 212-15; see also Berners-Lee and Clark, 2013, p 93) 
highlights the extent to which we give natural resources away to corporations 
who then charge us excessive amounts for the resulting service. Paradoxically,
... among the countries with the greatest inequality are those with 
the most natural resources. (Stiglitz, 2012, p 40)
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This is less an economic rationality than an economic irrationality, yet it continues 
to dominate. Arguing against running a motorway or high-speed railway through 
areas of natural beauty is rarely done without calculating the implications 
for economic growth or national competitiveness. As such, the cost to the 
economy is invariably rated higher than those intrinsic costs that ultimately evade 
quantification. The attempt to reconcile intrinsic ecological values with laissez 
faire capitalism’s demand to endlessly expand everywhere has, not surprisingly, 
defeated even those who have approached the problem with good intentions. 
By being estranged from the natural environment to which we belong, we are 
thereby estranged from ourselves.
Therefore, an ecosocial account argues that (1) we lack an equitable distribution 
of, and sufficient control over, both socioeconomic and natural resources, and 
(2) we lack adequate synergies between socioeconomic and natural resources, such 
that (3) addressing one is counterproductive unless we also address the other. The 
implications of this for poverty debates are relatively straightforward.
Traditionally, socialists proposed that alienation implied alienation from the 
products of our labour (due to expropriation through the wage contract) and 
from each other (due to a lack of self-organisation within the workplace and a 
competitive consumerism). For socialists, then, poverty is not only a relative lack 
of money and goods, but also a deeper impoverishment and estrangement, one 
that affects poor and non-poor alike. The ecosocial starts from a similar intuition 
but emphasises more firmly that wealth is a ‘socionatural resource’ (defined 
below).8 This is why we need that paradoxical language of commodification and 
decommodification, of instrumentalist and intrinsic value. We must approximate 
the ownership and control of something that, ultimately, we can never own 
or control. This is to follow Polanyi (1957, pp 72-3) when he described land, 
labour and money as ‘fictitious commodities’. They may be fictions, but they 
are necessary fictions.
Understanding poverty therefore necessitates understanding how the 
degradation of the natural environment, caused by the untrammelled pursuit of 
wealth, impoverishes us all, alienating us from the intrinsic value of nature, and 
so excluding us from recognition of that value, an exclusion that inhibits the 
flourishing and fulfilment of human wellbeing.
The non-poor are at least more able to seek compensation for this through 
simulated activities. In short, they buy proxies for what has been lost: large 
houses, land and gardens, exclusive residential locations, convenient access to the 
countryside and wildlife, wilderness holidays and other privatised enclaves. The 
poor are those who bear the brunt of environmental injustices (inferior housing, 
inadequate heating, health and food, political disempowerment over planning 
decisions) without being able to purchase private forms of compensation.
An ecosocial approach also draws on older traditions of the common good. 
Campaigns to give people access to allotments and community gardens, the 
establishment of public parks and zoos, and granting rights-of-way across private 
land, have represented embryonic forms of socionatural distribution which, in 
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some cases, go back centuries. According to an ecosocial approach, the response 
to poverty must go further, involving universal repossession of our common 
possessions, a re-inheritance of a shared heritage.
Addressing the causes of poverty therefore requires not only the socialisation of 
natural capital, but also the ‘re-naturing’ of our economic and social institutions 
and practices. This means attending to natural realities instead of the fantasy 
economics on which free market capitalism has come to rely. The financial bubbles 
that eventually burst in 2007-08 were inflated by the view that so long as we 
make future generations rich enough to pay off the debts we are accumulating, all 
will eventually be well. But the ‘carbon bubble’ that we have created signals that 
the party is over for such assumptions (Berners-Lee and Clark, 2013). Either we 
burn all the fossil fuels available, and create levels of global warming that future 
generations cannot ‘pay off’, or we leave four-fifths of those fuels in the ground 
and must find other ways of creating and sharing wealth.
Re-naturing and socialisation
Protecting the commons is thus an ethical matter of re-socialising the economy 
and of re-naturing the social. These concepts relate to an important distinction:
• Domainship: what are we allowed and not allowed to do with nature? What 
is our domain, our legitimate sphere of action and intervention? What limits 
should we observe?
• Control and ownership: what forms of property, control and ownership should 
we prefer? What legal, political and social rules and institutions are required?
These dimensions should not be confused. Socialist forms of control and ownership 
could be environmentally destructive if, like their capitalist counterparts, they treat 
nature purely as a store of wealth to be exploited. This might be less desirable than 
a green capitalism that is more respectful than existing capitalism of ecological 
limits and values.
Re-naturing is therefore a principle of domainship. It rejects an ethos of 
‘full domainship’ in which we assume that there is no part of the world that is 
not ours to possess, control and dispose of, however we wish. That would risk 
neglecting the intrinsic value of nature. Yet nor should we adopt an ethic of ‘non-
domainship’.9 That would reflect the philosophy of non-intervention that I argued 
against above. Given the power we possess to affect the fates of non-humans, 
it is better to tie that power to an ethic of responsible intervention rather than 
imagine we can withdraw into some primitive state of pre-civilisation. In short, 
re-naturing implies an ethos of ‘partial domainship’, of self-limiting interventions 
into the natural environment to which we ourselves belong.
An ethos of partial domainship distinguishes between:
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(a) non-renewable resources we can use (even though once they are gone, they 
are gone forever);
(b) non-renewables we are not allowed to use;
(c) renewable resources that we are allowed to use if and only if such use is 
sustainable.
To this, however, we must add the respect for intrinsic value defended earlier. 
Therefore, even in the case of (a) and (c), we are not permitted to use at will. We 
are not allowed to deplete non-renewables without thorough consideration of 
the impact on other species and the natural environment. Nor are we permitted 
to use renewables without a similar assessment. It is not sufficient to cut down a 
forest one year so long as we replace it the next if, in so doing, we destroy natural 
habitats that it is beyond our capacity to renew.
An ethic of ‘qualified partial domainship’, then, is one in which we exercise 
both sovereignty and non-sovereignty over natural resources. Nature is both 
commodified in so far as we must devise ways of generating and organising social 
wealth while protecting the natural sources of that wealth. It is decommodified 
in so far as the elements of nature belong to one another organically. To alter one 
part is potentially to alter everything else. We may indeed intervene, but only 
with an overarching, respectful attendance to the interdependent web into which 
we ourselves are organically woven. Our ownership is fictitious but this, too, is a 
necessary fiction. Re-naturing therefore implies recognising the ecological bases 
of social wealth through an ethic of qualified partial domainship.
We are therefore entitled to use non-renewable resources (coal, oil, gas) if 
the long-term environmental impact can be minimised and if we do so as part 
of a rapid transition to an economy of renewable energy. The intuition here is 
one in which we are privileged to borrow the natural world, subject to certain 
conditions. We are entitled to receive the yield, the dividends, of natural assets 
if and only if we preserve the real, intrinsic value of the world as a whole. 
Arguments about peak oil, shale gas or the longevity of coal reserves risk missing 
the point of our responsibilities to the non-human: (1) a self-limiting recognition 
of the extent to which we belong to the world but do not possess it, and (2) the 
‘ethical reinvestments’ we should make to revitalise an environment that previous 
generations have degraded.
In short, we are obliged not simply to get our distributions of resources right, 
but to organise those distributions in such a way that we reconnect people to the 
natural environment on which they depend but from which they often separate 
themselves.
This takes us to the issue of socialisation. What should the socialisation of 
natural capital imply? I adopt a minimalist stance in this respect, and do not over-
prescribe the property regime implied by ‘socialisation’.10 I assume that qualified 
partial domainship implies that (1) we should not regard nature as an endlessly 
exploitable resource, and (2) it can only be used in ways conducive to the common 
wellbeing. This is to reject the laissez faire, winner-take-all approach that has long 
51
Resources
characterised our economic systems. Therefore, no system grants an absolute, 
exclusive right to dispose of a resource without reference to the environmental 
and the social consequences for the common wealth and wellbeing. Thus, in an 
ecological age, even free market capitalism must be socialised to some extent.
Imagine a group of us are stranded on a desert island, with limited access to 
food. You stumble upon a buried treasure trove of food and use your ingenuity 
to haul it out of the ground. The economic liberal might argue that you then 
have an exclusive right to dispose of that food as you wish: to sell it at extravagant 
prices or even to throw it all into the sea. An alternative is to argue that, while 
you might deserve a fee for finding and extracting the resource, because you did 
not create the food, because you were lucky in stumbling across it, and because 
the rest of us have a basic need, you do not have the right to dispose of the food 
as you wish. And if use of the extracted resource has implications for other people 
on other islands, then arguably control of that resource should be global. If use of 
that resource has implications for future generations and/or non-humans, then 
this, too, should be part of the decision-making process. (For a slightly different 
application of this example, see Fitzpatrick, 2005a.) In short, even a minimalist 
approach to socialisation implies that systems of private property should be more 
closely attuned to social contexts and ecological consequences than is permitted 
by the deregulatory mania of free market capitalism – in other words, a principle 
of stewardship.
But beyond that, we should be wary of over-generalising about which model of 
control, governance and ownership works best. As Ostrom (2012, p 70) observed:
There are certainly very important situations where people can self-
organise to manage environmental resources, but we cannot simply 
say that the community is, or is not, the best; that the government 
is, or is not, the best; or that the market is, or is not, the best. It all 
depends on the nature of the problem that we are trying to solve.
To conclude, re-naturing implies recognising the ecological bases of social wealth 
through an ethic of qualified partial domainship. Socialisation may entail the 
social ownership and control of social and natural resources but, at the very least, 
implies retuning markets to their social contexts and environmental consequences.
Poverty as an ecosocial category
Given the concepts discussed in the last section, what does ecosocial poverty 
imply?
According to the above argument, poverty represents an alienation of and 
exclusion from social wealth, which, in turn, implies an alienation of and exclusion 
from the natural sources of that wealth. This means that the environmental justice 
movement is correct: social and natural disadvantages are mutually reinforcing. To 
ensure that everyone has a decent quality of life and the opportunity to flourish, 
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therefore, measures of poverty must incorporate indicators drawn from the natural, 
the social and the intersection of both (such as access to energy, decent water, 
air, food and living environments).
All of which is to open some big issues concerning resource inequalities. For 
example, according to Kevin Cahill (2002), 69 per cent of UK land is owned by 
less than 0.6 per cent of the population, with 160,000 families, or 0.3 per cent of 
the population, owning two-thirds of British acreage (approximately 37 million 
acres). Most of Britain’s 24 million homes occupy about four million acres. We are 
in a worse position than we were before the enclosures and highland clearances 
of the 18th and 19th centuries, when 8 million acres were stolen; to this day, the 
Land Registry does not even know who owns 50 per cent of UK land (Cahill, 
2006). Land ownership is by far the most unequal form of resource ownership.
Therefore, in addition to income and wealth as traditionally understood, we 
ought to add a stock of socionatural resources. So, continuing to use land as our 
example, what matters is the:
• ownership of land;
• control of that land within the moral limits set by the relevant communities 
to which a duty of concern is owed (local, national and global; human and 
non-human; present and future generations);
• right and the opportunity to participate democratically in the relevant decision-
making process;
• capacity to flourish by developing the requisite capabilities (the obligation 
to value the intrinsic worth of land and so care for and preserve the natural 
conditions of social interaction).
If we distil each of these down, the component principles appear to be:
(a) minimum entitlements to socionatural resources and/or their commensurate 
value;
(b) property rights, as mediated by the needs and interests of relevant communities;
(c) institutions and networks permitting political voice and democratic representation;
(d) obligations to value, that is, that we recognise, care about and preserve the worth 
of nature in conjunction with other living beings (human and non-human).
In the language of the Introduction earlier, these principles are broadly distributive 
and procedural: (a) and (b) are entitlements and rights to what gets distributed, 
which, in turn, facilitates participation in the political and policy-related means 
of distribution; (c) and (d) concern procedures, but procedures that involve the 
ownership and control of key material resources and public goods.
It should be possible to take principles (a)-(d) and apply this basic framework 
to every socionatural resource. What, then, do I mean by ‘socionatural resource’?
Socionatural resources can be defined as those that exist squarely at the interface 
of the natural and social world, such that each is a condition for the production 
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of the other (Swyngedouw, 2004), and both have instrumental and intrinsic 
values.11 They denote (1) the material that humans obtain from the natural world 
and which, through transformation, enables (2) the beings and doings of social 
interaction, and eventually (3) the waste that the natural world will eventually re-
absorb and re-assemble into new forms of matter. Socionatural resources describe 
the space through which we either sustain, or fail to sustain, the interconnecting 
lives of humans and non-humans. Thus, in addition to land we might include 
energy, water, food stocks and the atmosphere as examples. For ecologists, the 
task is to revise our understanding of wealth so that we put less pressure on the 
capacity of the Earth to supply resources and to absorb the resulting waste.
Based on this concept and the above principles, we are now ready for a first, 
tentative formulation of an ecosocial understanding:
Ecosocial poverty implies falling below some decent minimum access to, ownership of 
and control over key socionatural resources due to malfunctioning social institutions and 
systems (including distributions of income and wealth). Ecosocial poverty is thus one extreme 
manifestation of wider social and environmental injustices where humans can neither 
adequately flourish qua humans nor fulfil their duties to the natural world to which they 
belong and over which they possess considerable power. Ecosocial poverty therefore implies 
inequalities in both rights (the power to command those resources that minimise vulnerability 
to ecological hazards and permit individuals and communities to adapt to climate change) 
and obligations (the capacity to care for and cultivate the intrinsic value of such resources 
so that their production, use and replacement is sustainable).
There are many questions left begging here, not all of which we will be able to 
address in the course of this book. Nonetheless, this is the basic definition that 
we will return to and develop over the next couple of chapters.
Conclusion
Our task in this chapter has been to conceptualise resources. I began by arguing 
that natural assets have not been given sufficient attention in a range of literatures 
dealing with assets, poverty and justice, and social policy. I then critiqued a 
principled justification for ecological modernisation by proposing that intrinsic 
value should be at the heart of social thinking and reforms. This was taken to imply 
that we should look beyond ecological modernisation to more radical approaches, 
albeit ones still rooted in the pragmatic need to apply economic categories and 
ideas to the natural world. This then inspired the first elements of an ecosocial 
account via a discussion of de/commodification, alienation and exclusion. This 
account argues that we lack sufficient control over socioeconomic resources and 
adequate synergies between socioeconomic and natural resources; it proposes both 
the socialisation of natural resources, and also the ‘re-naturing’ of economic and 
social relations through an ethic of ‘qualified partial domainship’. This led to the 
idea that ‘socionatural resources’ should be subject to the principles of minimum 
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entitlement, property rights, political voice and democratic representation and 
obligations to value. The chapter closed by offering a preliminary definition of 
ecosocial poverty.
Our next task is to consider concepts of space and of time in order to 
conceptualise and refine this definition further. We begin in Chapter Three 
with space.
Notes
1 ‘Economic capital’ is often called ‘human capital’, but due to my use throughout this 
book of a human/non-human distinction, I refer to ‘economic capital’ to avoid confusion.
2 However, some, like Bateman (2010, pp 201-10), deny that such measures have been 
effective. First, rather than offering an emphasis on human-centred economics, justice 
and ecological sustainability, microfinance has been driven by an economic liberal 
agenda of possessive individualism, profits and self-interest. Second, commercialisation, 
entrepreneurship and self-help have been promoted in order to alter the behaviour of the 
poor (on the assumption that social problems are caused by behavioural irresponsibility). 
In short, microfinance amounts to a ‘local economic liberalism’ in which the poor are 
seduced into becoming entrepreneurs.
3 As Ian Gough observes (private correspondence), I use the term in a broader sense than 
is usually applied, for example, green reforms to existing social, economic and political 
institutions. Here, and more broadly, ecological modernisation denotes a social philosophy 
about how humans relate to the non-human world. The pragmatic and principled 
justifications inform the view of those who believe that the ‘greening of capitalism’ is 
all we need to contemplate. In truth, as Christoff (1996) once observed, there may be 
versions of ecological modernisation that incorporate more radical social, economic 
and political changes. Whether the ecosocial approach being defended in this book is 
compatible with them is a question I leave open.
4 See also Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012, pp 139-40). For a critique of the Aristotelianism 
and republicanism they support, see Fitzpatrick (2010, 2014).
5 I am clearly bypassing big questions about the nature of sentience and the value of non-
sentient life hdfd, but see below and note 6.
6 As Nussbaum (2006, pp 361-2) observes, there is the problem here of drawing a line; 
for example, do we only treat sentient beings as moral agents? If there were no more 
humans or non-humans after your death, would you still have an obligation to respect 
the forests? See the brief discussion of anthropocentrism in the next paragraph.
7 I am not sure what to call someone who would support (1).
8 Now that I am about to use the term ‘socionatural’ more frequently, it is time to state 
that it and the ‘ecosocial’ are similar, but the terms capture slightly different emphases. 
The ecosocial highlights the ecological nature of that which has to date largely been 
defined through social frames, for example, poverty. The socionatural highlights the 
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social nature of that which has to date largely been defined through natural frames, for 
example, land or air. The concepts are therefore practically synonymous but, given their 
genesis, I think a slight variation in terminology is warranted and shouldn’t be confusing.
9 The classic statement against all forms of property can be found in Proudhon (1994, 
pp 51, 66, 73), although he also expresses something close to my position when he 
distinguishes between property in products and property in raw materials and the natural 
means of production (Proudhon, 1994, pp 84-94).
10 My own politics is one that makes considerable room for social ownership, and in many 
countries this is what socialisation will imply. But an ecosocial approach is not only a 
distinct political position (see Table 5.1 if you want a sneak preview); it is also that which 
attempts to alter the terms of the debate across the political spectrum. We need to appeal 
not only to socialists and social democrats, but also to social liberals, social conservatives 
and to those who don’t see themselves or the world through political eyes at all. So, just 
as an ecosocial politics is more than green social democracy (see the Introduction earlier), 
it is more than ecosocialism too.
11 For a longer, more nuanced account, see Schuppert (2012, pp 218-23), although this 





Socionatural resources occupy geographical space. They take up space, border space 
and interact with space. But those resources are social, too, in that they must be used 
and exchanged within a system of social relations. The meaning and significance of 
any resource alters according to the distributive in/equalities and stratifications of 
the social system to which it belongs. Which is to say that since all social systems 
are structural, enduring across time and shaping the lives and opportunities of 
social agents, resources are structural too. Resources both structure and are structured 
by the spaces of social relations. Thus, while resources are distributed between 
individuals, it is also the case that individuals are distributed between resources.
Like socionatural resources, then, space represents an interface of the physical 
on the one hand, and the social on the other. As a result, the concept of space is 
necessarily open, dynamic, contested and, indeed, political.
To make sense of this, and its significance for the concept of poverty, we begin 
by reviewing various literatures dealing with space: social policy and environmental 
sociology. We then apply key elements of these debates in order to develop the 
definition given at the end of Chapter Two.
Social policy
Social policy is also spatial policy. Space affects, and is affected by, the delivery 
and regulation of services and the experiences of service users. Research into 
health, housing and labour markets often makes this clear, in relation to urban/
rural boundaries, for instance (see, for example, Woods, 2006). Furthermore, 
in an era of global social policy, welfare services resemble ‘nested systems’ that 
stretch across several spatial borders.
From Booth and Rowntree onwards, it has long been understood that poverty 
has significant geographical dimensions (see, for example, Coates and Silburn, 
1970; Townsend, 1979, Chapter 14). Within any particular territory there will 
be inequalities in access to decent housing, schools, shops, transport and other 
facilities necessary for social participation, quality of life and self-esteem. At 
the same time, the composition of a place – its wealth and distributions of that 
wealth – will be shaped by its relation to other relevant places. In short, social-
spatial inequalities are both intra- and inter-territorial. But what do we mean 
by ‘relevant places’?
The difficulty is that the meaning of territory and place is always evolving. 
Over the last century we have shifted from an imperial era, to a Cold War era, 
and then to a hyperconnected, post-national world of multiple axes (dominated 
by free market capitalism) in which globalities and localities infuse one other. It 
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sometimes seems we can no longer easily relate what happens inside a territory 
to what happens outside it, as our very notions of internal and external are highly 
mutable.1 Spaces and places are permanently coalescing and dissolving.
The natural environment adds another complicating dimension. We belong 
to the natural world as organisms who eat, sleep, defecate, fuck, and eventually 
decay; yet we are also the bearers of particular social and cultural contexts. In 
one respect, nature seems to stabilise what we mean by place, as rivers, woods, 
oceans, deserts and hills provide natural borders, yet boundary-drawing is always 
a socially constructed activity (Massey and Denton, 1993). Natural places, too, 
may be simultaneously solid and yet mutable.
If the social, spatial and natural pervade one another, therefore, how might we 
understand poverty?
Dorling’s maps
One method cuts straight through this complexity. We might conceptualise a 
territory based on existing governmental practices, for example, local authorities, 
wards, parliamentary constituencies, postcodes, and so forth. Each area can then 
be studied through the lens of multiple indicators of deprivation, including 
environmental ones. Those households living close to busy roads, and having less 
access to parks and gardens, are more likely to suffer from air pollution (Mitchell 
and Dorling, 2003; Pearce and Kingham, 2008).
The work of social geographer Danny Dorling (2011, Chapters 5-6; 2012, 
Chapters 4, 29, 36, 37, 40; see also Dorling and Ballas, 2008) provides invaluable 
maps of such socio-spatial deprivation.
Dorling et al (2007, p 31) show that UK poverty tends to be concentrated 
in central London, the North of England, Wales and Scotland. The dispersal of 
poverty became less concentrated during the 1970s but, as overall poverty levels 
began to rise again in the 1980s, such concentrations reappeared in the form of 
‘urban clusters’ that were highly pronounced, a polarisation that has subsequently 
continued. Thomas and Dorling (2007, pp 294-6) confirm the bipolar nature of 
geographical advantage in contemporary Britain, one that has effectively returned 
us to the 1930s. This contrasts with the bell-shaped distribution of the 1940s-1960s 
when there were more ‘in-between’ neighbourhoods establishing a continuum 
between rich and poor, and so a feeling of shared fate and common purpose. By 
the final decades of the 20th century, that bell-curve had split into two peaks, a 
bifurcation not only of assets but also of life chances and opportunities in which 
two parallel social worlds increasingly fail to inhabit a shared moral and cultural 
space of mutual respect and understanding.
This suggests something of a ‘multiplier effect’, where the dis/advantages of 
geographical separation are magnified the longer they persist (Dorling, 2010, 
pp  116-24). Once the best schools and the most expensive neighbourhoods 
are monopolised, they stay monopolised by being inherited from generation to 
generation. Thus, reversing the effects of sociospatial deprivation becomes harder 
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the longer relative dis/advantages remain entrenched. Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2010, Chapter 5) research confirms 
that there is a strong link between inequality and a lack of social mobility. The 
Marmot Review (2010) and the National Equality Panel (2010) showed that 
among adults in the most deprived 10 per cent of areas in England, 30 per cent 
had no qualifications at all and fewer than 8 per cent had degrees. In the richest 
10 per cent of areas, these figures were reversed.
Dorling and Thomas (2011, Chapter 6) have also mapped ecological factors 
in the form of transportation, domestic and industrial pollutants. Thus, by the 
time children are 10 years of age, cars are the greatest environmental risk faced by 
them; and cars obviously cause higher levels of air pollution in cities, especially 
in those areas where a lack of green spaces means that pollutants take longer to 
disperse. UK children from poorer communities are five times more likely to 
be killed in road accidents than children from more affluent communities; and 
half of all carcinogenic emissions occur in the top 20 per cent of deprived wards 
(Adebowale, 2008, p 263). Domestic pollution (from the heating of homes) offers 
a double whammy. The incomes of the poorest are the most adversely affected 
by rising prices, and remain the most susceptible to the resulting pollution. And 
the poorest households are the most likely to live near industrial sites and plants 
that affluent individuals can afford to avoid.2
Nuances of place
Yet such ‘God’s eye’ maps may miss significant ‘ground-level’ nuances. As Powell 
and Boyne (2001) suggest, not all spatial inequality is necessarily bad, just as not 
all spatial equality is necessarily good. Much depends on local circumstances 
and local autonomy. That said, we might be advised to supplement a broad-brush 
approach rather than abandon it. If there are long-term patterns in the degree of 
spatial equalisation or segregation, then, subject to further examination, we are 
entitled to treat these as prima facie evidence that something capable of overriding 
local circumstance and autonomy is at work.
Within this context, many researchers make a distinction between the following 
types of poverty (Room, 1995; Flaherty et al, 2004, Chapter 9; Lister, 2004, 
pp 69-72; Spicker, 2007, Chapter 5; see also Alcock, 2006, pp 151-3, Chapter 16):
… people poverty occurs where low-income people occupy certain 
parts of a city by virtue of their low income, but their money incomes 
are not low because of where they live. On the other hand, place poverty 
emerges when other benefits or penalties compound the advantages or 
disadvantages of particular groups by virtue of where they live. (Powell 
et al, 2001, p 247; emphasis added)
First, ‘people poverty’ implies forms of concentration (where households are 
more likely to cluster together with other households at similar levels of wealth), 
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segregation (in which clusters are socially and spatially divided from each 
other) and polarisation (in which those segregations intensify over time). As 
neighbourhoods drift apart, so it becomes less likely that their inhabitants will 
share the same experiences, opportunities and ambitions.
The US has long typified this process. Sociologists such as Davis (1990) and 
Wilson (1987) highlighted the way in which, through a malign interaction of 
individual choice, social conditions and punitive social policies, urban spaces 
bifurcated into dual ghettoes of affluence and poverty, each of them no-go areas 
for outsiders. Poor spaces are then policed and surveilled to ensure that the 
pressures of poverty are internalised onto the poor themselves and do not erupt 
into the public sphere (Wacquant, 2009). And when riots do occur – such as in 
Los Angeles in 1992, or London in 2011 – efforts are made to depoliticise the 
eruption by representing it as simple criminality.
Second, ‘place poverty’ captures the extent to which locations take on distinct 
characteristics in terms of transport links, leisure facilities, housing, medical 
services, schools, shops and basic design (Hanley, 2007). These characteristics 
then affect the opportunities of those living there, with those on low incomes 
being disadvantaged because of where they live. Living in inadequate housing 
without good shops nearby may exacerbate levels of stress and anxiety that affects 
health and so intensifies the other problems that people in such areas face, for 
example, it reduces the capacity to take the jobs that are in short supply anyway. 
Poor resources lead to poor spaces, which, in turn, exacerbate the quantity and 
quality of the public and private goods available (Power et al, 2011, Chapter 4).
The people/place distinction is one on which social ecologists have long drawn 
(see, for example, Gunter and Kroll-Smith, 2007, Chapter 5). ‘Environmental 
injustice’ captures the notion that environmental problems have disproportionate 
impacts on low-income communities and other disadvantaged groups (Cutter 
and Solecki, 2006; Walker, 2010, 2012). Since income determines the quality 
and location of the housing a person can rent or purchase, those who can afford 
to will tend to live away from major roads, industrial sites and other sources of 
pollution. Inhabiting poorer areas will often exert adverse effects on physical 
wellbeing (due to the consequences of pollution for respiratory systems, for 
example) and mental wellbeing (since an undesirable lived environment may 
aggravate feelings of stress, confinement and despair). Those effects will exacerbate 
the range of disadvantages that characterise poverty and make it that much harder 
for individuals to leave such circumstances. And, as Schlosberg (2007) argued (see 
Chapter One), this interaction of ‘people’ and ‘place’ is not just about distribution, 
but about participatory recognition and voice (we return to this point later).
The people/place distinction suggests that space is not merely something that 
contains resources, but is itself a resource such that those who are disempowered 
by social structures are ‘spatially deprived’ in two senses: deprived within space 
and deprived by space. This recognition helped drive the anti-poverty measures 
during the period of New Labour, with its area-based initiatives and strategies 
for neighbourhood renewal (for an analysis of health-related initiatives, see 
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Sullivan et al, 2006). The association of poverty with place may often reinforce 
the problem, for example, those living in certain areas may have to pay higher 
insurance premiums because high crime statistics suggest that the risk to the 
insurer is greater. But even well-motivated government initiatives, by parachuting 
in experts and agencies from ‘outside’, may reinforce the perception of some 
areas as lacking the capacity to organise things for themselves.
So, although people poverty and place poverty should not be confused,3 they 
clearly intersect. Not only do people define the places they occupy, places come 
to define their inhabitants – what they mean to themselves and their value (or 
lack of) to others in other places (Sibley, 1995, pp 55-9). Space is a resource 
that distributes individuals across itself. Individuals are shaped not only by the 
territories in which they live and work, but also by perceptions of those territories, 
their sense of where they do and do not belong. The inter-territorial nature of 
spatial inequality means that those who are living in more affluent areas get to 
define the worth of low-income neighbourhoods. The prevailing underclass 
discourse of ‘sick estates’ and ‘chavs’ collapses people and place into a sense that 
some individuals and groups are inherently dangerous because they embody 
those zones that are perilous and risky (Jones, 2011). Personal characteristics and 
situational circumstances are merged, with the poor constructed as wild, feral 
outsiders, barely distinguishable from wastelands, urban wilderness and no-go 
areas (Davis, 1998).4
In my own city, Nottingham, some estates are physically close to commercial 
and business districts and yet effectively occupy a different social world. St Ann’s 
is adjacent to the city centre but a world away from it, characterised by high 
unemployment and high crime rates, and stigmatised both locally and nationally, 
such that ‘social problems’ becomes code for ‘problem families’ who have 
supposedly excluded themselves from ‘normal’ society. A former doctoral student 
of mine would report that for some living in St Ann’s, a trip to our university 
campus of only a few miles was like going on holiday.
McKenzie (2009) also stresses how and why the face we present to the world, to 
represent what we are, is contrasted by what we are not. To go from one territory 
into another may involve forms of concealment (in which you dress and behave 
in ways designed to disguise your origins and appear as non-threatening) or of 
stridency (in which you proclaim your difference in order to occupy the alter-
territory and reshape it to yourself). Within the home territory, some people 
internalise the stigma while some construct forms of local pride and association 
– new ways of being an insider, where it is the well-off who become outsiders. 
Either way, feelings of otherness frequently persist, as do the socioeconomic 
inequalities that generated them. The worth of the affluent is maintained by 
keeping a social and symbolic distance from the worth-less.
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Relational social spaces
As Lister (2004, p 69) says, then, ‘geography both contributes to and mediates 
poverty.’ Available income and assets will determine where that household is 
located; in turn, locations will themselves contribute to the distribution of 
socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages. The growth in poverty levels since 
the 1970s represents a spatial re-segregation following the post-Second World 
War experiment in egalitarian universalism (also Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, 
pp 162-3). In the era of social and local authority housing, households with 
differing occupations and incomes were more likely to share the same kind of 
neighbourhoods and communal facilities. But with the explosion in owner-
occupation, the evisceration of social housing and the rise of the private rented 
sector (and private rents), the housing market has both reflected and helped to 
drive the rise in UK inequalities. Affluent parents can effectively ‘buy proximity’ 
to the best schools (‘selection by estate agent’) (Leech and Campos, 2003).
None of which is surprising to those who advance relative explanations of 
poverty and exclusion. Indeed, this is a fairly tepid word that allows its critics to 
dismiss unequal social conditions as merely relative. For conservatives, if ‘relative 
social position’ does not matter, the agency of those on low incomes is substantially 
the same as those on affluent incomes; their poverty can then be safely attributed 
to laziness, lax morals and malfunctioning cultures (Mead, 1997).
But relative conceptions are, more properly speaking, relational ones in which 
physically distant spaces interpenetrate socially and symbolically (Harvey, 1996, 
pp 261-4).5 This means not only that what happens here affects what happens 
there, but that the value of a territory – both to its inhabitants and to outsiders 
– is intimately associated with its comparator groups. In a country like the UK, 
whose wealth has long been dependent on house prices, this is what can make 
boundary changes, housing developments and other construction projects such a 
politically charged issue. Geographical space is always symbolic of how we view 
ourselves in relation to how we view others.
The polarisation of space within the UK has made it easier for the non-poor 
to dismiss poverty as a self-inflicted wound committed by those from whom they 
are morally and culturally dissimilar. With this increase in symbolic and economic 
distances, there has also been a moral estrangement.6 Those who are not like me 
are other, possessing an inferior status. Those who inhabit or travel through the 
same territory as me can nevertheless appear as trespassers, or squatters, occupying 
a space they haven’t really earned. Thus, citizenship rights atrophy, becoming 
highly conditional on the repeated performance of duties – defined by affluent 
individuals’ image of themselves as hard working, rather than the lucky recipients 
of inherited advantages – to prove one is deserving (Kahneman, 2011, pp 199-
201, 216). So what conservatives attribute to human nature is really a reflection of 
the moral alienations and estrangements deriving from socioeconomic priorities, 
political decision-making and cultural constructions.
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The following makes clear that this ‘relational’ analysis is suited to sociological 
and ecological critiques that emphasise the extent to which natural and social 
spaces are mutually interactive.
Environmental sociology
Before dealing with environmental sociology, the centrality of space to climate 
science should be noted, the most famous contribution being the ‘ecological 
footprint’ (Agyeman, 2013, pp 46-54, Chapter 3 passim). The ecological footprint 
initially referred to the size of the ‘hinterland’ needed to support an industry or 
population. Generalised, it refers to the amount of capacity needed to support 
humanity as a whole. In popular and media accounts this is sometimes expressed as 
the number of Earth-like planets we would need to sustain our present production 
and consumption habits, or as that point in the calendar year when humanity 
begins to exceed the ‘carrying capacity’ of the Earth:
If everyone in the world wanted to live like people in the UK … we 
would need over three planets like the earth and head into deficit in 
early April. (Simms, 2009, p 215)
The genesis of such thinking arguably tracks back to Malthus’s (2004) belief 
that population growth inevitably outstrips the supply of food. If there were 
ample food and space, then life forms would fill millions of worlds in just a few 
millennia, he observed. But in the absence of such surplus, nature ‘checks’ the 
growth of populations by effectively killing off those who cannot find enough 
food to survive. This idea directly influenced Darwin’s (1887, p 83) formulation 
of ‘natural selection’, in which those life forms most suited to their environments 
thrive and evolve accordingly.
Not surprisingly, Malthus and Darwin have been interpreted (by critics, but 
also some supporters) as thereby facilitating a brutal social ethic. Malthusianism, 
they say, must propose that starvation, epidemics and destitution are welcome 
means for dispensing with what Dickens satirically referred to in A Christmas carol 
as the ‘surplus population’; Darwinism must advocate a ‘survival of the fittest’ in 
which beings compete against and kill one another.
Yet such interpretations easily mislead. In later editions of his Essay on the 
principle of population, Malthus (2004, p 128) acknowledged that population growth 
could be brought under control through ‘moral restraint’ and thus reconcile two 
desiderata:
... a great actual population and a state of society in which abject 
poverty and dependence are comparatively but little known; two 
objects which are far from being incompatible.
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And for Darwin, humans have developed moral instincts, kinship relations and 
social-cultural structures through which cooperation can be effected (Fitzpatrick, 
2005b, pp 116-21; 2008a, pp 17-21).
In short, ecological space is continually reshaped by social practices. The 
ecological footprint, then, is more than a statistic generated by number-crunching 
scientists. If our moral judgements, social practices and political interventions 
matter, the footprint is not set in stone, being as much a social and qualitative 
category as it is a scientific and quantitative one. This idea of the footprint as being 
both solid and yet fluid, both fixed and yet flexible, is a particular instance of the 
contribution that environmental sociology has made to attempts to understand 
the interweaving of the ecological and the social.
Space is a central sociological concept (Scott, 2006, pp 158-63). Beck (2002), 
Bauman (2000), Castells (1999) and Giddens (1991, pp 16-27) all suggest that 
space has disconnected from localities, spreading along diverse geometries. 
Boundedness has melted, to be replaced by movements and networks that are 
always multidimensional and always changing. People still seek sites of stability, 
community and solidarity, but those sites are ‘social mirages’, forever being 
dissolved and recombined. In short, the predictabilities, certainties and regularities 
that formally characterised space have been replaced by indeterminacy, randomness 
and volatility.
For these authors, inequalities and stratifications are subject to similar tectonics, 
such that simplified models of hierarchies and structures no longer apply. Family 
background, class and gender, and so on still matter, but what they mean and 
how they manifest themselves is far more complex than was once imagined.
Where does nature fit into the picture? For Eckersley (2004, pp  122-6), 
there is a ‘pre-discursive nature’, but one that we can only understand through 
a shared, critical discourse; for Beck (1999, pp 145-8), there is no such thing 
as nature ‘in the raw’, for how can nature be encountered except through the 
social understandings of those encountering it? Whatever the subtleties at work 
in such debates, environmental sociology has reintroduced sociologists to the 
‘givenness’ of nature, that is, the extent to which nature may form a distinct 
yet interdependent material substance that causes and shapes social productions 
(Hannigan, 2006, pp 29-35).
If there is a degree of consensus here, it arguably resides in the acknowledgement 
that nature imposes limits on what humans can do, twinned with a view that 
those limits are not necessarily fixed and immutable but are always reconfigured 
by social practices and economic developments. (This notion of ‘flexible limits’ 
is one that I invoke below.) Society mediates the natural and nature mediates the 
social (Irwin, 2001). The nature we encounter is never untouched by human 
hands as there is no longer any primordial wilderness, but it is nature and not just 
another social production, representation or simulation. Inevitably, then, social-
ecological relations are deeply symbiotic (see Dunlap and Catton, 2002; for a 
useful review of other key literatures, see Manuel-Navarrete and Redclift, 2010).
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David Harvey and John Urry
For illustrations of how we might understand that symbiosis, take the work of 
David Harvey and John Urry.
According to Harvey (1996, pp 150-7; 2000, p 177), free markets have left 
us with both spatial inequalities and ecological degradation. The free market 
represents a fetishism of ‘process’ in which the means (monetary exchange, market 
contracts, profit-making) always justify the ends. Capital constructs whatever 
social and geographical landscape it needs in order to function, and then destroys 
those landscapes again (and again and again). In this way, new opportunities and 
needs are created, and the cycle of capital accumulation is kept in a devouring, 
perpetual state of motion. As Marx and Engels observed, it creates a world after 
its own protean and self-consuming image (Marx, 1977, pp 224-5).
This is why social politics has to be ecological and ecological politics has to 
be social:
The concept of sustainability ... points to spatiotemporal horizons 
different from those of capital accumulation. (Harvey, 2000, p 194; 
see also pp 221-3)
These horizons require mediating institutions that will facilitate (1) risk prevention 
and reduction, and (2) the restoration and control of resources, ‘in which the 
working class, the disempowered, and the marginalised take a leading role’ (Harvey, 
2000, pp 223, 241-4; see also 1996, pp 434-8). This would be a new utopianism 
of both process and space. For Harvey, the utopia of process implies democratic 
processes that regulate and limit the operation of market forces; the utopia of 
space implies a socialisation and (in my vocabulary) the re-naturing of capital.
Echoes of Harvey’s position can be found in the recent publications of John 
Urry.
Urry (2011, pp 50-2) advocates what he calls a ‘post-carbon sociology’. By 
being ‘carbon-blind’ sociology has failed to fully comprehend the resource and 
energy bases of social and economic life (cf Foster, 1999). Capitalism alienates 
us from natural environments and social processes by annihilating space in favour 
of time. It liberates people from the restrictive geographies of feudalism, but 
eventually sets them adrift in a world that lacks solidity and stability. Nature comes 
to be mastered by the interdependent systems of movement that occur ‘over, 
under and across it’. High carbon systems came to dominate capitalist practices 
due to the 20th-century hegemony of the US: electric power generation, cars 
and oil-based infrastructures, suburban housing, commuting and consumption, 
networked and mobile technologies.
So, throughout the last century, the scale and speed of our work, leisure and 
family relationships involved the elongation and urbanisation of social space, in 
a metabolism that requires us to live increasingly ‘beyond neighbourhood’ (Urry, 
2011, pp 55-9, 63-76). Places become defined by the physical and symbolic 
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distances between them. The modern self is always a mobile self, where we 
constantly track and are tracked by others:
… high carbon lives involve much movement beyond neighbourhood, 
because of fast-moving objects, signs and people. (Urry, 2011, p 58)
Like Bauman (1998, p 113), Urry is suggesting that immobility becomes a form 
of exclusion so that, unless we are constantly on the move (upwardly mobile, 
productive, touristic, networked, fully downloaded and updated), we risk being 
left behind. Economic liberal capitalism engenders this feverish, positional 
competition in which the solution to the frustrations created by movement is 
always more movement.
Urry’s (2011, Chapter 9) preferred solution is a ‘resource capitalism’, in which 
space is reinvented as natural and localised space. He rejects the view of those 
who would establish a green society on isolated eco-communities, but anticipates 
that a post-economic liberal era would have to address social inequalities by 
allowing the greater communalisation of life, work and leisure based on denser 
neighbourhoods. But such a social restructuring would be dependent on, and 
would therefore accompany, the continued digitalisation and virtualisation of 
space since, to put it simply, if you want less physical travel, then people will have 
to access better forms of virtual travel. Resource capitalism would therefore be 
low carbon and smart-tech.
For both Harvey and Urry, then, free market capitalism has ‘de-socialised’ 
systems of production, distribution and consumption. The task now is to re-
socialise these systems and to ensure that this is compatible with ecological 
imperatives.
Ecosocial poverty revisited
How might such insights influence our understanding of poverty?
Harvey and Urry both suggest that a green society requires new connections 
between process and space. For Harvey, the former implies a democratic dialogue 
and openness that is never finalised but always receptive to new developments, 
while the latter demands an equalisation of the resources that determine the 
opportunities and life course of different social groups. For Urry, process refers to 
practices of digitisation and technological innovation that surmount geographical 
distances, while space refers to the communal densities needed for sustainable 
production, transportation and consumption.
On both accounts, what is process and what is space, what is fluid and what 
is solid, is never finalised. Each morphs into the other. As such, a green society 
has to be constantly remaking itself as a response to the ever-changing and often 
unpredictable effects of human interventions into the natural environment. The 
givenness of natural space collides with the indeterminacy, randomness and 
volatility of social space. The notions of symbiosis and metabolism capture this idea 
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that socionatural interdependencies are never fixed and frozen. The institutions, 
networks and relations of a green society therefore have to be correspondingly 
resilient (Adger et al, 2011).
A green society, in short, has both to reconcile itself to natural limits while 
enabling its citizens to cope with instabilities emanating from the interactions 
of society and nature. This means not simply trying to diminish the shocks to 
the ecosystem that global warming is producing, through policies of mitigation 
and adaptation; it means that mitigation and adaptation are themselves sources 
of uncertainty that may create unintended consequences to which we have to 
respond rapidly and pragmatically. We need to live within our resources and 
distribute those resources such that individuals and communities are empowered 
to cope with ever-evolving uncertainties. We need to construct ‘institutional 
shock-absorbers’ so that the impacts of society on nature and nature on society 
can be managed imaginatively and quickly. The quality of social relations are 
woven into the texture of our natural world just as, reciprocally, the natural world 
can only thrive if the socioeconomic system it supplies is attuned to its needs.
Take the recent proposal for redistributive ‘personal carbon allowances’ (PCAs). 
The idea is to reduce overall carbon use by setting personal quotas while boosting 
the incomes of the poorest because, as those typically with low net emissions, the 
more affluent would only be able to feed their carbon habit by buying permits 
from the poorest (Hansen, 2009, pp 209-21; Seyfang et al, 2009). Such a system is 
only workable via highly complex technological systems, but the central principle 
is sound as a solution to the following dilemma: low-income households in the 
UK occupy too little social space, in the sense that they are spatially deprived 
relative to others, yet as inhabitants of the developed world, they disproportionately 
contribute to an ecological footprint which is unsustainable.
The main defect with this proposal is that it would be a consumerist, end-of-
the-pipe solution that emphasises private incentives and self-interest. If to such 
policy agendas we add Schlosberg’s emphasis on participatory recognition and 
voice in a public context of shared power and responsibilities, we end up with 
the view that sustainability is not simply a technocratic question of outcomes 
(applying quotas, hitting targets, conserving supplies), but of inputs, that is, 
ensuring that those whose fate is at stake have the greatest possible say in how 
social and natural resources are governed. If so, this notion of voice also has to 
make room for non-human interests and the representation of future generations 
in democratic processes.
Sustainability, therefore, means both living within nature’s limits and shaping 
nature so that ‘living within limits’ implies serving the widest possible range of 
human and non-human interests, across both present and future. It must straddle 
both private and public interests. From what has been said in Chapters One and 
Two and earlier in this chapter, let me speculate what this may imply regarding 
poverty.
The more poverty there is, the less effective any shock absorbers will be. Anti-
poverty policies, in fact, constitute one of the fundamental shock absorbers that 
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we need. Our efforts to effect environmental sustainability will be compromised 
if measures to address the causes and symptoms of poverty are not made. Unless 
people participate on roughly equal terms – sharing the burdens of climate change 
equitably in a society of mutual respect – on fulfilling the tasks of mitigation 
and adaptation, those tasks are less likely to be fulfilled effectively. And unless 
people are empowered to occupy more of their lives with something other than 
the acquisitive materialism of disposable, private goods, transition to a green 
society of public goods, mutual recognition, shared responsibilities and long-term 
sustainability becomes harder. The more we obsess about personal wealth, the 
more alienated from the ultimate sources of prosperity and wellbeing we risk 
becoming. This possessive individualism is bound together with the inequalities 
and social-moral distancing that disadvantages and devalues those on the lowest 
incomes, as people scramble against one another for vital but scarce positional 
goods (see Chapter Eight, later).
Therefore, in terms of the themes of this particular chapter, ecosocial poverty 
implies lacking an acceptable level of the resources found at the interface of social 
and natural spaces. It implies being spatially disadvantaged by those socionatural 
resources, being especially vulnerable to new uncertainties and volatilities and 
being excluded from the social processes (the economic and democratic decision-
making) that are reshaping nature and through which more robust, sustainable 
solutions must be developed.
In order to equip ourselves with a model needed to make sense of the topics 
in later chapters, let us now relate this approach to where we left off at the end 
of Chapter Two.
Ecospatial deprivation
The end of Chapter Two stated that ecosocial poverty denotes exclusion from 
social wealth and alienation from socionatural resources. It outlined four principles:
• minimum entitlements
• property rights
• political voice and democratic representation
• obligations to value.
How might these relate to the preceding discussion?
If space is that which both contains resources and which is itself a resource, 
then poverty also implies social-spatial deprivations in which one is alienated and 
excluded within space (kept at a distance from, and therefore deprived of, the goods 
one needs to live a decent life) and by space (estranged from the very places one 
inhabits). It therefore involves distributive disadvantages and a reduced ability to 
control the places one occupies. And if nature, society and space are symbiotic, 
then to lack sufficient socionatural resources means being ecosocial-spatially deprived. 
What I refer to as ‘ecospatial deprivation’ for convenience implies the following:
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(1) Not possessing enough space. In one sense this means that the poorer you are, 
the less living space you will typically possess (Ramesh, 2012). As a glance 
at any estate agent’s window tells us, extra bedrooms mean extra cost. House 
values and rents usually decrease according to a familiar scale: from detached 
houses to semis to terraces to flats/apartments. The more floor and garden 
space a home offers, the more expensive it will generally be. Although regional 
circumstances can introduce complexities, the essential picture remains.
Quantitative space matters because, to possess autonomy, individuals 
and families need personal spaces, areas of peace and privacy away from 
the ‘madding crowd’. To relate properly to others in a community or 
neighbourhood – to share some of our space with them – we need to feel 
they are not crowding in on us. To maintain physical and mental health, we 
need to avoid the reduced living space that can adversely affect sleep. To 
develop cultural capital and fulfil their potential, children need space to do 
homework and to read.
(2) Not having sufficient mobility across space. Although some city centre properties 
belie the point, by and large the most expensive places also tend to be those 
far from congested spaces: the suburbs, the commuter towns, the villages 
really only accessible by car. Transportation and housing costs effectively lock 
those on low incomes out of such places (see Chapters Eight and Nine). 
And even within their own localities, to afford transportation, the poorest 
either have to divert money away from other basic necessities, or they have to 
severely ration their transportation and so immobilise themselves, effectively 
imprisoned within open spaces.
Ironically, these spatial patterns can sometimes immobilise the affluent 
too, especially when compounded by inadequate investment in public 
transport and infrastructure – illustrating how affluent people gain from social 
inequalities less often than they imagine.7 Road congestion, high fares and 
overcrowded trains all suggest that the spatial distances bought by high incomes 
can eat into the time available to enjoy them. Yet a politics of sociospatial 
segregation prevails. Public solutions that benefit all communities have been 
shown to work, for example, London’s Congestion Charge, but they are 
always vulnerable to a backlash by those promoting privatised solutions to 
collective action problems.
(3) Not inhabiting valued spaces. The above elements (‘quantity’ and ‘mobility’) 
combine to suggest that some spaces are more economically and symbolically 
valuable than others. Affluent households will typically be closer to the best 
schools, facilities, transport links and parks, and have greater access to the 
countryside. The best spaces are those exclusive spaces that allow the affluent 
to keep their distance from, while still being able to compare themselves to, 
the less well-off. The type of space you occupy, and the type of ‘spatial tribe’ 
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to which you belong, is a sign of your worth because social space is what 
occupies you. Devalued space equates to devalued people.
And recall that the environmental justice movement has long translated this 
idea of spatial devaluation into ecological terms (see above). If green spaces 
have therapeutic value – aiding physical health, mental health and social 
relations (Juniper, 2013, pp 246-54; see also Walker, 2012, pp 173-7) – then 
their absence compounds other social problems.
(4) Not being able to control spaces. Spatial deprivation therefore involves multiple 
disempowerments in which space inhibits and restrains. Living in deprived 
areas reduces access to good jobs and wages. Being from a place already marks 
one out as being more or less than others, leading to divergent feelings of 
esteem and status. Stigmatised places are those in which social networks are 
already assumed to be threadbare or malfunctioning. Social problems are 
individualised in a downward spiral by being attributed to problem estates, 
problem streets within those estates, and problem families within those streets.
Such disempowerments inevitably also involve political disempowerment. 
To lack space in terms of quantity, mobility and value is already to lack 
the political voice needed to make a difference, to succumb to the feeling 
that things cannot change. Socioeconomic inequalities are always political 
inequalities. Even well-meaning attempts to target money at ‘problem places’, 
and to parachute in experts from public and voluntary agencies, may only 
exacerbate such obstacles by reinforcing stereotypes in which the well-off 
think they always ‘know best’ by virtue of their being well-off. And when 
the state is associated with bureaucracies operating according to complex 
rules about which one has little understanding, let alone control, managed 
by powerful and seemingly unaccountable officials – the police officer, the 
social worker, the benefits officer – it is then difficult to engage and consult 
in a genuine spirit of reciprocity and cooperation. The resentful teenager 
in a ‘sink estate’, facing a bleak future of few opportunities, already knows 
more about social power than any politician preaching the virtues of hard 
work and ‘playing by the rules’.
(5) Not adequately recognising that space is always shared. The inequalities creating 
such disempowerments also create various social disconnections. For the 
affluent, social space is highly commodified, judged according to house 
prices and equity in a society in which state pensions have withered. For the 
disadvantaged, taking pride in one’s space becomes harder and can manifest 
as a form of embattlement against a hostile world. Both cases are dissociative, 
constructing values against a background of deep social divisions.
It is hardly surprising, then, that social disconnections accompany natural 
disconnections in which people neglect the ecological foundations of their 
social spaces and their effects on them (Dominelli, 2012, Chapter 3). Natural 
space, too, becomes commodified (‘my garden’, ‘my tree’), and so detached 
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from the multifarious webs of the ecosystem. A piece of ground is treated as 
passive, an object of exchange one either can or cannot afford to own. For 
the affluent, it is unit of possession; for the disadvantaged, it is a further sign 
of exclusion, of what cannot be possessed. In neither case is the true value 
of the ground fully recognised: the water it contains, its subsoil minerals and 
nutrients, its micro-organisms, the breaking down of dead matter, its store 
of carbon, its role within the hydrologic cycle (Juniper, 2013, pp 27-35).
Our marketised and individualised cultures cannot cope with the extent 
to which social and natural spaces are collective pools in which we all swim, 
where the buoyancy and hygiene of the water depends on the wellbeing of 
all those with whom we share it.
(6) Not caring for shared space. And if space is not perceived as shared, then why 
bother caring for it? The bits of land I own or that I live near have an 
immediacy that is denied to ‘nature’ as such. I can object to the wind farm 
that would spoil my view and needn’t worry about the impact fossil fuels 
have on the natural environment. If something does not belong to me, then I 
can leave it to others. If a space lacks value, familiarity and obvious relevance 
to me, then I may not recognise myself as belonging to it.
But if we wish people to care, exhortation it is not enough. If people are to 
be asked to use power responsibly, power has to be distributed fairly. People 
with resources may lack the time and motivation to direct them in favour 
of those, human and non-human, who are vulnerable to its exercise. Those 
with few resources may possess the requisite motivations but not the power 
to realise them. Although you may recognise your place within the web of 
social and natural interdependencies, you are prevented from participating 
fully in their continuing and mutual evolution, not being able to protect and 
nurture the places to which you belong and on which you are dependent.
In this account of ecospatial deprivation I have clearly made reference to land and 
housing but, with appropriate adaption, they relate to all socionatural resources, 
as we shall see in later chapters. In terms of energy, for instance:
(1) and (2) the affordability of energy, that is, the supply of energy made 
available to us ultimately through the extractions from, and transformation 
of, natural space;
(3) the effects energy prices have on the spending of different households and 
so on their status regarding relative income and social equalities;
(4) the extent to which we can control the operation of energy companies 
and markets (as stakeholders and not just as customers);
(5) sustainability of energy usage;
(6) the impact energy usage has on those to whom we bear responsibilities 
(including non-human species and future generations).
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I assume that categories (1) and (2) are fairly uncontentious; (3) and (4) are likely 
to be acceptable to all those who recognise poverty as a relational category; and 
(5) and (6) are widely recognised as important and accepted as such in relation to 
poverty in developing nations. In developed nations, however, they persist much 
more as ecological categories than as social policy ones. An ecosocial approach 
to poverty therefore argues that (1)-(4) are incomplete without reference to (5) 
and (6), and vice versa.
We can now see how they correspond to the principles outlined at the end 
of the last chapter which, you will recall, I proposed were both distributive and 
procedural in nature (see Table 3.1).
These are necessarily complex, and it is somewhat artificial to distinguish so 
schematically between them. Nonetheless:
• ‘Minimum entitlements’ relate closely to items (1)-(3) in the above list, for 
example, being entitled to a sufficient quantity and quality of living space and 
to forms of energy at a reasonable proportion of one’s income (so avoiding 
fuel poverty).
• ‘Property rights’ relate closely to (3) and (4), that is, having qualified, partial 
rights to and ownership of the natural spaces and sources of energy on which 
we depend.
• ‘Political voice and democratic representation’ relate closely to (4) and (5), that 
is, having a stake and voice in the firms and organisations that manage, sustain 
and distribute spatial resources and energy.
• ‘Obligations to value’ non-humans and future generations relate closely to items 
(5) and (6), since if space is shared, and to ensure that socionatural resources 
are preserved and distributed fairly, there is an obligation to nurture, improve 
and bequeath what we have inherited.
Table 3.1: An ecosocial matrix 1
Distributive Procedural
Minimum needs and standards; 
equity and fairness
Equal citizenship Quantity
Opportunities and offices open 
to all





Respect and esteem Value
Ownership, democratic 





Equality regarding common 
resources
Joint membership of 
cooperative endeavours
Sharing
Power to contribute to common 
goals































The initial definition of ecosocial poverty given on page 53 therefore stands. 
When added specifically to the comments on page 68–73 we arrive at something 
like the following:
Poverty is an immobilisation in the spaces that have been residualised and devalued, being 
trapped in the interactions of ‘people and place’.
Ecosocial poverty therefore implies an ecospatial deprivation, that is, an alienation and 
exclusion from (1) the socionatural resources dispersed across space, and (2) space as a 
distinct resource that shapes the life course of individuals and the value and distributions of 
those socionatural resources.
Ecospatial deprivation implies deprivation in terms of minimum entitlements, property 
rights, voice and democracy and our obligations to value and care for those with whom we 
share relevant relational spaces.
Conclusion
Chapters One and Two defended the concept of socionatural resources and 
proposed that this is central to any understanding of ecosocial poverty. Since those 
resources occupy space, and since space is itself a resource, this chapter has looked 
at the spatial dimensions of poverty by exploring two subjects – social policy and 
environmental sociology – and concluded that space is highly relational. Given 
the interdependencies of society and nature, therefore, we need to devise resilient 
shock absorbers that enable us to cope with the ever-evolving relations that 
exist at the interface of these two dimensions. Addressing poverty in general and 
ecosocial poverty in particular is therefore vital. This means understanding, first 
of all, the spatial dimensions of socionatural resources and what poverty means in 
those terms. I defined ecospatial deprivation in terms of various categories and 
indicators, summarised in Table 3.1 as quantity, mobility, value, control, sharing 
and caring. This also cross-references these to the principles outlined in Chapter 
Two and to the distributive/procedural distinction introduced earlier. The chapter 
ended with another iteration of what ecosocial poverty can be taken to mean.
But the task of constructing a basic model is not yet complete because resources 
occupy time as well as space. This is the theme of Chapter Four.
Notes
1 As any parent in an age of social networking and mobile technology will tell you.
2 We explore all of this in the second part of the book.
3 Poor households can be found in relatively affluent neighbourhoods, and relatively 
affluent households can be found in poor neighbourhoods.
4 Jack London had an evocative term for this phenomenon: ‘people of the abyss’.
5 As indicated later in Chapter Four, by the relational, Harvey means a fundamental 
intertwining of elements that are apparently at a distance from one another.
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6 Making it easier for the Coalition government to means test space in the form of a 
‘Bedroom Tax’ (since April 2013, households with a ‘spare room’ have either had their 
Housing Benefit cut or have been forced to move to smaller properties, which are in 
short supply). This is in addition to a benefit cap that may well see poorer households 
forced to relocate to areas of cheaper housing (termed by some as ‘social cleansing’). The 
moral ‘othering’ of the poor has smoothed the way for such punitive policies.





Socionatural resources endure through time as well as across space (Giddens, 1984).
Space configures time in that where we are in relation to others alters across time 
and changes our experiences and perceptions of time. Living in an impoverished 
neighbourhood causes me depressive anxiety and insomnia. Sleeplessness affects 
my physical and mental wellbeing. My energy levels, motivation and concentration 
are depleted, harming my interactions with others and threatening to trap me in 
a vicious cycle of stress and deprivation.
Reciprocally, time configures space in that the rhythms of time, when we are, 
effects the geographies of social relations. Some individuals are pressed to take 
jobs with unsociable hours that adversely affect their family life and non-work 
activities. The value and meaning of time to them differs from its value and 
meaning to others.
Time, like space, is therefore socially constructed, structuring and structured 
by socioeconomic inequalities (Bauman, 2000; May and Thrift, 2001). The 
distribution of resources across space/time both enables and constrains social 
agents, telling them where and when they may or may not interact; the interactions 
of social agents sometimes conform to the existing contours of space/time 
(perpetuating existing resource structures), sometimes subjecting them to new 
processes and configurations.
Below, we look at our key concept and its relation to poverty in the light of 
three subjects: social policy, sociology and environmentalism. We are then in a 
position to refine the understanding of ecosocial poverty developed over previous 
chapters.
Social policy
Time is another central theme of social policy (Fitzpatrick, 2004a; Bryson, 2007, 
pp 39-43, Chapter 6).
• Social insurance is typically thought of as the socialisation, or pooling, of 
risks: mutual protection against shared vulnerabilities (Kuhnle and Sander, 
2010). Even if you yourself are never ill, unemployed, incapacitated, old, or 
whatever, you will still have benefited by being insured against such possibilities. 
Although we cannot predict the frequency and severity of such vicissitudes, nor 
who they will affect, we can introduce some security into life’s lottery. Social 
insurance smoothes out the life course. Social insurance also represents the 
socialisation and pooling of time. Consider pensions.1 Those who die young 
will be net contributors to a scheme that never supported them; others will 
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be net beneficiaries. We could say that the former have bequeathed some of 
their time to the latter. But here, too, even the former have gained, both in 
a contractualist sense (being insured against vulnerabilities provided a sense of 
future security) and in a solidaristic sense (as participants within what Bauman, 
2005, Chapter 3, called a ‘community of fate’).
• This idea, in which schemes of mutual security are devised to protect against 
shared vulnerabilities, is central to the ‘classic’ welfare state. Take healthcare. In 
health systems a large proportion of resources are devoted to the final months 
of life and to those suffering from severe, chronic conditions that need regular 
care, expensive drugs or other costly interventions (Kielstra, 2009, p 3). The 
contributor who dies suddenly, and/or before reaching old age, receives little or 
none of this, having contributed time and other resources that may improve the 
quantity and quality of the time available to others. Yet here, too, she will have 
gained, both by a system that would have protected her had her circumstances 
been otherwise and as a participative member of a community that sees it as a 
duty to care for strangers. The ‘welfare community’ is one in which the social 
and moral distances between compatriots and strangers are reduced.
Yet many inequalities inhabit these systems too. Some inequalities of time 
are matters of luck, but many are matters of systemic disadvantages that social 
policies fail to address and may sometimes exacerbate. Domestic labour and 
unpaid care are activities still performed predominantly by women (Bryson, 
2007, Chapter 9; Goodin et al, 2008, pp 178-82), with such work contributing 
vast amounts to social wellbeing without being recognised in GDP measures 
(UNDP, 1995, p 6). In effect, such carework is an essential but cheap form 
of provision whose personal cost is borne by undervalued individuals. The 
‘breadwinner model’ distributes time from women to men. And with less 
time to devote to jobs and careers, women are more likely to occupy part-
time and/or low-paid employment. With more frequent and longer periods 
outside the labour market, the knock-on effects on job promotion and benefit 
entitlement are clear (Ginn, 2006; Kan and Gershuny, 2009). Achieving a 
‘work–life balance’ remains much harder for women than men (Fagan et al, 
2012, pp 10-12).
• And harder the poorer you are. Think of longevity. People living in the poorest 
UK neighbourhoods will, on average, die seven years earlier than people living 
in the richest ones (The Marmot Review, 2010, pp 16-17). Professional men 
can expect to live to 80 years and unskilled manual men to 72.7 years; for 
women, the figures are 85.1 and 78.1, respectively (ONS, 2011). In a very 
real sense, then, inequalities of income and wealth are temporal inequalities 
too, in which the disadvantaged are deprived of the quantity and quality of 
life available to the better-off. Gender offsets class to some extent, but the 




• This, in turn, has implications for public debates about demographic change. 
With average life expectancy continuing to rise, the prevailing orthodoxy is 
to claim that because ‘we are living longer, we are all going to have to work 
longer’. So the state retirement age is levered up and defined benefit schemes 
are closed. Unfortunately, few politicians pay much attention to the ‘we’ who 
are living longer or to the ‘we’ who will be forced to work for more years. 
The greater your income and assets, the greater your freedom to adapt to 
such reforms, and retire or flexi-retire early. Most politicians wish to avoid 
a mature conversation, not only about social inequalities, but also about the 
many possible ways in which life and work can relate to one another.
Social and temporal inequalities therefore interact and do so in ways that are 
fundamentally political. The principles of social insurance and universalism have 
been under assault from economic liberals for decades with variable success 
(Fitzpatrick, 2012, pp 235-7). For the strict individualist, there are two basic 
alternatives (Shapiro, 2007, Chapter 4). Either (1) people should be free to take 
out whatever forms of commercially provided insurance they wish and accept 
the consequences if they choose unwisely; or (2) there should be compulsion 
to purchase minimal insurance, backed up by means-tested vouchers for those 
in genuine need. Option (1) falls to the objection that many on low incomes 
will either neglect to insure themselves or will be financially impoverished 
if they do (especially if companies charge higher premiums for individuals 
perceived to be high-risk). Option (2) is better because it prohibits people 
from opting-out and helps to compensate for low incomes. However, if the 
minimal requirement and the vouchers are small, then (2) is barely preferable 
to (1). We could increase the requirement and the vouchers, but then we are 
closer to the compulsive, tax-based, redistributive features of social insurance 
that economic liberals abjure. And option (2) arguably fails to embody the 
‘welfare community’ invoked above.
In conclusion, social policies are capable of socialising time. At their best they 
counterbalance the ‘brute luck’ lotteries of birth, inheritance and death, that is, 
undeserved events that lie beyond the control of individuals. In a world where 
people face so many uncertainties and insecurities, social welfare systems empower 
them to control their futures. Social insurance, redistributive taxation and universal 
provision connect your present self to your future self by connecting individuals to one 
another, enhancing communal and individual wellbeing and liberty. But social 
policies also struggle to make much difference in the face of broader inequalities 
(such as health inequalities) and can sometimes make things worse (by failing to 
recognise carework, or by raising the retirement age without sensitivity to class 
inequalities). All too often, ‘time poverty’ continues to characterise welfare states:
You are time poor to the extent that you have little time left over after 
what you need (not after what you choose) to spend your time on. 
(Goodin et al, 2008, p 84)
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Goodin et al (2008, pp 149-50) found that the more economic liberal the system, 
the more likely it is to embody social and temporal inequalities, while social 
democracies are more equal in both respects (cf Gershuny and Sullivan, 2003, 
pp 214-25).
So in terms of the politics of time, social policies constitute something of an 
ambivalent ‘counter-lottery’, an assemblage of conflicting tendencies. How might 
we explain that ambivalence?
Sociology
Sociologists and social philosophers look at time from numerous angles (Zerubavel, 
1981; Adam, 1990, 1998, 2004). The following summarises the analyses in 
Fitzpatrick (2004a, 2004b).
David Harvey redux
Harvey (1973, pp  13-14; cf Whitehead, 2004, pp  33-8) offers a threefold 
distinction. There is an absolute space that exists independently of matter: space as 
a neutral container of that which is enclosed within it (Whitrow, 1988, pp 128-
31). There is the relative space of the relationships between objects. And there is 
relational space within which space and objects are fundamentally entwined and 
less easy to distinguish. How can these categories be applied to time?
• Like absolute space, absolute time exists independently of those who are 
contained within it and would continue to exist in their absence; it would be 
measurable even if there was no one here to measure it (see Mumford, 1963, 
pp 12-18, 197-9, 269-73).
Relative time is, first, spatial since the position of agents vis-à-vis one another 
begins to matter. As people move through space they move through time too, 
and vice versa. Relative time fluctuates as the motions and positions of agents alter. 
Second, therefore, relative time is complex, multiple and only fully understood 
within a social context. Third, relative time is intersubjective, interactive and 
performative as it is shaped by those who move within it. Relative time is thus a 
social, spatial category. But social relations are not just external connections between 
agents; they are ‘internal relations’, connections that configure the identities and 
practices of agents. ‘Social time’ is therefore an amalgamation of the relative and 
the relational.
Relational time goes even further in collapsing the distinction between medium 
and agent. Here, there are no time-less agents or agent-less times. It is a flowing, 
embodied, intra-subjective time of perception, reflection and memory. Whereas 
with absolute time – and to some extent, relative time – we can achieve a scientific 
distance from what we are mapping, with relational time there is no God’s-eye 
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view to which we can ascend. Relational time is therefore never completely fixed 
because it is always destabilised through struggles, conflicts and contestations.
Yet relational time is also structural, because the conflicts that occur are not 
random and chaotic. Mental, emotional and physiological rhythms do not simply 
follow individual streams but the collective tributaries into and out of which those 
streams flow. Conflict runs across collective gradients of power and domination. 
Perceptions, reflections and memories are always shaped by cultural practices and 
traditions (Fitzpatrick, 2009). Relational time is therefore intimately political.
In sum, social time is a mutual configuration of two sub-categories; it implies 
the inter-subjective and intra-subjective relations of, respectively, relative and 
relational time (see Figure 4.1).
A person is distributed across all three dimensions of time: we age in absolute 
time, we live through relative, interactive and intersubjective time, and we embody 
relational and intra-subjective time.
What these categories suggest is both a new and an old approach to the politics 
and social policy of time.
A radical politics of social time
The trick performed by capitalism is both institutional (it freezes space) and 
hegemonic (it compels us to believe that space cannot be unfrozen). ‘There is 
no alternative’ is the enduring slogan of a corporate-dominated capitalism in 
which markets follow an ‘iron law’ and economic gravity flattens everything 
onto the same surface. According to Harvey (1996, pp 329-33), radical politics 
must therefore be rooted in a notion of social space since only this expresses the 
collective power that agents have to shape the spatial environments to which 
they belong and out of which their identities are shaped. A truly social space is 
never frozen, because those who inhabit it always have the power to reconfigure 
it. Rather than being immobilised, the agent is that which always embodies and 
brings forth new spatial relations.
If we follow Harvey’s lead, a radical politics must also be rooted in the concept 
of social time, that is, in the struggles to control time and the ways in which time 
is valued (Schor, 2010, pp 100-14, 178-9). To unfreeze space we must unfreeze 
time, and vice versa. Rather than being immobilised by the 40-hour working week, 
multiplied (typically) across approximately 48 weeks per year and 40-50 years, 
and rather than accept the dominance of the productivist work ethic in which 
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labour, or ‘wage-dependency’, is regarded as the most virtuous form of activity 
(Beder, 2000), a radical politics seeks new spatial and temporal geographies:
... a radical shift from the historically prevailing tyranny of necessary 
labor-time to the conscious adoption and creative use of disposable 
time.... (Mészáros, 2008, p 344; see also pp 177-8, 344-8; Negri, 
2005, p 9)
In particular, radicals have long sought to reduce the length of the working week 
(Kropotkin, 2007, pp 133-41; Schor, 2010, p 163-8). A slogan used by some 
trades unions – ‘From the people who brought you the weekend and the holiday’ 
– captures the extent to which discretionary time had to be wrestled away from 
the grip of political and economic elites.
This was necessary for the reasons Thompson (1991, Chapters 4, 5) highlights 
in his famous account. While in the ‘moral economy’ people only laboured for 
as long as was necessary to provide them with necessities (once their duties to 
landowners were fulfilled), industrial capitalism required people to labour for as 
many hours as possible in order to produce the surplus needed for the further 
accumulation of capital (Thompson, 1991, pp 274-84). And having been obligated 
to produce that surplus, people must then be enjoined through advertising and 
psychocultural norms to devour its consumer goods, to need what they are 
compelled to want. ‘More, more, more’ becomes the mantra of modern economics 
(Gorz, 1989, pp 112-13).
The welfare state, as indicated above, represents a partial victory. The power of 
capital is partially regulated and social wealth is subjected to fairer distributions 
than would prevail otherwise. Battles over time were central to this settlement. 
The working week was gradually reduced in length, holidays were lengthened 
and the right to free time was enshrined in the 1948 United Nations Declaration 
of Human Rights.
But this was always an uneasy and ambivalent compromise. State welfare and 
the Keynesian mixed economy still obeyed a capitalist logic. Even during the 
relatively egalitarian politics of the 1950s-1970s there were limits to the fairness 
of social distributions. Time was partly socialised, but only within fairly narrow 
confines. And once capitalist elites found a way of breaking free of that post-
Second World War settlement, they did so.
So from the 1980s onwards this shift propelled the dominance of an economic 
liberal agenda that served corporate and business interests by swinging distributions 
away from wages and benefits and back towards profits and shares.2 Thus was 
forgotten the battles about time that had characterised earlier periods of political 
radicalism. There have been important skirmishes, such as social democrats’ 
insistence on enhancing paternity leave and work–life balance (Gornick and 
Meyers, 2008), but to argue for a shorter working week today is to risk looking 
like an ideological dinosaur. ‘Don’t you believe in the work ethic? Think of the 
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mischief the underclass will cause if their time isn’t being constantly filled and 
monitored.’
So far as poverty, inequality and injustice go, one of the biggest elephants in 
an already crowded room is that of time (Stewart et al, 2009, pp 8-16). What 
matters is not simply poverty, but how many hours people have to work in order 
to avoid poverty, and the type of jobs to which the disadvantaged have access 
(Goodin et al, 2008, pp 16-19). We might applaud a country for having low 
poverty rates but condemn it if the least well-off have to work an average of 60 
hours per week in jobs that are repetitive, trivial and unfulfilling. Goodin et al 
also observe that the combined ‘time-or-money poverty rate’ is between two to 
five times higher than the ‘money poverty’ rate in Germany, France, Australia 
and the US. Of the countries they researched, only in Sweden and Finland are 
the rates broadly similar. In other words, poverty research must make reference 
to both income and time (Leisering and Leibfried, 1999, pp 240-3; Kuchler and 
Goebel, 2003, p 364; Whelan et al, 2003; Gough, 2013, pp 208-9).
In conclusion, a radical politics of social time has to make structural, systemic 
disadvantages central to its analysis if new spatial and temporal geographies are 
to emerge.
Environmentalism
This is all complicated by another dimension. Environmentalists believe that 
the timescale with which economic and social policies are typically concerned 
is too short, neglecting the interests and needs of, and our obligations towards, 
future generations (Fitzpatrick, 2003, Chapter 7; Page, 2006, Chapter 2). A 
longer timescale should encompass not just humans but future generations of 
non-human species too, giving rise to some knotty philosophical and political 
problems (Carter, 2011).
Let’s consider one of the principal ones. Why do most environmentalists 
challenge the short-term anthropocentrism which, favouring the present 
generation of humans, dominates our systems of governance? One reason is that 
such short-termism is seen as counterproductive.
Imagine a hedonist, Jeffrey, who lives each day as if it was his last. On Monday 
he drinks excessively, injects copious drugs and gambles all his money. Unless 
Jeffrey is very lucky he won’t experience too many days like this. The person 
who lives for today exclusively will quickly burn out. In other words, the shorter 
the periods of time that the short-termist regards as valuable, the fewer such 
periods are likely to be available to him. So, if there is difficulty in estimating 
the scope and nature of our long-term obligations, there is as great a problem in 
restricting ourselves to the very short term. Even short-termists have an interest 
in lengthening their lives.
For economists, the problem occurs in debates about the discount rate (Gollier, 
2012; see also Fitzpatrick, 2003, pp 137-40). Let’s say that a malevolent economist 
offers you a series of choices:
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You can either receive £100 









Clearly, the shorter the period of time before we receive the higher sum, the 
more likely we are to defer gratification. Furthermore, the higher the sum, the 
longer we might we willing to wait in order to receive it.
You can either receive £100 









The higher the discount rate, the more we favour present-day benefits over future 
ones, and the more we prefer to avoid burdens today and, instead, defer them 
to tomorrow. In environmental terms, a high discount rate means prioritising 
the interests of the present generation; a low rate means treating the needs and 
interests of present and future generations on a more equal basis. In other words, 
short-term anthropocentrism applies a very high discount rate.
Now if Jeffrey’s example holds, the higher the discount rate, the more self-
defeating it is. Jeffrey’s ideal is to indulge himself as much as he wants so long as 
someone else suffers the consequences. But we do experience the consequences of 
our recklessness. Neglect regarding flood defences during the 2005 New Orleans 
floods was a stark illustration of this. With extreme weather events increasing in 
frequency and severity, injustices committed against future generations may also 
be injustices we also impose on ourselves.
Yet we prefer a high discount rate because our economies are characterised by 
negative externalities (Stern, 2007, pp 27-8; and see Chapter Eight, this volume). 
An externality is that which is produced through an interaction but which is not 
factored into the interaction. If you wish to purchase my widgets, then I will 
charge you a competitive price based on the cost of the raw materials, production 
and transportation, plus a reasonable profit for myself. But these calculations do 
not take other costs into account. The van transporting the widgets contributes 
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to the noise, congestion and pollution experienced by Bob, whose lives near my 
factory. The negative effects of my business thus produce social costs, for example, 
pollution causes ill health that entitles Bob to healthcare partly funded from my 
taxes. But since such social costs will be borne by everyone, while the profits of 
selling widgets accrue to me alone, I have no reason to factor such external costs 
into my business. GDP measurements are notoriously ineffective at distinguishing 
between activity that is and is not socially and ecologically destructive (Jackson, 
2002, 2009, pp 32-4; also Stiglitz et al, 2010).
Thus, we seek a high discount rate because even when the consequences are 
visited on the present generation, an individual gambles that the costs of his 
activities will be spread across the entire community, particularly those – for 
example, the poorest – who lack the resources and political voice to do much 
about it.
Externalities extend across space, time and species. Negative spatial externalities 
occur when the global warming produced by wealthier nations has a most 
severe impact on the global poor (Osbahr, 2007, p 3). There are also negative 
temporal externalities in that present activities build up an ecological debt that 
may have immediate effects (such as New Orleans) but that also magnify across 
time (Purdy, 2008). And negative externalities are disproportionately visited on 
other species if even modest estimates of species extinction are correct. There 
is no rule demanding that negative externalities will have an impact across all 
sectors of space, time and species, but it seems reasonable to assume that the more 
we are governed by short-term self-interest, the more likely it is that they will.
So, in supporting a lower discount rate, environmentalists argue in favour of 
‘internalities’ and positive externalities.3 By an ‘internality’ is meant the process of 
factoring external costs into a transaction. A moral economy would treat Bob’s 
wellbeing as important rather than as costs that can be ignored, deferred or borne 
by the community at large. Prices would need to reflect, or internalise, the full 
social and ecological costs involved in a market exchange. Typically, this would 
suggest that prices must rise. If you want to buy fruit from Argentina at your local 
supermarket, then you should bear the full costs of doing so. And if the prices 
of socionatural resources rise, then the implications for the poorest are obvious.
But not all external costs are negative. Bob may benefit by living near factories 
that make more employment opportunities available to him. This would suggest 
that prices should fall where the positive externalities of a relevant transaction 
outweigh the negative ones.
There are very large questions here, of course. What would an economy based 
on internalities and positive externalities look like (Stern, 2007, pp 352-3)? How 
low should the discount rate be? And how can we develop the political will to 
change when – given all the pressures we face in life – so many are reluctant 
to pay higher prices, to address climate change (although the costs of doing so 
mount the longer we delay) or to compensate those on lower incomes for those 
same price rises?4
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Although there is no straightforward consensus on these matters among 
environmentalists, one key argument is that our short-term anthropocentrism 
is ultimately counterproductive. The more negative externalities there are, the 
more, in an interdependent world, they will interact and so create consequences 
that rebound on us sooner or later. Despite its apparent irrationality, short-
term anthropocentrism persists because we are making a reckless gamble on 
those rebounds happening much later. Our children, grandchildren and great 
grandchildren may not thank us.
In sum, a green economy would frame itself across a longer timescale – Pinker 
(2011, pp 736-8) suggests that as societies evolve, they become more orientated 
towards the future. In the near future this is likely to involve some difficult 
conflicts and trade-offs. For instance, Rosnick (2013) estimates that reducing the 
US working week by 0.5 per cent per year would, by the end of the century, 
eliminate 25-50 per cent of the global warming that is not already locked in by 
reducing levels of consumption. However, this would entail the majority of US 
workers taking a pay cut unless there was significant redistribution from those – 
the top 1 per cent – who have acquired most of the income gains made since the 
1970s (Stiglitz, 2012). In this and other respects, for example, rising energy and 
food prices, ensuring that measures to tackle climate change do not exacerbate 
poverty demands a commitment of economic resources and political will that 
few developed nations appear ready to offer.
Nonetheless, Schor (2010, pp 157-63) observes that trade-off economics must 
be eventually replaced by win-win approaches that yield double and even triple 
dividends. First, ecological regeneration restores the natural assets on which 
economic wealth depends. Resource depletion is, in the long term, more costly 
than regeneration (Stern, 2007, pp xv-xix). Second, when such regeneration is 
engineered by those who depend on natural assets, this not only benefits them 
monetarily, but also empowers communities and raises wellbeing. This requires 
personal and communal forms of shares in, and rights to, socionatural resources. 
Third, therefore, the political voice of the disenfranchised can be revitalised. 
Yielding these three dividends simultaneously suggests an economy of ‘trade-ons’ 
in which each becomes the condition for realising the others.
Ecosocial poverty revisited
How might the debates sketched above shape our understanding of poverty?
Take the taxonomy in Figure 4.2. Those in zone 1 have little by way of assets, 
although they possess large amounts of disposable time: they are asset-poor 
and time-rich. However, without the assets that can buy access to fulfilling, 
participative activities, that time is often ‘empty time’. Those in zone 2 arguably 
have the worst of both worlds (Goodin et al, 2008, pp 16-18). They are both asset- 
and time-poor, having to spend large amounts of time in low-paid employment or 
other activities such as carework, without accumulating the socioeconomic assets 
to compensate. This represents ‘treadmill time’, digging holes and filling them 
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in again. Something similar happens to people in zone 3 but, while being time-
poor, they are at least compensated through the possession of considerable assets; 
for example, this ‘potential time’ would describe the position of many well-paid, 
middle-class professionals (Bunting, 2004; Goodin et al, 2008, pp 77-80). Those 
in zone 4 have the best of both worlds, for example, those who have retired on 
large pensions and can experience ‘sovereign time’. Many in zones 1-3 yearn 
for zone 4, although only some in zone 3 have a realistic chance of attaining it.
To what extent does this taxonomy correspond to social realities? Like any 
model we should be wary of editing the facts to fit the hypothesis. Rather than 
inhabiting one zone exclusively, it is likely that many people experience several 
during their lives. Someone on a low income may save so that once a year, during a 
foreign holiday, they temporarily experience ‘sovereign time’. A male breadwinner 
household may include a zone 3 husband and a zone 2 wife. Nonetheless, to 
the extent that these zones capture social divisions, the research of Goodin et al 
(2008) suggests that social democratic countries possess few instances of zones 1 
and 4 – because they are more economically, politically and culturally equal – and 
more social mobility (also OECD, 2010, Chapter 5). In many respects, then, the 
social democratic ideal is to make 5, where the possession of assets does not require 
the sacrifice of excessive amounts of time, as large and inclusive as possible.5 This 
ideal of ‘socialised time’ has both socioeconomic and environmental dimensions. 
Let’s examine these in turn (see also Chapter Eight, this volume).
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Socialised time 1
First, zone 5 embodies the view that time is a social resource interwoven with 
other resources. The time we have available to us, and the use we make of it, is not 
simply a matter of personal determination but largely one of social opportunities 
and dis/advantages. Since zones 1 and 2 are more likely to be occupied by those 
on low incomes, the just distribution of time cannot be separated from other 
questions of distributive justice. A cooperatively organised economy is one that 
harmonises differing asset-time paths (that is, it clusters zones 1-4 towards 5), 
recognising that the quantity and quality of time available for individuals, families 
and communities is influenced by what we give to one another as fellow citizens. 
Time becomes an object of progressive government intervention.
This contrasts with a free market capitalism in which possession frequently 
implies dispossession. The acquisitive practices that have characterised the post-
1980s were bought at the cost of greater inequality, relative deprivation and social 
exclusion. This applies not only to income and wealth, but also to time. Snider 
(1998) documents the extent to which employees are suspected of stealing time 
from their employers when, so often, it is the other way around. To possess time 
economic liberalism encourages you to dispossess others of theirs, forcing them 
to steal time from themselves to compensate.
As indicated earlier, over the last four decades growth has been diverted 
towards profits and capital to the disadvantage of both earnings (including many 
on middle incomes) and the social wage (there has been downward pressure on 
social expenditure) (Kumhof et al, 2012):
… while most countries have experienced a declining share of wages 
in national income over the last four decades, the decline in the wage 
share in the UK is particularly high by international standards. (Reed 
and Himmelweit, 2012, p 5)
And as the proportionate values of wages fall, so people must work longer hours 
or take more jobs (Ehrenreich, 2001; Toynbee 2003). As the value of the state 
pension tumbles, so people are required to extend their working lives, a burden 
that falls most heavily on those on low incomes. The household debts that came 
to characterise laissez faire capitalism – and which drove the 2008 financial crash 
– were accumulated not only in the form of credit cards and mortgages, but in 
a time-squeeze experienced by many millions (Schor, 1992, 2012), all of which 
contrasts with the more balanced welfare state capitalism of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Social policies have bowed to this shift by becoming more and more conditional.
The temporal interventions of the economic liberal state have two functions. 
First, they keep the relatively affluent tied to zone 3, envying the securities of 
zone 4 that remain out of reach. Zone 4 is so enticing, and zones 1 and 2 so 
undesirable, that many in zone 3 are compelled to sacrifice short-term wellbeing 
for the long-term hopes of entering zone 4. Second, those interventions seek 
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to expand zone 2. Social insurance is eroded, trades unions are attacked, labour 
market regulations are dismantled, corporate and higher rates of taxation are 
lowered, benefits are reduced and conditionalities are increased. To put it crudely, 
the aim is to get as many of the disadvantaged into shit jobs for shit wages. Keep 
them busy and keep them underpaid.
Both the middle and poorer classes experience acute forms of insecurity, as a 
result, with the former encouraged to blame the latter and the latter encouraged 
to blame themselves – which means that each strata blames the one below it for 
its feelings of anxiety and fear. Insecurity then motivates people to support the 
kind of punitive social policies for which the US stands as an exemplar (Standing, 
2011). We punish those less advantaged in order to increase the social and moral 
distances between them and us. We seek security by making others insecure. 
Keep them busy and underpaid and at each other’s throats.
Socialised time 2
Second, one outcome of free market capitalism is that people are diverted away 
from other forms of value and wellbeing, particularly those centred on the natural 
environment. By chasing the zones above us, and by individualising our fate, we 
are seduced into a competitive, aspirational rat race. We are encouraged to seek 
individualised solutions to social problems, to jump from zone to zone rather 
than trying, collectively, to reshape the composition and position of the zones 
vis-à-vis one another.
The time devoted to earning and spending is not only time taken away from 
preserving and enriching the natural world; it is a time-use that may help to 
destroy that which needs preserving. Those in zones 1 and 2 may certainly care 
about ecological issues, but lack the time and/or the money to do much about 
it. Those in zone 3 can afford to care monetarily, but may have little time or 
energy for much else. You can tend a garden (it’s therapeutic and good exercise) 
or clean rubbish away from a wood, but what meaningful contribution can you 
make beyond the local?
True, those in zone 3 can always choose to downsize but, in a world of rising 
prices, where being ‘left behind’ risks a fall into the zones below, this is a gamble 
that relatively few have the courage to take. To downsize is to ‘downtime’ but, 
fearful of being thrown off into those zones of impoverishment, constant struggle 
and surveillance by public and private agencies, we are driven to sacrifice the 
only time we have (our all-too brief lives) in order to avoid being on the wrong 
end of socioeconomic inequalities. We embrace a time-squeeze for fear that, if 
we don’t, others will force us to do so on their terms.
Thus it feels easier to seek status by abiding with the norms of earning and 
consuming. Working for another, in paid employment, often exhausts our 
capacity and energy to work for and with others in a common enterprise; ‘leisure 
time’ often means recovering from paid employment and recharging the batteries 
88
Climate change and poverty
in preparation for another bout. Environmental waste becomes an acceptable 
compensation for the effects of social and human waste.
Ecotemporal deprivation
We are now ready to revisit the categories and principles left at the end of 
Chapter Three.
Socionatural resources are spatial but also temporal in that they endure through 
time – perhaps the zones in Figure 4.2 should be reimagined as space/time zones 
(see Fitzpatrick, 2001). In addition:
• they are the means through which humans endure through time;
• human interventions affect the quantity, quality and longevity of socionatural 
resources.
Both of which are made harder by what I now call ‘ecotemporal deprivation’.6
You can be deprived within time. Suspecting they face decades of empty time, 
some young people from impoverished backgrounds are more compelled to seek 
solace in gangs, violence, drugs or other self-destructive behaviour than their 
wealthier peers. They are lectured on the virtues of hard work and aspiration. 
Yet the treadmill time of zone 2 resembles the labours of Sisyphus; the hole you 
are filling in today is the one you dug yesterday. Your consolation is that at least 
you are thought of as more deserving than those anti-social scroungers in zone 1.
And you can be deprived by time. As argued earlier, the hierarchies of 
contemporary capitalism are immobilising, disconnecting individuals from one 
another and present selves from future selves. To be poor means being less able 
to endure through time because the lower your income, the lower your life 
expectancy and ‘healthy life expectancy’ is likely to be. This being the case, many 
are less able to preserve socionatural resources than they might wish. This is not 
necessarily because people lack the correct motivations, but is primarily due to 
social institutions and economic practices.
Ecotemporal deprivation thus means being controlled by time rather than being 
able to control it, with others, through possession of sufficient socioeconomic and 
socionatural resources. As in Chapter Three, this argument can be broken down:
(1) Not possessing enough time. Once a year, the UK Taxpayers’ Alliance identifies 
the day on which, as they put it, people stop working for the government 
through their taxes and start working for themselves, their agenda being to 
lower the tax rate. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) similarly calculates 
how much unpaid work, including overtime, employees effectively perform 
for their employers. A comparable exercise can be performed in respect of 
socionatural resources (Simms et al, 2006). As these resources absorb a greater 
proportion of household income, how much time do people have to spend 
acquiring the money to afford them? How much time do we effectively give 
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to energy companies, for instance? And what effects on the quantity and 
quality of time does this have for low-income households? Thus, poverty 
implies restrictions in the quantities of available time.
(2) Not having sufficient mobility across time. If you possess a good wage – or shares, 
inheritances, rental property, and so forth – the easier it becomes to plan 
for the future, to protect yourself against contingencies and to respond to 
opportunities. What Giddens (1991, pp 7-8; see also Leisering and Leibfried, 
1999, pp  240-3) calls the biographisation of the life course is easier for 
middle- than for low-income households. Should I retire a few years early 
and live modestly? Should I continue to work and enjoy a higher retirement 
income? These are questions that those on low incomes are less able to ask 
themselves. The higher the social wage, the more people on low incomes 
can approximate to that middle-class freedom of choice. Redistributions and 
measures to smooth out the life course are about more than readjustments 
to final income; they are about fostering a sense of mutual security in 
which we can all plan ahead. But with the erosion of the state pension, the 
evisceration of social insurance and the polarisation of labour markets, that 
sense of collective shelter goes too. And as socionatural resources become 
more expensive, so they contribute to this temporal immobilisation.
(3) Not inhabiting valued times. The social nature of time is something our 
common-sense intuitions easily miss. Surely a minute is no longer for you 
than it is for me! Yet the subjective experience of time belies that intuition. 
You inhabit a zone distinct to that inhabited by someone living a few miles 
away (Fitzpatrick, 2001). Eight hours at work is not the same as eight hours 
of enforced inactivity. Eight hours at a job you love is not the same as eight 
hours at a treadmill job you hate but must endure because it pays the bills. 
Those who in one sense inhabit the same society are, in another, living in 
different zones. Space and time therefore fragment. At the periphery of the 
labour market this usually means a rotation between no work and ‘shit work’ 
under the disciplinary tutelage of the workfare state. Devalued people are 
those who are more likely to inhabit and be trapped within the marginalised 
zones of 1 and 2 (in Figure 4.2).
(4) Not being able to control time. Restriction, immobilisation and devaluation 
combine to leave the disadvantaged without sufficient control of their time. 
Those who can afford to buy the time of others (nannies, cleaners, personal 
assistants, and so on) are not only saving their own time, they are using time as 
a currency to acquire a higher social status. By contrast, those who experience 
treadmill time are those who cannot afford not to sell their time, servicing the 
domestic needs of ‘the middle’ (zone 3) or the privileged (zone 4). The more 
someone is dependent on selling their labour, the more they are dependent 
on selling not only their physical industry and/or cognitive skills, but on 
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trading in a large proportion of the only time they will ever have. Control 
over time and control over space therefore converge. With rising house prices 
and the separation of affluent from non-affluent neighbourhoods, someone 
who works as a cleaner or a security guard (or in several jobs) may have to 
travel great distances, spending precious hours every week, just getting to 
and from their low-paid employment. Those on low incomes are kept on 
the move, tramping from low-wage job to low-wage job, training scheme 
to training scheme.
(5) Not adequately recognising the extent to which time is shared. Against this 
background of social dislocation, the sense that the natural rhythms of time 
are part of the public, common good risks vanishing. As the post-war bell-
curve becomes more bipolar (see page 58), the sense that the availability 
and meaning of time to one group is entwined with the availability and 
meaning of time to others begins to erode. Poorer neighbourhoods are the 
sites of lives lived repetitively, inadequate refuges from the cycle of no work/
shit work that are statistically likely to ensnare your children too. Affluent 
neighbourhoods are signs of self-worth and transports into a secure future: 
promises that the mortgage will be paid off and your children will inherit 
your privileges. Poverty increases the risk of mental and physical ill health, 
reducing the quality and duration of life. Seasonal change is more likely to 
be life-threatening to the vulnerable, whether because of inadequate heating 
during cold winters or inadequate cooling during increasingly oppressive 
summers. Leisure time is altered depending on whether you have a decent 
garden, or access to parks and the countryside.
(6) Not caring for shared time. Thus, the pooling of time becomes individualised: 
you borrow time from yourself rather than teaming with others to enhance 
the time available to all. The former ethos – mutual systems of security 
to protect against shared vulnerabilities – is replaced by a them-versus-
us hardening of attitudes (‘why should I donate my time, that is, taxable 
earnings, to undeserving strangers?’). The socialisation of time, the counter-
lottery to the brute luck lotteries of birth and death, is weaker than before. 
And if our sense of shared social time has eroded, then what chance for an 
appreciation, sharing and protection of the natural world? Time devoted 
to wage-dependency and consumerism is time that could have been spent 
on ‘internalities’ and positive externalities. A time = money market society 
distracts us from the intrinsic value of nature (Adam, 1998, pp 65-9). Can 
possessive individualists establish effective normative and ethical connections 
to other species and future generations? Can those who interpret poverty as 
behavioural manage to lower the discount rate and internalise costs? Will the 
relatively affluent agree to pay the full ecological cost of socionatural resources 
while protecting those lower down the income and wealth ladder? Dislocated 
in time and space from nature we become desensitised to the temporary but 
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beautiful fragilities of our surroundings. Oblivious to our own mortalities we 
are disagreeably surprised at the speed with which our lives get away from 
us.
As in Chapter Three, I assume that an ecosocial approach to poverty implies that 
(1)–(4) are incomplete without reference to (5) and (6), and vice versa. I also 
assume that they correspond to the principles outlined in Chapter Two:
• ‘Minimum entitlements’ relate closely to items (1)-(3) in the above list, for 
example, being entitled to socionatural resources at a reasonable proportion of 
one’s income in order to enhance the quantity and quality of time available.
• ‘Property rights’ relate closely to (3) and (4). Think of bulk purchasing schemes, 
begun in the Netherlands, where communities bargain collectively for lower 
energy deals than companies are otherwise willing to offer (Scott-Smith, 
2011, pp 8-9).
• ‘Political voice and democratic representation’ relate closely to (4) and (5), that 
is, having a stake and voice in the firms and organisations that manage, sustain 
and distribute socionatural resources.
• ‘Obligations of value’ non-humans and future generations relate closely to items 
(5) and (6), since if we affect the quantity, quality and longevity of socionatural 
resources, and if they are the means through which humans endure, then there 
is an obligation to nurture, improve and bequeath what we have inherited.
As such:
Poverty implies forms of temporal alienation and exclusion, for example, immobilisation 
within the residualised and devalued zones of the empty and treadmill times that characterise 
economic liberal capitalism.
Those temporal deprivations affect and are affected by a relative lack of access to, and 
control of, the socionatural resources that influence the freedoms and capacities of individuals 
to endure through time.
Ecosocial poverty therefore incorporates an ecotemporal deprivation that impedes 
individuals’ power and opportunity to flourish and to fulfil their obligations to value and 
care for others (which includes enabling socionatural resources to endure through time).
Conclusion
Chapter Three explored the spatial dimensions of socionatural resources and 
proposed that these are highly relational. This chapter has extended that analysis 
to a further dimension, that of time, and argued that time is also relational. At 
its best, the classic welfare state enabled social groups to socialise and ‘pool’ their 
time, although its successes must in some respects be highly qualified. This is 
because capitalism’s tendency is to immobilise and freeze time, which is why 
social radicals have long sought to unfreeze it through, for instance, systematic 
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reductions in working hours. To this must be added the problems created by the 
short-term anthropocentrism that has dominated social and economic systems. Yet 
high discount rates and negative externalities are things we can no longer afford 
to indulge. An ecosocial understanding of poverty brings these ideas together. I 
defined ecotemporal deprivation in terms of the categories introduced in Chapter 
Three – quantity, mobility, value, control, sharing and caring. As before, these 
were related to the principles outlined in Chapter Two and the chapter ended 
with another iteration of ecosocial poverty.
We are now in a position to summarise and consolidate the analyses of Chapters 
One to Four, giving us a basic model that we will apply throughout Chapters 
Six to Ten.
Notes
1 In theory, if less frequently in practice.
2 In discussing social changes I am aware of the need to take other factors into account: 
new technologies (including the internet), globalisation in a post-communist era, newly 
industrialising countries (especially China), and so forth. Economic liberalism has driven 
some of this, but to some extent it is also a consequence of such broader changes.
3 A lower rate but not a zero rate, which would value present and all future generations 
equally. Bizarrely, Skidelsky and Skidelsky (2012, pp 130-1) condemn environmentalists 
for supporting a zero rate, a crude and unsubstantiated generalisation.
4 Environmentalists say that in order to lower the discount rate we should construct an 
economy of internalities and positive externalities. However, we could do the latter 
without lowering the rate to any great extent; for example, we could continue to 
prioritise the present, and we could continue to neglect the interests of non-humans. 
The ‘counterproductive’ argument being made here may supply an adequate response, 
but these ‘large questions’ illustrate why the debate is ultimately a moral one, that is, what 
we owe to others as well as ourselves. At some point over the last half-century, however, 
economics and moral philosophy parted company, a divorce for which Keynesian social 
democrats are as much to blame as economic liberals (more used to invoking Adam Smith 
than actually reading him).
5 Economic liberalism pushes the zones away from 5 and from each other.
6 Which is not to claim that spatial deprivation is perfectly conjoined with temporal 
deprivation. An elderly person with a disability may live in a beautiful neighbourhood 
while experiencing too much empty time. Someone may have a deeply fulfilling job 
and a good wage but live in run-down surroundings. The fact that poverty has always 




The purpose of this chapter is to summarise Chapters One to Four, and to offer 
a bridge to Chapters Six to Ten.
Chapter One welcomed the capabilities approach’s recognition of complexity, 
pluralism and diversity, but proposed that it is flawed in several respects. First, 
it has failed to ground itself in a universalist frame of reference that is both 
sufficiently robust and flexible. And second, it unjustifiably downgrades the 
importance of income and wealth, material resources, economic power and 
the distributive paradigm, both to the capabilities approach itself and to any 
understanding of contemporary capitalism. The chapter then adapts the work of 
Holland in identifying a category of meta-capabilities (that which makes other 
capabilities possible), based on the premise that the interdependency of social 
and natural environments is both strong and fundamental. The chapter ended 
by suggesting that in so far as ‘poverty’ implies a multidimensional ‘poverty of 
capabilities’, we ought to focus on the socionatural conditions underpinning those 
multiple dimensions. Thus, an ecosocial understanding of poverty defines it as 
the deprivations resulting from an inadequate distribution of, and participative 
access to, those resources that are key to both natural and social environments.
The aim in Chapter Two was to formulate an appropriate conceptualisation of 
resources. It began by arguing that natural assets have not been given sufficient 
attention in a range of literatures. It then critiqued a principled justification 
for ecological modernisation by proposing that intrinsic value should be at the 
heart of social thinking and social reforms. We should look beyond ecological 
modernisation to more radical approaches, albeit ones still rooted in the 
pragmatic need to apply economic categories and ideas to the natural world. 
This then inspired the first elements of an ecosocial account via a discussion of 
decommodification, alienation and exclusion, domainship and ownership. This 
account argues that we lack sufficient control over socioeconomic resources and 
adequate synergies between socioeconomic and natural resources; it proposes both 
the socialisation of natural resources but also the ‘re-naturing’ of economic and 
social relations through an ethic of ‘qualified partial ownership’. This led to the 
idea that ‘socionatural resources’ should be subject to the principles of minimum 
entitlements, property rights, political voice and democratic representation, 
and obligations to value. The chapter closed by offering an initial definition of 
ecosocial poverty.
Since socionatural resources border, occupy, affect and are affected by space, 
Chapter Three reviewed several debates relating to social space. During the era 
of welfare capitalism, this understanding inspired policies that, while flawed, 
were motivated by a sense of egalitarian justice. Under the ‘bipolar’ economic 
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liberalism of the last four decades, social spaces have fragmented and diverged. 
One consequence is that we have become less able and willing to recognise 
the solidarities that link, and the processes that influence, distant spaces and life 
courses. The interrelatedness of different spaces is now more likely to manifest 
itself as mutual estrangements, hostilities and antagonisms. Not surprisingly, 
social injustice has typically accompanied growing environmental injustices. The 
chapter then proposed that anti-poverty policies are needed to reattach spaces to 
one another, but such policies must take ecological imperatives into account. It 
concluded by defining and outlining the key elements of ‘ecospatial deprivation’.
Since space relates to time, Chapter Four reviewed several literatures dealing 
with time in order to complete our theoretical account. It proposed that welfare 
systems sometimes socialise time, sometimes reflect broader socioeconomic and 
temporal inequalities, and sometimes exacerbate those inequalities. For decades 
now, a social conception of time has given way to ‘absolutist time’ in which our 
capacity to alter the collective rhythms of our everyday and communal lives has 
become institutionally restricted and defined in highly individualised terms. In 
addition to social dislocations, this encourages the short-term anthropocentrism 
that is ecologically damaging. Time is made to appear immutable rather than as 
something we may shape for and with one another as interactive social beings. 
The chapter offered a model of space/time zones, in which the socialised time of 
zone 5 represents an alternative ideal to the hierarchies and rigidities of economic 
liberal capitalism. It concluded by defining and outlining the key elements of 
‘ecotemporal deprivation’.
On this basis of these chapters, an ecosocial account of poverty:
(1) Is grounded in, but seeks to build on, existing relative (or more accurately, 
‘relational’) understandings of poverty, exclusion and deprivation.
(2) Identifies a dual injustice, that is, in terms of both social and natural wealth.
(3) Proposes that we lack an equitable distribution of, sufficient control over 
and adequate synergies between socioeconomic and ‘socionatural resources’, 
such that addressing one type of resource is ineffective unless we address the 
other.
(4) Recommends a re-socialisation of the economy and a re-naturing of the 
social via a principle of ‘qualified partial ownership’.
(5) Argues that ecosocial poverty implies falling below some decent minimum 
access to, ownership of and control over key socionatural resources due to 
malfunctioning social institutions and systems, involving inequalities in rights 
and obligations.
(6) Specifies the principles against which the distributions, and participative 
control, of those resources should be assessed:
• minimum entitlements
• property rights
• political voice and democratic representation
• obligations to value and care for the worth of other beings.
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(7) Finds that defining ecosocial poverty as a deprivation of socionatural resources 
implies various spatial and temporal deprivations which can be broken down 
into several categories:
• Quantity: not possessing enough space and time due to systemic, 
institutional inequalities, for example, space/time zones, which allow 
some to flourish at the expense of others.
• Mobility: not possessing sufficient mobility across space (geographical 
segregations) and time (lacking the power to plan for the future and insure 
against uncertainties and vulnerabilities).
• Value: inhabiting space/time zones that devalue because they are widely 
devalued.
• Control: lacking the social and political voice needed to challenge and 
reverse the above disempowerments and disadvantages.
• Sharing: misjudging and underestimating the extent to which environments 
(social, natural and socionatural) are interdependent.
• Caring: lacking the capacities and opportunities (but not necessarily the 
motivations) to preserve, sustain and enhance the value of shared social 
spaces and natural habitats.
Chapter Two also noted that minimum entitlements, property rights, political 
voice and obligations to care are both distributive and procedural (recall Table 3.1).
In short, ecosocial poverty refers to,
Ecospatial and ecotemporal deprivations due to socioeconomic disadvantages and a relative 
lack of access to, and control of, key socionatural resources.
We can also now assemble the main elements of this account and contrast it with 
other interpretations of poverty (see Table 5.1). So far as the ecosocial row is 
concerned, please note that this is a preliminary sketch only, and we elaborate 
on it in Chapters Six to Ten (for a summary, see the Conclusion).
I appreciate that breaking complex debates down in this way is a classic hostage 
to fortune. First, because when we mention ‘causes’ we are talking about what 
appear to be causes from within a particular explanatory framework. We hope 
that our framework is robust and reasonably accurate, but debates are clearly 
replete with ideological and methodological contestation. Second, even within 
a framework, what counts as what isn’t always clear. You become unemployed, 
experience stress and develop a chronic illness that prevents you from getting 
a new job. Which is cause and which is symptom? The original act of being 
made unemployed? But that itself may need to be contextualised. Despite these 
difficulties, and at the risk of oversimplification, I propose to use the cause/
symptoms/solutions categorisation in order to make sense of the data and debates 
in the chapters ahead.
That done, we can now construct a matrix by fitting together our four 
principles, six categories of deprivation and five socionatural resources: energy, 
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Table 5.1: Accounts of poverty
Causes and 
explanations Symptoms Solutions
Economic liberal  – State intervention
 – Restricted freedom
 – High taxes and 
public spending
 – Moral hazard
 – Benefit 
dependency
 – Social 
egalitarianism
 – Bloated public 
sector
 – Lack of, or 
malfunctioning, 
agency
 – Ailing economy
 – Dependency 
culture
 – Underclass
 – Minimal state
 – Reduced social 
spending
 – Greater role for 
profit-making 
providers, eg private 
insurance
 – Incentives
 – Means-tested 
safety-nets
 – Workfare
Conservative  – Liberal relativism
 – Stress on rights 
rather than 
obligations
 – Moral hazard
 – State/public 
crowding out 
family, charity and 
community
 – Moral deficits
 – Intergenerational 
transmission 
of ‘cultures of 
poverty’
 – Erosion of civic 
values (eg laziness 
and criminality)
 – Underclass
 – Enforceable 
obligations
 – Moral paternalism
 – Workfare
 – Stronger families 
and communities
 – Social 
‘remoralisation’
Social democratic  – Deregulated 
markets




 – Lack of affordable 
childcare
 – Lack of decent 
wages and jobs
 – Public squalor vs 
private affluence
 – Social exclusion
 – Unmet needs and 
deprivation
 – Vulnerabilities
 – Debilitating 
inequalities, eg 
in health and 
longevity
 – Labour market 
regulation
 – Economic growth
 – Social rights and 
fairer distributions
 – Public spending
 – Social insurance
 – Universal welfare 
services
Socialist  – Capitalist class 
structures
 – Exploitation
 – Systemic and 
undeserved dis/
advantages
 – Capitalist state
 – Private ownership 
and control of key 
resources
 – Social and moral 
distancing
 – Pathologisation of 
social problems
 – Class domination 
and bias
 – Profits valued more 
than people
 – Economic 
democracy
 – Socialisation of 
capital
 – Cooperative forms 
of association
 – Use-value and 
decommodification
 – Planning





food, land, air and water. As Schuppert (2012) notes, there is a risk here. Resources 
are dissimilar in various ways. Water and air transcend property boundaries in 
ways that is not the case with land, for instance. To talk about rights to and the 
distribution of ‘resources’ might therefore overlook the extent to which resources 
differ from one another. I try to allow for key differences in what follows, but 
certain nuances and subtleties have been skated across.
What we end up with is Table 5.2, although note the resources row has been 
shaped to reflect the organisation of the chapters to come (hence the reference 
to Land I and Land II).
The task for the rest of the book is to fill in those empty cells. What makes 
things slightly more complicated is the need to ensure consistency between this 
Causes and 
explanations Symptoms Solutions
Feminist  – Gender-bias in 
state welfare and 
public services
 – Labour market 
discrimination and 
disadvantage
 – Public/private 
divisions
 – Sexual division of 
labour
 – Male-dominated 
political systems
 – Lack of affordable 
childcare
 – Gendered wage 
inequalities




 – Lower benefit 
entitlements for 
women
 – Greater risk of 
poverty for women
 – Extensive parental 
leave and childcare
 – Equal pay and 
removal of ‘glass 
ceiling’
 – Improved access to 
occupational and 
state benefits
 – Cultural change 
in caring 
responsibilities
 – Greater recognition 
of value of unpaid 
work
Ecosocial  – Unsustainable 
economic growth 
 – Growth-dependent 
social distributions
 – Climate change 
agenda separate 
from economic and 
social policies
 – Alienation and 
exclusion from 
social and natural 
wealth




 – Profit-based 
exploitation of 
resources
 – Spatial and 
temporal 
deprivations






eg fuel and food 
poverty
 – Limits on carbon 
emissions
 – Green taxes and 
sustainable growth





 – Internalities 
and positive 
externalities
Table 5.1: Accounts of poverty (continued)
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matrix and Table 5.1. Therefore, each of the following chapters reviews the causes, 
symptoms and possible solutions to poverty in light of the particular socionatural 
resource being discussed. The template around which the discussions are based is 
represented in Table 5.3. Completing this template within each chapter will then 
enable us to fill in the empty cells of Table 5.2 once we reach the concluding 
chapter.
The essential question for the following chapters is this: to what extent does 
an ecosocial approach allow us to understand existing literatures, critique recent 
developments and prescribe future courses of action?








Table 5.2: An ecosocial matrix 2































Energy and fuel poverty1
What do you do when you switch on a kettle? You trigger a flow of electrons 
that warm the filament and heat the water. Those electrons are transmitted down 
a distribution system (transformers, power lines and substations) from a plant in 
which turbines and generators are powered in any number of ways: by burning 
natural gas, oil or coal; nuclear energy; or alternative energy (such as hydropower, 
or geothermal and biomass sources).
What do you do when you switch on a boiler? The gas comes into your 
home from a low-pressure distribution zone, which is in turn fed by a national 
transmission system in which compressor stations push the gas through 173,000 
miles of iron, steel and polyethylene mains pipeline. Gas enters the system from 
terminals attached to pipelines from the North Sea or from other countries – 
although liquefied, natural gas can be delivered by boat.
In short, the simplest act connects you to vast histories played out across immense 
distances. The engines of the last 250 years of social development and economic 
growth have been fossil fuels (coal, oil, natural gas), formed over hundreds of 
millions of years from the decomposition and compression of dead organisms.2 
Organic matter originates in turn from the heavier elements formed in the last 
stages of a star’s life billions of years ago, before it ejected those elements violently 
into space. All energy is ultimately solar energy.
Energy prices have been rising dramatically for a number of years now 
(Boardman, 2010a, pp 73-5), and although we should be wary of predicting the 
future – much depending on the availability of oil and whether other energy 
sources can be found (Yergin, 2011, pp 242-3, 419-20) – the era of cheap energy 
may not return. In any event, ecological imperatives require us to reduce our 
use of fossil fuels, and develop cleaner energy sources, which is likely to further 
increase prices, at least in the short term.
This raises three questions for social and environmental policy-making 
(Diesendorf, 2011). First, how can we protect the incomes of the poorest as energy 
prices rise? Second, how do we ensure that all people are sufficiently warm while 
also achieving reductions in carbon emissions? Finally, how do we manage the 
climate change transition as the problem shifts from the need to keep homes warm 
during cold winters to the need to cool homes during excessively hot summers? 
(The nightmare scenario is one of colder winters and warmer summers.)
That final question is not one we discuss here.3 So far as the first two questions 
are concerned, research into fuel poverty which also addresses climate change 
suggests that the answer to both depends on finding an effective policy synergy. 
In other words, with an intelligent application of energy-efficiency programmes, 
government subsidies and coordinated governance, low carbon technologies, 
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tariffs and, yes, traditional transfer policies (living wages, generous pensions, 
benefits and tax credits) we can both protect the poorest, reducing and eventually 
eliminating fuel poverty, and decrease carbon emissions. Could such a convergence 
of policy agendas be managed? To what extent does the existing literature speak 
to the ecosocial approach? Does that approach identify any gaps in existing 
research and debates?
In setting out to explore those questions this chapter is concerned with gas 
and electricity, rather than oil (Heinberg, 2011, pp 106-18).4 It is also largely 
concerned with the consumption of energy, although in one instance I suggest 
why research and commentary should be more concerned with production and 
delivery processes. We begin by outlining the basic facts about fuel poverty. 
Then we consider the synergies and possible trade-offs identified by the 
literature dealing with fuel poverty and climate change. Finally, I connect these 
debates to the ecosocial understanding of poverty, as summarised in the previous 
chapter.
Basic facts
Not surprisingly, buildings account for much of the energy we use and carbon 
we emit. Buildings are responsible for at least 36 per cent of all GHG emissions 
and 41 per cent of all CO
2
 emissions (Committee on Climate Change, 2010, 
p 197). They account for 40 per cent of total energy consumption and two-thirds 
of all electricity consumption (DECC, 2011, pp 29, 136). Of the total amount 
of energy used in buildings, two-thirds is gas or oil and one-third is electricity. 
Around three-quarters of this energy is used by the residential sector and the 
remainder by businesses (not including industrial processes) (Boardman, 2012a, 
p 5). Changing the design and the use of buildings is therefore central to both 
the fuel poverty and climate change agendas.
In the UK, a household is defined as fuel-poor if it needs to spend more than 
10 per cent of its income on fuel to maintain adequate warmth (21ºC degrees 
for the main living area, 18ºC degrees for other occupied rooms).5 Those 
experiencing it habitually have to juggle heating costs against other basic needs, 
such as food. The figures for fuel poverty since calculations began (they have 
not been calculated every year) are as follows (DECC, 2013b, p 18): ‘vulnerable 
households’ are those that contain elderly members, children, people with 
disabilities or the long-term sick. For instance, Macmillan Cancer Support (2010) 
found that people who have undergone cancer treatment in the previous year are 
twice as likely to be in fuel poverty as the rest of the population, and are likely 
to remain there because of costs associated with the disease.
The trend since 2004 has been upwards, with a sharp peak in 2008-09 that 
has subsided again (see Table 6.1). According to the DECC (2012, pp 32-5), 
three-quarters of all fuel-poor households can be found in the lowest two income 
deciles and the highest rate is among the unemployed, where over 50 per cent of 
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households are in fuel poverty. Eighteen per cent of lone parents with dependent 
children are fuel-poor. And,
In those households where the oldest person is aged between 65 and 
84, over a quarter are in fuel poverty. Over a third of households where 
the oldest person is aged 85 or over are fuel poor. (DECC, 2012, p 35)
Although a sizable minority of the fuel-poor are owner-occupiers, the majority 
rent their homes from private or social landlords.
Fuel poverty is caused by rising prices, inadequate incomes and energy-
inefficient homes. Government interventions can clearly be counterproductive 
(by depressing the incomes of the poorest) or helpful (energy-efficiency subsidies 
can be directed towards new boilers, insulation, double glazing, solar panelling, 
draught-proofing, and so on). The Labour government attributed the post-2004 
increase mainly to rising energy prices that was only partly offset by income 
growth and greater energy efficiency (DECC, 2009). It should be observed, 
however, that Labour’s record on reducing all forms of poverty began to stall 
around the same time.
Therefore, although income measures are incomplete (some households may 
need higher temperatures than those stated in the official definition), there is a 
close correlation between fuel and income poverty. Being fuel-poor is a good 
indicator that you are poor in other respects too.
The lower your income, the more difficult it is to provide for basic needs, and 
the less is available for non-essentials and for savings, thereby affecting individuals’ 
quality of life and sense of security. Also, a low income typically raises opportunity 
costs, making someone less willing and able to take risks – such as changing 
jobs – and more likely to be trapped in deprived circumstances. Low-income 
households are also more likely to use pre-payment meters that disadvantage 
them compared to customers paying by direct debit.
Liddell and Morris (2010) reviewed a range of literatures and concluded that 
although reducing fuel poverty has only modest effects on the physical health of 
adults, there are significant impacts on the respiratory health of children and on 
the physical health of infants. The mental health effects on adults and adolescents 
are also encouraging. As Walker and Day (2012, p 70) observe: ‘In Sen’s terms 
Table 6.1: UK fuel poverty
Fuel poverty 
(millions of 
households) 1996 1998 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
All UK 
households
6.5 4.75 2.5 2.25 2 2 2.5 3.5 4 4.5 5.5 4.75 4.5
Vulnerable 
households
5 3.5 2 1.75 1.5 1.5 2 2.75 3.25 3.75 4.5 4 3.5
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fuel poverty can have impacts on the capability to achieve a range of valued 
functionings in everyday life.’
There are some obvious conflicts between some policies designed to reduce 
fuel poverty and those designed to reduce carbon emissions. On average, the 
richer the household, the higher the amount of carbon it emits. Roberts (2008, 
p 4471) observed that the ‘poorest 10% of households produce only 45% as much 
carbon dioxide emissions from their homes as the richest 10%.’ More recently, 
Hargreaves et al (2013, p 5) find that ‘the richest 10% of households in Great 
Britain emit three times more than the poorest 10%.’ The poorest are particularly 
vulnerable to energy prices rises, with a 1 per cent rise in fuel prices likely to 
result in another 40,000 households entering fuel poverty (Jenkins, 2010, p 832). 
Clearly, then, trying to suppress carbon use by raising prices – and/or introducing 
a carbon tax – would have a most severe impact on those least able to afford them 
and those least responsible for producing emissions in the first place.6
Political solutions and prospects
The last Labour government tried to address fuel poverty in several ways.
Economic instruments
• Increasing the incomes of the poorest, for example, through benefits (such as 
Winter Fuel Payments), and tax credits (such as pension credits).
• Reducing fuel bills through voluntary ‘social tariffs’ (where the government 
encourages energy companies to reduce fuel costs for vulnerable and low-
income customers) and other ‘social price supports’ offering additional 
discounts.
Regulations
• Improved energy efficiencies. Some helped the poorest directly, for example, 
the Warm Front programme provided grants and reduced annual fuel bills 
by £360-400 on average; some were more indirect, for example, the boiler 
scrappage scheme.
• Parallel initiatives such as the Carbon Emissions Reduction Target programme 
and various Public Service Agreements.
Information
• Publicity campaigns (through helplines, advertising, leaflets and consumer 
advice networks) to encourage greater energy efficiency, including changes 
to lifestyles and daily habits, and to encourage low-income households to 
regularly switch suppliers.
• Improved advice about benefits and welfare rights, for example, some Warm 
Front recipients were entitled to a subsequent benefit entitlement check and 
data-sharing.
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Since 2010 (for recent developments, see Snell and Thomson, 2014), the Coalition 
government has:
• introduced a Green Deal Finance and Energy Company Obligation (see below);
• reduced subsidies for solar panel installations;
• exhorted consumers to ‘shop around for the best deals’;
• indicated it wants to simplify energy bills, reduce the array of energy tariffs 
and make it easier for households to switch suppliers;
• indicated that Winter Fuel Payments could be withdrawn from affluent 
pensioners.
Having set ambitious targets for itself, for example, eliminating fuel poverty for 
all households by 2016, Labour was seduced by the falling energy prices of the 
late 1990s into believing that fuel poverty could be reduced without introducing 
substantial changes to energy markets. New Labour therefore wanted to reduce 
energy costs for low-income households, but was reluctant to challenge energy 
firms any further. It thought it could humanise markets by working with firms 
in partnerships inspired by a social conscience. The Coalition government has 
pretty much adopted the same stance.
Take the example of social tariffs. This approach derives from the widespread 
view that targeting is the most cost-efficient and effective way of assisting the 
poorest. Baker (2006, pp 28-30) reported that suppliers, regulatory bodies and 
government representatives all preferred targeting in order that limited resources 
could reach those most in need. This, despite a wealth of evidence that targeting 
– by raising administrative costs, complexity, feelings of stigma and so by lowering 
take-up – is usually less effective than its champions admit (Fitzpatrick, 2012, 
pp 221-3, 227-8). Thus, barely 25 per cent of the money allocated to relieve fuel 
poverty actually goes to the fuel-poor (Boardman, 2010b, p 53), since ‘passport 
benefits’, such as Income Support and Housing Benefits, do not necessarily 
identify the fuel-poor accurately.
The attraction for government in addressing fuel poverty lies in the triple 
dividend doing so might yield. Reductions in fuel poverty:
(1) assist low-income households with knock-on consequences for other social 
objectives;
(2) facilitate (with government assistance) energy-efficient technologies and 
firms;
(3) are capable of reducing carbon emissions and providing a potential shock 
absorber against future climate change, enabling environmental targets to be 
met.7
We have seen that (1) is undermined by rising energy costs and over-confidence 
in the efficacy of targeting. To these we might add the effects of energy markets 
in which competition is fairly minimal. In November 2012 the Financial Services 
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Authority started an investigation following allegations by a whistleblower that 
the £300 billion wholesale gas market had been frequently manipulated by some 
of the big energy companies; and even in the absence of such manipulation, the 
suspicion is wide that prices are quick to rise when wholesale costs increase but 
slow to fall when those costs come down again.
A combination of austerity economics and the Coalition government’s 
reluctance to pursue an active investment strategy has paralysed (2). Not that 
Labour’s approach was vastly superior. Consumer Focus (2009) found that a major 
energy-efficiency programme, costing £21 billion in 2009 prices across seven 
years, would reduce fuel poverty by 83 per cent, prevent the risk of fuel poverty 
re-occurring in the future and reduce the fuel bills of the fuel-poor by 52 per 
cent (and their carbon emissions by 59 per cent). This is three times more than 
the last government was spending.
And even were fuel poverty to be decreasing, the environmental improvements 
of (3) do not follow automatically, although as Pearce (2012) reports, UK local 
authorities have often been lazy in assuming otherwise. The ‘rebound effect’ 
describes what happens when savings made per unit of energy encourage more 
energy usage (Berners-Lee and Clark, 2013, Chapter 6). A ‘direct rebound’ 
happens when consumers use more of the same commodity; an ‘indirect 
rebound’ occurs when users switch from one commodity (warmth and household 
appliances, in this case) on to another which is also energy-intensive (Pett, 2009, 
p 1676). In short, as bills come down people may jack up the temperature, or spend 
some of the savings on other carbon-heavy goods, services or activities, so that 
overall carbon emissions do not decrease or decrease by less than is desirable. The 
rebound effect potentially makes energy-efficiency measures counterproductive. 
We review this issue below.
Therefore, triple dividends may or may not exist depending on whether national 
and local governments and energy firms make genuine, well-funded, coordinated 
and evidence-based attempts to realise them. Much of the difficulty lies in bringing 
together short- and long-term imperatives. A solution to fuel poverty that is 
effective in the short term but that makes it harder to reduce carbon emissions 
in the long term is no real solution at all. The following literature suggests ways 
of bringing these timelines together.
Ultimately, however, we have to be concerned not just with the retrofitting of 
buildings, but their spatial distribution.8 Anne Power (2008, pp 4489-90) points 
out that population density falls as households become smaller, for example, more 
houses are needed as more people choose to live alone. This lower density then 
means that the housing stock occupies more space and has a greater environmental 
impact due to higher energy use (it takes more energy to supply two single-
occupier houses than a single house occupied by two people).
Aligning more progressive social policies with environmental limits 
and avoiding the expansion of average space and energy per person 
are critical to sustainability ... we have at least 18 million family-sized 
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homes, far more than the actual number of families. The distribution 
of space is highly unequal but we have more, larger homes in the UK 
than elsewhere in Europe. (Power, 2008, p 4490)
We therefore have to reconcile a series of objectives. First, the need for higher 
density communities to avoid the disadvantages of low density to which Power 
draws attention. Since it is the affluent who tend to spread out, occupying 
the most desirable rural and semi-rural areas, using space more efficiently and 
sustainably in the form of higher density housing may imply reducing sociospatial 
inequalities. We consider this issue in Chapters Eight and Nine later. Second, the 
poorest households often need more space (more and bigger rooms, gardens, and 
so on), but if this is not to propel an increased and unsustainable level of energy 
use, then there is a need for greater energy efficiency. This imperative is central 
to the following discussion.
From trade-offs to synergies?
Before examining specifics it is worth making the point – first raised in Chapter 
Three – that an ecosocial approach does not pretend that there can ever be a 
perfect, once-and-for-all solution. This is because a green society has to be 
constantly remaking itself. There may be ecological limits, but the scale of 
nature, the extent to which humans are woven within it, and so the intricacies 
and unintended consequences of our interventions into the natural environment, 
all mean that we should approach matters in a spirit of flexibility and reflexivity. 
We should act, plan and reform while leaving enough policy ‘spare room’ for 
those acts, plans and reforms to be adapted and revised. Such is implied by the 
very term ‘adaptation’.
An ecosocial agenda therefore means (1) acknowledging the extent to which 
there are currently few synergies between social and environmental goals; 
(2) accepting that there can never be perfect synergies between those goals; and 
(3) working to promote synergies wherever possible. The contentious claim here 
is (2). Observing that there can never be perfect synergies is to concede that trade-
offs will always have to be made because some priorities will override others.
This is because there are bound to be limits to our knowledge (what we should 
do) and limits to our capacity to achieve rapid and efficacious social organisation 
(how we should do it) – collective action problems, in other words. Thus, even 
if we can pinpoint a problem and its causes, knowing when, where and how to 
respond effectively to it is, more often than not, likely to be difficult. The very 
interdependency of social and environmental factors is also what makes the new 
realities we face extremely complicated and resistant to easy answers and swift 
interventions. We should not be paralysed by complexities but nor should we 
succumb to the ideological temptation to ignore them. There is an urgent need 
for ecosocial policies precisely because there is always a lag in the policy process 
and so a need to stress some priorities at the potential cost of others. We will 
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often have to feel our way forward pragmatically, in a fog of uncertainties, of risks 
we cannot assess and potential outcomes we cannot fully anticipate or discern.
Yet even if there is no one-size-fits-all, the literature on fuel poverty and climate 
change suggests that much more can and must be done than is acknowledged by 
existing political orthodoxies.
Brenda Boardman
Relatively few sustained attempts to link fuel poverty debates to those about 
climate change have been made (see also Seymour, 2000, pp  76-8; Johnson 
et al, 2008, pp 10-15; Ekins et al, 2011; Gough, 2013, pp 197-201). Ekins and 
Lockwood (2011) argue that tackling climate change requires energy price rises 
over the long term. If these are not to hurt the poorest, then rebates on energy 
bills should be available, conditional on households adopting energy-efficiency 
measures.
Perhaps the most prominent author in the field has been Brenda Boardman 
(2010a, p 119), who states that:
The strong correlation between levels of carbon emissions and prices 
for the different fuels means that most climate change policies are good 
for fuel poverty and most policies to improve the energy efficiency of 
low income homes are good for climate change.
(As such, Boardman supports the principle of PCAs.) She identifies three possible 
exceptions to this general rule, however.
First, there is the rebound effect, as described above. The effect is very difficult to 
measure, and no real consensus exists, but it seems reasonable to estimate that the 
direct effect amounts to no more than a third of the savings made through energy 
efficiency (Sorrell et al, 2009). In short, two-thirds of the reductions produced 
from greater efficiencies are consolidated as real emissions reductions. However, 
it is much harder to estimate other aspects of the rebound effect (Dimitropoulos, 
2007), and wide variations in household behaviour cannot be ruled out 
(Druckman et al, 2011). The difficulty derives from the fact that the effect is not 
a constant, but alters according to a number of intersecting variables, including 
the income, composition, existing energy efficiency and other characteristics of 
a household. Boardman (2010a, pp 179, 207) observes that already-warm homes 
are more likely to direct savings towards non-necessities, for example, flights. In 
colder households – which typically have lower incomes – savings will enable 
temperatures to rise (which is surely a desirable result) since there will still be less 
money for that household to spend on other energy-using activities. Therefore, 
targeting efforts on the coldest, least energy-efficient households ‘will limit the 
growth in discretionary energy consumption’ and constitutes a sensible economic 
policy.
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Second, since carbon taxes are regressive, they should be introduced carefully 
to ensure that the poorest households are protected. This might mean taking 
the emphasis away from certain forms of low-carbon electricity generation as:
... this could have the effect of pushing fuel prices to an uncomfortable 
level for the fuel poor. Reducing demand is almost always considerably 
cheaper than supplying it. (Boardman, 2012b, p 146)
The targeted energy-efficiency measures she supports vis-à-vis the rebound effect 
therefore apply here too and include: improved building insulation, low-carbon 
technologies, reverse tariffs (see below) and feed-in tariffs (in which households are 
paid for the energy they produce from renewable sources). Additionally, because 
the poorest are most likely to buy older, energy-efficiency appliances second-hand, 
scrappage schemes are needed for a range of goods (Boardman, 2010a, p 120).
Finally, Boardman (2010a, p 209) criticises governments’ tendency to fund 
efficiency improvements through utility companies. This simply leads to higher 
utility bills, hitting the fuel-poor most severely. (Boardman bypasses the point 
that such regression will be exacerbated when those utilities are privately owned 
and answerable to shareholders in a competitive market rather than to customers. 
The idea that privatised, for-profit utilities fawn over their customers is a 
fairy tale that economic liberals must tell themselves before bedtime.) Yet UK 
governments prefer this approach because the alternative – government-directed 
and taxpayer-funded – is habitually judged to be old-fashioned tax-and-spend, 
and so politically unacceptable.
This is why measures to protect the poorest have been made through voluntary 
‘social tariffs’, where the government encourages energy companies to reduce fuel 
costs for vulnerable and low-income customers. As we saw earlier, however, there 
are problems with this approach. As based on figures from the late 2000s, only 
8 per cent of the fuel-poor benefit from those tariffs (Boardman, 2010a, pp 86-8).
Much of what Boardman (2010a, Chapter 9) says is consistent with the 
ecosocial approach to poverty. She makes room for both social and ecological 
concerns since she recommends aligning the timescales for meeting fuel poverty 
and climate change targets. She is concerned to ensure minimum entitlements to 
resources, not only in terms of income redistribution and improved minimum 
wages, but also the money needed to fund long-term energy efficiencies and so 
improvements to assets (building stock):
... every home is owned by someone and is worth a considerable sum of 
money. Unlocking this equity, even for the fuel poor, is the core of the 
following proposals.... If the value of the property becomes linked to 
its level of energy efficiency ... then not investing in energy efficiency 
improvements would lead to the value of the property declining. And 
investing in energy efficiency improvements is, literally, an investment 
in the value of the property. (Boardman, 2012b, p 146)
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In other words, Boardman signals the importance that property and property 
values play in any discussion of fuel poverty. (We return to this below.) And 
although hers is technical, fairly a-political analysis, it is clear that she is critical 
of the existing arrangements between the state and utility companies.
Diana Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero
A second attempt to link fuel poverty and climate change debates has been made 
by Diana Ürge-Vorsatz and Tirado Herrero. They first echo the view of the last 
four chapters that relative, or inter-relational, poverty:
... stresses the conditions that a decent life should fulfill and identifies a 
list of items (eg, diet, clothing, shelter, environment, etc) that define 
the necessities that are recognised as such in a society.... Thus enjoying 
an adequate provision of domestic energy services is one of those basic 
needs that a household is expected to meet. In that sense, energy 
poverty is one component of a multi-faceted deprivation notion that 
encompasses the various aspects of human life. (Ürge-Vorsatz and 
Herrero, 2012, p 84, emphasis in original)
Therefore, deprivations in access to energy (manifested as fuel poverty) should 
be understood as one element in a web of deprivations, such that addressing one 
part of the web is likely to be ineffective unless we address the rest too.
However, Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero (2012, p 85) reject the idea that Income 
Support per se can be central:
... providing a long-term solution to the energy poverty problem 
via households’ income (eg through subsidies to energy costs or fuel 
payments) is often difficult because extra income may not be used 
by households for covering their unmet energy service needs or for 
improving the energy efficiency of their dwellings.
Often poorly targeted and expensive, Income Support schemes are too dependent 
on the whims of policy-makers, and subsidies may be a temporary solution at 
best. At worst, they are counterproductive in the absence of energy-efficiency 
measures ‘because lower-than-real energy prices provide wrong economic signals 
and thus result in a capital stock whose efficiency is lower than that justified by 
economic rationality considerations’ (Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero, 2012, p 85; see 
also Jenkins, 2010, p 838). This can lock households – potentially for decades 
– into higher energy expenditures than are desirable. Therefore, efforts should 
generally be targeted on improving housing stock:
The energy performance of the dwelling is thus identified as the key 
factor to take or keep households permanently out of energy poverty 
111
Energy and fuel poverty
while contributing simultaneously to reducing GHG emissions. But 
other co-benefits can be accrued as well, as there is evidence of the 
significant net employment creation and energy dependency reduction 
effects of investing in buildings’ energy efficiency. (Ürge-Vorsatz and 
Herrero, 2012, p 86)
In this context there are two potential conflicts, or trade-offs, involving the 
rebound effect and carbon pricing.
Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero (2012, p 87) go further than Boardman, denying 
that the rebound explanation has much relevance:
It may be argued that potential savings are estimated following the 
unrealistic assumption that households living in energy poverty will 
not increase their energy consumption following an improvement in 
the energy performance of their dwelling.
In other words, since we want poorer households to be warmer, why should we 
categorise this as a ‘take-back’ from efficiency savings? So far as carbon pricing is 
concerned, we can avoid trade-offs between social and environmental goals by 
targeting carbon taxes on affluent households and by ensuring that low-income 
households are well insulated and have access to low- or zero-carbon measures 
and to feed-in tariffs.
For long-term synergies to take effect (carbon-zero homes that are adequately 
warmed and cooled), state-of-the-art retrofits and technologies are required; 
otherwise buildings may be ‘locked into’ sub-optimal measures that are both 
ineffective and that need new retrofits before long anyway.9 On the one hand, 
although expensive, the most effective retrofits will pay for themselves several 
times over in the long term; that said, initiating the comprehensive programme 
we need seems beyond the incremental, market-based obsessions of (most of) 
today’s politicians. Avoiding ‘lock-in’ should be a priority since
... under certain circumstances (ie, demonstrated technical and 
economic feasibility of the state-of-the-art solution alternatives), the 
sustainable solution may be to wait out until a complex, deep retrofit 
can be performed on a building rather than force large-scale, superficial 
renovations. A negative effect of this strategy is that it lets current or 
increased emissions and energy poverty levels go on unabated for a 
number of years until the political decision for deep efficiency is taken. 
(Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero, 2012, pp 88-9)
By aligning social and environmental goals, that is, the resources and potential 
savings that accrue to each, we may ‘tip the expenditure-benefit balance in 
favour of action’ (Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero, 2012, p 89). We therefore need an 
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integration of ‘policy fields’ that are currently separated. Walker and Day (2012, 
p 75; see also Boardman, 2012b, pp 144, 146) make the same point:
Whilst fuel poverty is a problem of energy underconsumption, it is 
occurring within an overall climate of energy overconsumption and 
the two issues must be addressed in an interconnected way. Without 
this, the justice of reducing fuel poverty may be overshadowed by 
consequent exacerbation of global social and climate injustice.
Like Boardman, Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero appeal to an ecosocial agenda. They 
are concerned with minimum entitlements (‘enjoying an adequate provision of 
domestic energy services is one of those basic needs that a household is expected 
to meet’ [Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero, 2012, p 84]), which generates an emphasis 
less on income and Income Support than on improving housing stock over the 
long term. They are more dismissive than Boardman of the rebound effect and, 
so far as I am aware, do not discuss utility companies.
An ecosocial consensus?
We can therefore see that the debate about fuel poverty has both spatial and 
temporal implications. Spatially, it concerns the availability, use and efficiency 
of household space; temporally, fuel poverty is something that can help trap 
households in a cycle of deprivation. Energy, too, has a spatial dimension (the 
occupancy and accessibility of fossil fuels) and a temporal one (the longevity and 
sustainability of such fuels and the need to develop alternatives). These debates 
therefore speak to the framework outlined in Chapters Three and Four.
Let’s try to sum all this up by filling in the cells of Table 5.3 in relation to 
energy. Based on the previous sections, Table 6.2 encapsulates much of what I 
imagine Boardman, Ürge-Vorsatz, Herrero and others would argue and propose.
How to ensure policy coherence across the solutions column needs careful 
consideration. For instance, if what the poorest lack is sufficient living space, then 
at least the space they do occupy is easier to heat. We want the poorest to have 
more space, as Chapter Three noted, so long as this does not compromise the 
need for carbon reductions. (We return to this issue in Chapter Eight.)
The italicised phrases in Table 6.2 indicate those places that I think warrant 
additional attention.
Green assets
First, take the reference to ‘green assets’ in the mobility row. Boardman argues that 
we should (1) tie the equity of a property more firmly to its energy efficiency and 
(2) enable the fuel-poor to benefit from that equity. Some reform in favour of (1) 
has already occurred. All homes going on the market are now required to have 
an energy performance certificate (EPC) (energy efficiency and environmental 
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impact ratings), which ranks houses from A-G, although most purchasers continue 
to overlook them in favour of traditional criteria (loft conversions, conservatories, 
etc) (Boardman, 2012a, pp 69-70). The Coalition government has made a move 
in favour of (2). The Green New Deal, introduced in 2013, allows people to 
borrow money from a private provider to improve boilers and insulation. The 
loan (at 7 per cent interest over 10-25 years) is fixed to the property, that is, it is 
taken over by a new tenant or owner, and repaid through energy bills, but if the 
improvements lower energy use, then (theoretically) savings should outweigh 
the costs. There are various assessment, set-up and operating charges. Boardman 
(2012a, p 79; Harvey, 2013) anticipates that,
The introduction of mandatory minimum standards for private-
sector landlords means that few tenants would be expected to agree 
to the green deal finance, as this would result in them subsidizing the 
landlord’s obligation. Green deal finance will, therefore, be taken up 
primarily by owner occupiers....
Table 6.2: The ecosocial poverty of energy
Fuel poverty
Causes Symptoms Solutions
Quantity Energy inefficiency; low 





targeted at low-income 
households, and other 
energy efficiencies, eg 
appliances
Mobility Proportionately high 
energy expenditure 
reduces capacity to save
Fuel poverty trap – 
reduced capacity to 
escape vicious cycle of 
inefficiency, income and 
prices
Tax-funded retrofitting, 
targeted at low-income 
households, and other 
energy efficiencies. Green 
assets
Value Fuel-poor given 
insufficient priority 
within energy markets 
and government policies
Fuel poverty trap. 
Inadequate assistance in 
the form of social tariffs
Tax-funded retrofitting, 
targeted at low-income 
households, and other 
energy efficiencies
Control Fuel-poor lack social and 
political power
Continued devaluation 
of fuel-poor households’ 
needs and interests
Control of budgets; 
improved market regulation 
and socialised control of 
utilities
Sharing Lack of integration of 
fuel poverty and climate 
change objectives
Dual injustice: fuel 
poverty and high carbon 
emissions. Rebound effect
Synergies between social 
and environmental ‘policy 
fields’. Non-regressive 
carbon taxes
Caring Lack of integration of 
fuel poverty and climate 
change objectives




Reverse tariffs; shift to 
renewable technologies 
and zero-carbon energy 
systems; PCAs
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As for the Energy Companies Obligation (ECO), where energy suppliers must 
spend £1.3 billion per year subsidising insulation for poorer consumers,
As all households contribute equally to the ECO, through their 
fuel bills, it is a regressive measure unless almost all is used to fund 
improvements in low income homes. (Boardman, 2012a, p 80)
Although it is early days, at the time of writing – July 2013 – neither the Green 
New Deal nor the ECO have registered much success.
There is thus considerable scope for bringing (1) and (2) together more 
effectively. From 2018, it will already be illegal to rent out an F- or G-rated 
property on the EPC scale. The minimum could be raised further and integrated 
more effectively into the housing market. Boardman (2012a, p 78) suggests that 
EPCs could be issued for all homes. Those that do not meet a minimum efficiency 
standard would need additional work done on them before they could be sold 
or rented out, thus making them worth less in the market than more efficient 
buildings. Boardman (2012a, p 109) proposes a timescale:
• from 2018 onwards no F- and G- rated properties can be sold/let;
• from 2025 no E- or D-rated;
• from 2032 no C-rated;
• from 2039 no B-rated.
Thus, all properties would be in or near the zero-carbon A-band by 2050.10
Going even further, Boardman wonders whether any building with low 
standards could attract a higher Council Tax. It goes without saying that such 
reforms would meet with resistance and would need to protect low-income 
owner-occupiers and tenants.
But since carrots can be designed as well as sticks, those obstacles need not 
be insurmountable. For those who make substantial and early improvements, 
Boardman (2012a, pp  115-16) recommends: lifetime mortgages, ‘green’ 
mortgages, grants and loans from a government-backed Green Investment Bank 
(including low and even zero-interest rate loans), stamp duty rebates, Council 
Tax discounts, low VAT rates on retrofitting and energy-efficient appliances. 
The money could come from auctioning European Emissions Trading Scheme 
permits. (Note that Boardman does not imagine that financial signals alone will 
change behaviour in the required direction.)
Weighted towards low-income households, such measures could help the 
poorest to accumulate the stock of assets, which, as we saw earlier in Chapter 
Two, they frequently lack. Particular schemes to facilitate tenants’ rights can be 
imagined. For instance, longer rights of tenure – perhaps even co-ownership – 
could be envisaged for tenants shouldering a higher burden when improving 
the property’s rating. Some assets could even be mobile, carried by low-income 
individuals from property to property, and some could even be heritable.
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All in all, these represent imaginative proposals that policy-makers should start 
to consider and pilot. But there is a very large elephant missing from the room. 
Where, we must ask, are the energy companies in all of this? Boardman imagines 
utilities funding scrappage schemes but, by and large, more radical proposals to 
regulate and re-socialise the energy market are missing from the literature on fuel 
poverty. Boardman (2012a, p 89) is well aware that,
Policies that foster the relationship between local people, their 
community and local government are poorly understood, but are 
an important part of delivering the social ambience within which to 
achieve low-energy communities in practice.
It is difficult, however, to picture any ‘social ambience’ being formed unless 
individuals, communities and local government have a stake and a voice in the 
production and distribution of energy. Otherwise, what we are saying? That 
consumers and government should spend the next 30  years decarbonising 
themselves while companies continue to price-gouge with minimal expectations 
that they will foster ecosocial objectives?
Curiously, such a conclusion might be implicit within the following claims:
Energy is an unusual commodity, as it can only be consumed in a piece 
of capital equipment. It is the efficiency of this capital equipment (a 
light bulb, refrigerator, boiler) that determines the value the household 
obtains from its energy purchases. (Boardman, 2012b, p 143)
Concern over fuel poverty is about the distribution of access to energy 
services (rather than energy itself).... (Walker and Day, 2012, p 70)
But unless we are concerned with the justice and sustainability of the production 
process, then it is difficult to envisage end-of-the-pipe reforms as being efficacious. 
It seems short-sighted to focus on consumption without considering the umbilical 
connections between production and consumption (Teske, 2010, pp  56-7; 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2012). Energy is a socionatural resource above 
and beyond its distribution in the form of an ‘energy service’. Even electricity 
– a flow of electrons – still depends almost entirely on the utilisation of primary 
resources, mainly non-renewables (oil, natural gas, coal, uranium), but increasingly 
renewables too (water/wave, wind, geothermal, solar). And as previous chapters 
argued, we all have stake in what happens to socionatural resources.11
Social and political control
The second set of italicised phrases in Table 6.2 – the control row, referring to 
the principle of political voice and democratic representation – therefore suggests 
that the fuel-poor are deprived not simply because of price rises and energy 
116
Climate change and poverty
inefficiency, but because they are denied the social and political voices to make 
a difference. They are disadvantaged as participants and citizens, not simply as 
consumers. In gas, electricity and coal markets, the shareholder is sovereign, and 
while all non-shareholders will thereby be disempowered to some extent, this 
will most adversely affect those without the resources to compensate.
As indicated in Chapter Four, the system of ownership is not my primary 
concern. Decades of globalisation and liberalisation in the energy sector make 
it unlikely that any single model can be recommended for all nations. In some 
countries a nationalisation of energy companies will be preferred while others 
will continue to prefer a heavily market-based system. That said, one major study 
anticipates that the conjunction of ecological imperatives with a need for greater 
energy security may well encourage greater decentralisation and localisation in 
an industry that has been highly centralised historically (Skea et al, 2011).
Without more engagement of the public in climate change policy it is unlikely 
that ‘commitment to and understanding of the need for emissions reduction’ can 
be delivered (Ekins et al, 2011, p 61). Engagement can imply nothing more than 
improved consumer information and education campaigns. A more ambitious 
approach (see Hawkes et  al, 2011, pp  239-43) – particularly around micro-
generation technologies – could facilitate a form of ‘energy citizenship’ in which 
people become co-producers, co-investors and therefore co-owners of energy 
systems, whether as individual households or as members of cooperatives and 
communal micro-grids. In an industry dominated by sales and profits, the real 
savings to be made by consumers may be too slender and/or too long term to 
attract people to the energy efficiencies that need to be made. More imaginative 
approaches can be envisaged, for example, reorganisation that favours not-for-
profit suppliers, which breaks down the divisions between shareholders and 
stakeholders, implements market regulation around green imperatives and which 
opens up for-profit companies to civil society (deliberative parliaments that shape 
company policy?).
Walker and Day (2012, p 72) summarise the same point under the headings of 
information, representation and accountability: 
In terms of access to information, being able to know the scale of the 
problem of fuel poverty, its occurrence and patterning is fundamental 
to being able to address it, and also to enabling advocacy and 
campaigning groups to call policy bodies to account. Having ready 
access to information on energy prices and on ways of being more 
efficient in energy use is also important in informing the responses of 
vulnerable consumers and those that are supporting them. In terms of 
“meaningful participation in decision-making”, the interests of those 
affected by fuel poverty need to be properly represented in a variety 
of relevant decision-making processes – in energy policy and strategy, 
energy pricing and market regulation, housing policy, energy efficiency 
policy and so on – if they are to be given some priority alongside 
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other concerns and addressed effectively. This involvement is an issue 
at different scales of governance – from international energy policy 
arenas, through to local community fora. In terms of access to legal 
processes this is important in providing mechanisms for challenging the 
decision-making and actions of both public bodies with responsibilities 
for vulnerable consumers, and private energy companies. Having laws 
and regulations in place in the first place which protect the interests of 
the fuel poor is a necessary prerequisite, but then enabling low income 
and other vulnerable people and their advocates to use the courts to 
enforce these laws and regulations is also important.
Yet this sits uneasily alongside their view that,
It seems clear that the focus of the next generation of policy will be 
on improving the energy efficiency of housing rather than addressing 
the other distributional inequalities of incomes and pricing. (Walker 
and Day, 2012, p 73)
Presumably, they mean that simple Income Support measures, for example, social 
tariffs, and so on, do not work effectively. This appears reasonable, as we saw above.
But since ‘distributional inequalities’ surely include unequal ownership of 
property, and because we should define property to include stakes in energy 
companies, then we should not equate ‘incomes’ with traditional Income Support 
transfers, and not confuse ‘pricing’ with the self-serving interests of energy 
monopolies. In other words, policies to improve information, representation 
and accountability require stakeholders to possess and exercise property rights. 
We could also imagine a social dividend system. Some of the wealth generated 
by carbon taxes and energy markets can be earmarked for sustainability projects 
and programmes; some could be distributed in the form of an unconditional 
income, as happens in Alaska with oil extracted from Prudhoe Bay (Widerquist 
and Sheahen, 2012, pp 11-15; Fitzpatrick, 1999, Chapter 7).
Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero (2012, p 85) also tend to think of income simply as 
household expenditure and, to repeat, there are, indeed, limits to what Income 
Support schemes can achieve. But if we characterise income as ‘assets’ that include 
budgets that local communities derive as social dividends from the companies they 
co-own, and can invest in local energy-efficiency schemes, then we reimagine 
poverty not simply as a lack of income but as a lack of voice and of participative 
inclusion that can be addressed through more imaginative forms of redistribution. 
In short, radical reforms can be proposed by synergising the themes of income 
and assets, distributive inequalities and participative decision-making.
If nothing else, then, the ecosocial approach recommends that research into fuel 
poverty and climate change be concerned not only with buildings and energy 
demand, but also with the characteristics and social-environmental significance 
of the entire energy chain. Energy is not simply that which powers your kettle; 
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it is a resource that connects you to the rest of the matrix of socionatural 
interdependencies. Although his concern is with oil, Urry (2013, p 1) comes 
close to the truth:
Energy systems are incredibly important. They ‘generate’ very varied 
and often highly unequal economic, social and political patterns.
If the future is indeed characterised by reduced energy demand, cleaner energy 
and decentralised systems, we might be led back to the view of Illich (1974, p 17) 
when he claimed that ‘only a ceiling on energy use can lead to social relations 
that are characterised by high levels of equity’.
Rebound effect
The final italics in Table 6.2 concern the rebound effect. As we saw above, 
Boardman is more concerned with rebound than Ürge-Vorsatz and Herrero, 
although none believe this to be a major problem (see also Barker et al, 2007; 
Pett, 2008, 2009). Indeed, rebound is desirable when poor households ‘take 
back’ efficiency savings in the form of higher household warmth, although there 
is no guarantee that this will happen. The rebound effect is modest, at least for 
low-income households, precisely because, as Anderson et al (2012, p 51) find, 
they are often forced to divert the savings away from considerations of warmth 
(for instance, the heating versus eating dilemma many households experience). 
In short, in a continued trade-off between comfort and other necessities, it is 
often the latter which is preferred.
To these views I would simply add that although we want the coldest, low-
income households to be warmer, we do not want any home to be so warm that 
efficiency savings are significantly counteracted by increased carbon emissions. 
In short, minimising the rebound effect without compromising on ecosocial 
objectives may imply giving a greater role to ‘reverse tariffs’ where the prices 
charged for the first tranche of energy units consumed is cheaper than for later 
tranches (Boardman, 2010a, pp 93-4). As a simple example, if we judged 21ºC 
degrees to be reasonable, then anyone who uses more than a stipulated amount 
would need to pay an escalating surcharge.12 In other words, some forms of 
rebound are more ecosocially desirable and acceptable than others, and such a 
realisation needs to be applied both to research into the rebound effect and into 
pricing policies.
The point is to emphasise the obligation to care and to recognise natural values 
– the sharing and caring rows in Table 6.2 – by making what Brunner et al (2012, 
p 57) call an ‘environmental consciousness’ more central to policies promoting 
energy saving. Brunner et al observe that the amount of energy people consume 
and waste often exceeds their estimates. A ‘habitus of modesty’ therefore implies a 
greater consciousness of the need to use space more effectively and less carelessly, 
including those with the most to lose from wasting energy (for a literature review 
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of coping strategies, see Gibbons and Singler, 2008). But let me repeat what was 
said in previous chapters. This is not about singling out ‘the poor’ as somehow 
ecologically ignorant or immoral. Pett (2009, p 1686; see also 2008) found that 
low-income households ‘seemed generally interested in their carbon footprints 
but were not likely to be able to do anything to reduce them further.’ Further 
research into the rebound effect is undoubtedly needed.
Conclusion
This chapter has been largely concerned with two questions: how can we protect 
the incomes of the poorest, and how do we ensure that all people are sufficiently 
warm while also achieving reductions in carbon emissions? The burgeoning 
literature on fuel poverty and climate change suggests that realistic policy synergies 
between these imperatives can be found, although they are rarely in evidence 
in governmental policies today. There are double and even triple dividends to 
be fashioned, but these will not happen easily or automatically. This implies a 
whole series of measures to be implemented and maintained over the next few 
decades, including:
• major retrofitting programmes, with governmental coordination and taxpayer 
funding;




• non-regressive carbon taxes;
• PCAs;
• equity schemes that tie social and ecological objectives together.
We saw that such initiatives are more than consistent with an ecosocial model and 
help us to understand what this approach could mean in practical terms. Table 6.2 
drew attention to several areas that arguably require more debate: green assets, 
control and sharing of energy resources and the rebound effect.
We are left with two considerations. First, Roberts (2008, pp 4472-3) anticipates 
a shift in the problems associated with fuel poverty:
Over the next 40 years, warmer winters and warmer summers with 
more extreme heat may shift the problem of fuel poverty from one 
principally of inadequate heating in winter to one which also features 
inadequate cooling in summer.... This need may be particularly acute 
in urban heat islands for vulnerable elderly living in thermally poor 
dwellings....
120
Climate change and poverty
This means that when designing and implementing the above measures we need 
to ensure they are flexible, that is, appropriate for summer cooling as well as 
winter warming. We need reprogrammable buildings that can provide insurance 
against the uncertainties of the future. Without knowing exactly how much 
warmer winters and summers are likely to be, we need flexibility built into our 
reforms and reflexivity built into the policy-making process. The worst scenario 
is to act now and lock ourselves into approaches that only need to be reversed 
at unnecessary expense and effort in 20 or 30 years time. To repeat: this is why 
Chapter Three stressed the dynamic, resilient ‘remaking’ aspects of a green society 
and its ecosocial politics.
Second, if to be poor means being deprived of sufficient space, how can we 
increase the living space of the poorest in the context of the higher density 
communities that we need for greater energy efficiency and sustainability? We 
consider this question later, in Chapter Eight.
At the end of the Introduction I stated that the ecologically excessive, careless 
and destructive use of key socionatural resources is connected to the social 
deprivations that characterise that usage for millions of those on low incomes. 
In terms of energy, our fossil fuel dependency has been misplaced, locking our 
social and economic infrastructures into a reliance on non-renewables that we 
have only begun to reconfigure and that will take several decades more to alter. 
Combined with profligate and profit-driven energy markets, the poorest are 
bearing the brunt of this. If we are to make a successful and fair transition to an 
economy of renewables, then mitigation and adaptation policies must make their 
interests front and centre.
Notes
1 Energy poverty refers not only to space heating needs, ‘but also other energy service 
demands such as space cooling, lighting and powering appliances’ (Ürge-Vorsatz and 
Herrero, 2012, p 84). However, for the sake of convention, this chapter refers to all these 
needs and demands as ‘fuel poverty’.
2 And 80 per cent of the world’s energy still consists of those fuels.
3 Since fans and air conditioning use energy, the alternative is ‘passive cooling’. For instance, 
redesigning house interiors to enhance ventilation and shading, as well as altering and 
taking advantage of natural surroundings, for example, planting trees to improve shade, in 
order to increase air circulation and to decrease the solar radiation absorbed by buildings.
4 Oil only accounts for a small proportion of UK domestic energy. Nonetheless, it does 
have an impact on poverty, in the form of high transport costs absorbing household 
income, for instance. Also, the more governmental and voluntary agencies have to spend 
on oil, the less may be available for anti-poverty policies (see Bridge and Le Billion, 2013, 
pp 216, note 7). We consider transport later, in Chapter Nine.
5 I say ‘is’, but from 2014 a new definition of fuel poverty is being adopted, based on the 
work of John Hills (see DECC, 2013a).
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6 Adding investment costs to bills are likely in any event. Upgrading the UK’s electricity 
connections to meet key climate change targets could cost up to £5 billion, requiring over 
600 miles of cabling to connect to new energy sources. The transition should therefore 
be as non-regressive as possible.
7 By upgrading its buildings and housing stock, the country helps to protect itself against 
at least some of the unforeseeable energy and climate change shocks that may hit us in 
decades to come.
8 Some believe greater emphasis than at present should be given to demolition/new build 
(see, for example, Boardman et al, 2005; Preston et al, 2008). However, others advocate 
the retrofitting of existing stock with minimal demolition, believing that initial measures 
should be targeted on fuel-poor homes and cheap housing (Power, 2008, p 4489; cf 
Jenkins, 2010, p 832). This is not a debate we review here, although there appears to be 
no conclusive evidence one way or another.
9 For a useful overview of retrofitting in practice, see Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2012); 
for data from a new build project, see Bell et al (2010).
10 These dates could be adjusted, obviously, depending on considerations of what is 
feasible and necessary. For instance, Hansen (2009, pp 173-5) argues that coal emissions 
must be eliminated by 2030 if CO
2 
is to peak at 400-425 parts per million and return to 
350ppm by the end of the century.
11 Renewable sources are not free either (Yergin, 2011, pp 596, 614-8). They still require 
an infrastructure for collection and distribution, and therefore decisions about priorities 
and the allocation of resources.
12 This is a simple example. A reverse tariff system would need to allow for seasonal and 
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For most of human history, if you expended more energy in acquiring food than 
you derived from it, you would eventually starve. But in the fossil fuel era, the 
amount of energy we use in the production of food exceeds the energy we derive 
from food by a factor of 10 (Heinberg, 2011, p 130). By accessing hundreds of 
millions of years of stored sunlight we have evaded the old expenditure versus 
consumption equation, while swelling the population from 1 billion to 7 billion 
in less than two centuries.
Famines and starvation have not disappeared, obviously, because such profligacy 
has been bestowed by the affluent largely on themselves (Patel, 2007). Developed 
nations have devoured the earth’s inheritance, leaving countless millions, both 
now and in the future, to rely on the scraps. But regardless of when oil, gas and 
coal peak, or whether new miracle technologies emerge, there must come a 
time when either it is no longer practicable to access those fuels, or we decide 
to limit the emissions they create, or both. In other words, the energy equation 
is on its way back.
None of this should be surprising since food has long occupied a central place 
in political and social policy conflicts (Vernon, 2007, Chapter 8). In the late 1970s 
the then Leader of the Opposition, Margaret Thatcher, pointed to shopping 
baskets that seemed to shrink year after year. ‘Unlike inflation-happy socialists,’ 
went the message, ‘wives and mums know the real cost of living.’
Yet as is now clear, it is difficult for wives, mums or any of us to know what 
powerful market actors do not want us to know. Companies (and governments) 
depend on consumer passivity, complicity and ignorance about what goes into 
food and what consequences it has (Singer and Mason, 2006, pp 8-12). The 
industrialisation of farming alienates consumers everywhere from the food 
production process, but this blindness is especially virulent where corporations 
control the food chain. The consumer revolution took social contexts out of 
shopping, constructing food as nothing more than an economistic series of cost-
benefit decisions made by ‘active’ customers in supermarkets humbly grateful for 
their business.
This was not always the case. Since food is a basic need, a lack of regular, good 
quality food summons at least two of Beveridge’s five giants: want (poverty) 
and disease (ill health), each of which makes it difficult to work and affects the 
learning of children. Although it would be naive to imagine there was a magical 
moment ‘after the 1940s when hunger vanished from Britain’ (Vernon, 2007, 
p 273; see also Townsend, 1979, pp 167-9), memories of the ‘Hungry Thirties’ 
shaped the political conscience of post-war reformers – including middle-way 
conservatives – until the 1970s.
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But if you disparage the principles of needs and rights, these ‘giants’ lose their 
salience as social problems requiring collective responses. Having first suffered from 
the politics of food (she achieved public recognition in 1971 when, as Minister for 
Education, she withdrew free milk from some classrooms, earning the appellation 
‘milk snatcher’), Thatcher’s legacy was to individualise and de-socialise our 
understandings and practices. Her yearning for the restoration of soup kitchens 
was first laughed at by ministers normally submissive to her nostalgic dreams 
of a Golden Age destroyed by welfare state hedonism. But by tapping into an 
intolerance towards social explanations and solutions, Thatcher’s judgemental 
populism eventually become normalised within everyday discourse. Many an 
exasperated politician has sighed that the poor would be less obese if only they 
ate better and exercised more (a message reiterated by much of the media).1 By 
2012, over half the respondents to a Demos poll wanted the government to stop 
claimants from spending their benefits on cigarettes or alcohol, and 38 per cent 
extended this to junk food (Wheeler, 2012). However, such polls rarely interrogate 
what drives people to cigarettes, alcohol and junk food in the first place.
Thus, in the wake of the 2007-08 financial crisis, with austerity the preferred 
response of the Coalition government, and with yet another reinvention of the 
vocabulary of ‘the undeserving poor’, the UK experienced an alarming rise in 
the number of food banks (which distribute emergency food parcels) and of 
children going to school or bed hungry.2 The ‘heating or eating’ dilemma (see 
Chapter Six) is a daily one for many, and one in five mothers miss meals in order 
to prioritise their children.3
Conservative attacks on the concept of relative poverty were never going to lead 
us here, they once assured us. Avoiding absolute poverty would be sacrosanct, and 
this meant that, ‘A family is poor if it cannot afford to eat’ (Joseph and Sumption, 
1979, p 27). If you judge that family to be hungry because they are undeserving, 
then they are not really poor, are they? So it’s not really your responsibility, is it? 
Absolute poverty can be vanished too, it seems, once you learn the correct moral 
conjuring tricks.4 Thus the food insecurity once associated with the 1930s has 
returned. The Golden Age is back.
Given this pathologisation, this de-socialisation, this non-political politics of 
food, have we the ethical resources needed to address food poverty? And since 
we now struggle to understand the social contexts of food production and 
consumption, can we successfully address the social politics of climate change? 
This chapter proceeds by presenting some recent facts and figures about food 
poverty before drawing on the most systematic attempt yet made to understand 
food as the intersection of social and ecological imperatives. It ends by mapping 
this notion of ‘ecological public health’ against the ecosocial matrix with which 
previous chapters have dealt.
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Recent developments and prospects
UK food prices rose dramatically – 12 per cent in real terms – in the five years after 
2007, so although they spent more on food, UK households purchased 4.2 per cent 
less food in 2011 than in 2007 (Defra, 2012a, p 54), all of which had particularly 
detrimental effects on the poorest fifth who spend 16.6 per cent of household 
income on food (Defra, 2012a, Chapter 5) compared to the average household’s 
11 per cent. Not surprisingly, many coped with rising prices by ‘trading down’ 
to cheaper, processed and thus less healthy food, but for low-income households, 
there wasn’t much ‘further down’ they could go (Flaherty et al, 2004, pp 112-13). 
The poorest tenth spent 17 per cent more on food in 2011 compared to 2007, 
but purchased 29 per cent less fruit and 20 per cent less vegetables (fruit prices 
rose by 34 per cent over this period). Their intake of nutrients thus fell between 
2007-12 for the simple reason that fresh fish, fresh meat, fruit and vegetables cost 
more, making them even less affordable for low-income households at a time 
when food price inflation exceeded wage and benefit rises. On average, every day 
the poorest tenth eat less than half the fruit consumed by the richest tenth, and 
those who eat high quantities of processed meat run a higher risk of developing 
cancer and heart disease (Campbell, 2013).
It is also no surprise, then, that charitable assistance has increased over this 
period (Lambie-Mumford, 2013). According to The Trussell Trust, in the spring 
of 2013 the UK had more than 320 food banks which had issued food parcels to 
over a quarter of a million people in the previous year, a fourfold increase since 
2010.5 The figures would be higher except that a maximum of three visits a year 
are allowed for people who must be referred by a GP, charity or other agency. 
Nor do these figures allow for similar actions by churches, housing associations 
and other charities. FareShare feeds over 35,000 people a day, distributing unsold 
or surplus food from the industry.6 In February 2013 it was reported that the UK 
was close to violating its obligations to the UN’s Economic and Social Rights 
Convention which sets out minimum standards of access to food, clothing and 
housing (Butler, 2013b).
For those facing desperate circumstances, any assistance is surely welcome. Yet 
Riches (2002) argues that food banks enable governments to ‘look the other 
way’, neglecting hunger and nutritional health in the expectation that others 
will take up the moral slack. Anti-state politicians effectively say ‘Look, we 
told you charity works better than state hand-outs’. Food banks thus risk being 
institutionalised, that is, co-opted into the very political and economic strategy that 
created the problem in the first place, taken as evidence of the voluntary sector’s 
success rather than of free market and corporate capitalism’s failure. Poppendieck 
(1998, pp 269-83, 293-4, 300-8) calls this a ‘two-for-one’ bargain: (some of) 
the hungry are fed while volunteering motivations are fulfilled. And charity can 
also be disempowering, by taking the emphasis away from social rights, universal 
provision, jobs, wages and the organisational capacities of poor people themselves 
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(who risk being constructed as the helpless, compliant, grateful recipients of the 
compassion of others) (Poppendieck, 1998, pp 155-9, 263-8).
Recent developments should also be understood in terms of the long-term 
evisceration of high streets and shopping boroughs, once much more diverse 
than they are today. The top four supermarkets now have a 62 per cent market 
share of food and non-alcoholic drink purchases in the UK. Food poverty thus 
intersects with the phenomenon of place poverty in the form of ‘food deserts’. 
These were noticed in the 1980s and early 1990s. With large supermarkets opening 
on the edges of cities (under the benevolent gaze of the Thatcher government), 
smaller retailers were often unable to compete with their aggressive marketing, 
one-stop convenience and loss-leading practices. Nor could emasculated local 
authorities do much to stem the tide. Food deserts particularly afflicted low-
income communities that were less likely to have access to those superstores, 
or good quality retailers, both because of restricted transport (especially car 
ownership) and because there were fewer profits to be made for shops locating 
in their communities (Wrigley, 2002).
The proliferation of local ‘convenience superstores’ since the late 1990s (for 
example, with mini-Tescos blanketing the country) has scattered oases across 
those deserts but not necessarily reduced the underlying problem, since they are 
dominated by processed food, and by capturing the market can keep prices at 
uncompetitive levels (Dowler et al, 2007, p 136). The debate about food deserts 
has subsided, if only because places differ and it is difficult to make straightforward 
generalisations (Macintyre et al, 2008): ‘The geography of food poverty cannot 
be simply drawn on a map’ (Hitchman et al, 2002, p 9). Nonetheless, it would 
be simplistic to deny a correlation between geography and access to, and choice 
of, food (Kneafsey et al, 2008, p 14; Caraher et al, 2010). And as Steel (2008: 
147-52) observes, countries that have restricted and controlled supermarket 
expansion more effectively than the UK are less likely to experience food deserts 
and food poverty.
A new climate for food
Overall, then, few of the food practices across developed countries seem ready to 
deal with global warming. Take waste. Over 60 per cent of the waste produced 
by UK households is avoidable (Defra, 2012b, Chapter 5), while according to 
the European Commission, the European Union (EU) wastes 50 per cent of its 
edible food.7 In addition to the obvious financial costs, such waste has adverse 
environmental impacts too, because of landfills and because of the energy, GHGs, 
water and soil embedded in food:
... food waste is equivalent to 15 million tonnes of CO
2
 emissions, 
and the vast majority goes into landfill, where it generates methane. 
(Lang et al, 2009, p 200)
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The higher the level of processing and calorific content, and the later in the 
supply chain food is wasted, the heavier the impacts. Globally, about one-third 
of edible food gets lost or wasted every year (1.3 billion tonnes) – enough to 
feed the world’s hungry several times over (Stuart, 2009, p 83). Some of this is 
due to damage inflicted during harvesting, transport or storage, but some is due 
to retailers refusing to stock food that is blemished or aesthetically unappealing 
(Stuart, 2009, pp 102-8). And the more consumers waste, the more they purchase 
replacements, leaving supermarkets with little incentive (other than PR) to apply 
or encourage different practices. Yet nor do consumers have a particular reason 
to change their habits since, compared to developing nations, food prices are 
relatively low vis-à-vis average incomes.8 Yet where concerted efforts are made 
with recycling schemes, immense improvements have been achieved (Steel, 2008, 
pp 278-81).
The social and ecological agendas are converging, then. If, as expected, prices 
continue to rise, without intervention levels of nutrient intake among poorer 
households are likely to remain inadequate. Oxfam (2012, p 5) estimates that 
between 2010-30, export prices for:
• maize could rise by 177 per cent, with up to half the increase due to climate 
change;
• wheat could rise by 120 per cent, with around one-third of the increase due 
to climate change;
• processed rice could rise by 107 per cent, with around one-third of the increase 
due to climate change.
These percentages may even be underestimates depending on what happens to 
oil prices, extreme weather events and panic buying.9 And as prices rise and 
food insecurity grows, so ethical considerations drop down the list of shoppers’ 
priorities.
All of which leaves us ill equipped to deal with the new challenges headed our 
way. According to Lang (2010, p 1821),
A bedrock of some new and some old fundamentals will reshape 
food systems in the 21st century: climate change; a fuel/oil/energy 
squeeze; water stress; competition over land use; labour pressures; 
urbanisation; population increase; dietary change and the nutrition 
transition with accompanying healthcare costs; and social inequalities 
within and between countries.
A series of collisions has been anticipated (Harding, 2010). With world population 
expected to reach 8 billion by 2030, global food poverty can only decrease if 
affluent countries reduce their resource- and energy-heavy consumption of meat 
and dairy (Singer and Mason, 2006, Chapter 16):
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... it takes an estimated 11 times as much grain to feed a man if it 
passes through a cow first.... It also takes a staggering thousand times 
more water to produce a kilo of beef than of wheat. (Steel, 2008, p 9)
And it takes 160 litres of oil to make a tonne of maize in the US, all of which 
increases the risk of crop failure and soil exhaustion.
Let us now take a more considered look at these challenges, utilising the key 
work that has been done by Tim Lang and various co-authors.
Food policy and poverty
Research into food poverty has recently gathered pace (Leather, 1996; Craig and 
Dowler, 1997; Dowler and Turner, 2001; Dowler, 2002; Hitchman et al, 2002, 
pp 23-51; Dowler and Tansey, 2003; Marmot and Wilkinson, 2005, Chapter 9; 
Dowler and O’Connor, 2012). Lang et al (2009, p 255) define food poverty as 
‘persistent underconsumption’ and food security as ‘a state where everyone is fed 
well, sustainably and healthily, and able to choose culturally appropriate food.’
For Lang et al (2009, p 257), food policy holds a mirror up to social policy 
since ‘poverty in general and food poverty particularly expose decisions about 
the allocation of resources.’ In the Victorian era food philanthropy was often 
a means of social control, in which this basic need was made conditional on 
recipients demonstrating ethical and behavioural improvements to their character. 
In the post-Second World War era, a more societal emphasis took over, a ‘never 
again’ ethos in which food became a material and public good. By the 1980s 
an individualistic and moralistic emphasis had returned, albeit in a consumerist 
context stressing the importance of customer empowerment, information and 
choice. Although the social control aspects never faded entirely, they have returned 
with a vengeance in recent political and public debate. The argument that tackling 
poverty is more cost-effective in the long run is drowned out by a moralistic 
discourse about the failures of ‘the poor’ who are always made to resemble a drain 
on social resources. Therefore, an economic and moral revaluation is required. 
We need a new mirror:
Ultimately, food poverty is a matter of human concern and care, the 
recognition that one’s fellow citizen – whether this word is defined 
in planetary, regional, national or local terms – is not too dissimilar 
to oneself. The need for food from a healthy, sustainable food supply 
is common…. (Lang et al, 2009, p 258)
Within food policy we therefore find a familiar tussle between absolutist and 
relativist perspectives, with the former emphasising the amount of food essential 
for physical survival and health, and the latter stressing that food is necessary for 
personal wellbeing, self-respect and social interaction, because food is as much 
about sociocultural positioning as it is about physiological needs. As such:
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... both absolute and relative approaches are valuable. They show the 
absolute characteristics, such as lack of resources and physical health 
outcomes, alongside relative aspects of food poverty and inequality, 
such as feeling isolated, not being able to eat what you feel necessary 
... studies have shown policy-makers that there are consistently large 
groups of people experiencing food deficits, even in developed 
countries. A study of Londoners may show different food problems 
to those experienced in sub-Saharan Africa but, for Londoners, that 
is their reality. (Lang et al, 2009, p 262)
Lang et al stress that the individualist discourse of recent welfare politics (the 
emphasis on lifestyle and habits) makes it hard to correct such deficits, however. 
What feeds this individualism are lingering images in the popular and media 
imagination of the Dickensian poor as thin and threadbare, where sedentary 
corpulence was associated with affluence – gout was the ‘rich man’s disease’. This 
contrasts conveniently with today’s perception that low-income individuals are 
more likely to be overweight or obese – although the reality is more complex 
(Dowler et al, 2007, pp 129-30; Bennett, 2013). ‘See, since they could spend 
their money wisely, but choose not to do so, why should I care about them?’ 
The images of indigence have changed but the central message (poverty is due 
to deficiencies of character) has barely altered.
This may help explain why supermarket expansion has been so popular 
among policy-makers for decades now, including New Labour (Dowler et al, 
2007, p 144). A market-dominated politics means it is easier for governments 
to make cheap food available than healthy food affordable. They are also more 
cost-effective for low-income shoppers (the late lamented corner shop lacked 
economies of scale), and since supermarkets can make it easier to purchase fruit 
and vegetables that, too, feeds the individualistic discourse (‘they could spend 
their money wisely’).
In other words, consuming the wrong kind or excessive amount of food is 
tantamount to a failure of agency. If what you are is what you eat, then the body 
becomes a screen for reading character and constructing a narrative either of 
personal worth or weakness, where weakness implies succumbing to appetites 
that responsible consumers are meant both to indulge (shops need shoppers, 
after all) and control (you need to keep yourself alive and healthy and shopping). 
Lurking within this economic liberal discourse, therefore, is a subtle moralistic 
tone, one applied to families, too, as part of a wider panic about social change 
that is particularly directed against poorer households (see Fitzpatrick, 2008a, 
pp 141-8).10 Moral character requires strong families, it is claimed. If the characters 
of the poor are deficient, then their families and support networks must be too. 
An equation is therefore constructed in which unhealthy diet and nutrition is a 
sign of irresponsible agency, lack of respect for self and others, family breakdown 
and antisocial communities.
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By contrast, a sociostructural analysis highlights the ‘psychosocial’ aspects of 
health in which relative low income matters because of the stress and anxiety it 
creates (Wilkinson, 1996, pp 156-65). Lack of income accompanies the need to 
make unenviable choices:
It is not that families in poverty are unaware of the health benefits 
of eating certain types of foods; just that that these assume a lower 
priority than the immediate concern of filling stomachs. (Lang et al, 
2009, p 260)
Social exclusion matters because food signifies the need to fit in, to be regarded 
(and regard oneself) as normal, as belonging to the social group:
A family may be well-nourished from a calorific perspective but 
experience deprivation through lack of access to valued foods.... This 
can result in making decisions about food, not on the basis of cost or 
health but to meet social objectives, as when parents on low incomes 
buy more costly branded foods for their children in order not to let 
them feel at odds with their peers. (Lang et al, 2009, p 262)
An affluent society makes foods high in sugar, salt and fat more available and, 
because they are often cheap, dangles them in front of those who seek whatever 
escape or short-term stimulation they can in a society that they know devalues 
them. The ‘new food poverty’ is one dominated by processed, energy-dense and 
high-calorie foods, in the context of a seductive, airbrushed but also judgemental 
popular culture.
These kinds of relativist perspectives have been familiar for decades, going back 
at least to Peter Townsend and the Black Report. More recently, environmentalist 
critiques have contributed to the familiar structural-relativist challenge to 
individualism:
Today, cheap food is under attack for externalizing environmental, 
as well as social, costs. Behind cheap food may lie uncosted or 
under-costed externalities in the form of threats to the environment, 
healthcare bills, distant workers on low wages and other social 
dislocations.... Rather than polarizing understanding – and therefore 
policy – between the general and specific, macro-economic and food 
policies, it is more sensible to accept that the two foci are related. 
(Lang et al, 2009, pp 262-3)
If – in my vocabulary – our political economics has to become more ecosocial, 
then what Lang et  al are pointing to is an understanding of food policy and 
poverty which more directly and transparently incorporates social and ecological 
perspectives. The developed world manages to combine overconsumption (and 
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so a high ecological footprint) with new forms of stratification in which those 
on low incomes are deprived, both in terms of nutrition and physiology, but 
also in terms of sociocultural belonging, that is, they are excluded and devalued.
What solutions to these problems can be envisaged? Despite my earlier caveats, 
charities remain important. As noted above in relation to FareShare schemes, 
food companies have begun to donate surplus food, at least partially filling a gap 
left by recent welfare state retrenchment. The other main solutions proposed to 
food poverty include: market regulations and taxes; education and information 
campaigns; technical innovations, for example, genetically modified (GM) 
foods (Singer and Mason, 2006, pp 202-12); and public welfare, for example, 
guaranteed Income Support and school meals (McMahon and Marsh, 1999, 
pp 6-11; Gustafsson, 2002). Yet Lang et al (2009, p 266) argue that it is difficult 
to generalise: ‘The conclusion from this welter of important data is that single 
factors are unlikely to be the sum of the situation.’
What is clear is that the ‘downstream’ solutions favoured by economic liberalism, 
emphasising customer choice and responsibility at the point of purchase, have not 
worked. The assumption has been that consumers will act wisely (for themselves 
and others) with the addition of correct signals, such as labels, information and 
health campaigns. Poor individuals can be transformed from failed into responsible 
consumers by being alternately shamed about their habits and encouraged into 
new ones:
The purpose of information and education strategies is to change 
behaviour. They fit psychological analyses locating the reasons for poor 
nutritional intake primarily at the level of behaviour and attitudes, 
rather than the societal or economic level. (Lang et al, 2009, p 171)
Yet market individualists fail to understand the structural and social contexts of 
individual behaviour. Steel (2008, pp 196-7) identifies a vicious cycle, for instance. 
As we have become used to ready meals and packaged vegetables – in which 
others effectively cook our food for us – so our cooking skills decline. New homes 
are built with smaller kitchens than older houses and this, in turn, encourages 
us to reduce our cooking skills still further. We travel further to purchase food 
that has often travelled thousands of miles to reach us, and that we then do little 
more than heat up in kitchens too small to do much else. This ever-shrinking 
circle of space and capabilities has an adverse affect on the poorest in particular.
More systematic solutions that focus on the ‘upstream’ are therefore needed, 
that is, what happens throughout the food chain before food reaches the shelf. 
This is an approach that the climate change agenda similarly enjoins.
Natural environments and food11
Despite its long history (see, for example, Schumacher, 1973, pp 87-96; Carson, 
2000), let us continue with the synthesis attempted by Lang et  al (2009; see 
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also Leahy, 2004; Dowler, 2008; Agyeman, 2013, Chapter 2; Berners-Lee and 
Clark, 2013, Chapter 13). Human health and natural health are symbiotic and 
interwoven. They propose: (1) growing food has an impact on the environment 
and (2) the health of the environment affects the amount and quality of the food 
available to us. Let’s review these in turn.
Food supply chains have an impact on the environment in a number of ways. 
Inputs on the production side include inorganic fertilisers, pesticides, machinery, 
ploughing, feed, deforestation and interventions into the water supply. These 
have many effects, including: loss of soil fertility, depletion of water systems, 
acidification and air pollution, loss of biodiversity and overgrazing. Once the 
food is grown it has to be processed, packaged, distributed, sold, refrigerated, 
cooked, excreted or discarded, all of which uses energy, creating carbon emissions 
and waste.
In the UK the agri-food sector (including manufacture, transport, retailing, 
and so on) accounts for 19 per cent of GHG emissions, which is, in fact, less than 
two-thirds of the EU average (Lang et al, 2009, p 197). Thus,
Food transport’s externalities are identified as including: GHGs, air 
and noise pollution, congestion, accidents and infrastructure impacts. 
Attempts to cost these externalities for the UK have been priced 
variously at £1.9 billion and £4 billion. (Lang et al, 2009, p 198)
In fact, estimating externalities is fiendishly complex since it is a matter of morals 
as much as economics (Thompson, 2012, pp 224-6). Negative externalities include 
‘food miles’ as food now travels over vast distances, amplified by the desire for all 
types of food to be available to consumers during all seasons, in what Lawrence 
(2004, pp 87-98; see also Paxton, 1994) calls a ‘permanent global summer time’. 
Yet driving 6½ miles to a food shop produces more carbon than air freighting a 
pack of green beans from Kenya. ‘Local production’ and ‘low ecological footprint’ 
do not always or necessarily coincide (Lang et al, 2009, pp 199, 298; see also 
Singer and Mason, 2006, pp 140-50). But food miles also bring some positive 
externalities, including supporting workers in other countries. Ballingall and 
Winchester (2010) find that some of the world’s poorest nations, particularly 
in sub-Saharan Africa, could suffer considerably from European reductions in 
food miles.
Conversely, climate change affects, and is further expected to affect, food supply 
in ways that are equally diverse and multiple:
The commonly presented scenarios include impacts such as an increase 
of extreme climate events and rising sea levels and shifting temperature 
zones. Agriculture and food impacts include some regionally specific 
advantages, such as increased rainfall or milder temperatures and longer 
growing seasons, but the overall picture is negative. There will be more 
extreme weather events from drought to flooding, and so harvest loss, 
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increased and wider spread of crop and livestock diseases (currently 
witnessed with blue tongue disease and avian flu), water loss, and shifts 
in optimum growing areas for particular crops. Particularly at risk 
are those parts of the world where populations and their agricultures 
are already highly vulnerable to disruption, notably in areas prone to 
flooding, such as estuarial zones. Along the supply chain there will be 
disruption to sourcing of foods, unexpected shortages, and transport 
and supply locations. (Lang et al, 2009, pp 196-7)
The growing recognition of this human–nature symbiosis has driven attempts 
by governments and industry – often in partnership – to manage the food–
environment relationship more effectively.
Since the Second World War, agricultural policy has been mainly concerned 
with improving levels of production, largely in the form of agricultural subsidies, 
guaranteed minimum prices, tariff protection and the purchase of surplus 
production. But since the 1990s the emphasis has shifted, with subsidies decoupled 
from production and directed towards agreed public goods:
... the maintenance of agricultural land, including permanent pasture, 
in good agricultural and environmental condition ... cross-compliance 
with a range of regulations covering environmental protection, animal 
and plant health, animal welfare and food safety. (Lang et al, 2009, 
p 209)
However, an ecosystems approach to the management of fisheries has been mixed 
at best (see also Singer and Mason, 2006, pp 111-14). The need to conserve 
stocks has been difficult given the issue of overlapping and disputed territories – as 
well as a fair amount of politicking, corruption and non-enforcement of laws.12 
Changes have been industry-led, with consumers given little relevant information.
Overall, however, issues of biodiversity, environmental protection, pollution 
and GHGs have entered the policy process. So-called ‘conservation agriculture’ 
includes minimal soil disturbance, permanent soil cover and crop rotations. Thus, 
organic farming involves the abolition of inorganic fertilisers and most synthetic 
pesticides, although, according to Lang et  al (2009, p  210), ‘with reduced 
production levels, it does not necessarily make it more efficient in terms of land 
to energy input ratios or in terms of GHG emissions’ (cf Singer and Mason, 
2006, pp 197-202, 216-18). Despite its popularity with some consumers, organic 
farming occupies a fairly minor position within agricultural production overall. 
Within ‘conventional agriculture’, meanwhile, improvements in the use of nitrates 
and pesticides, protection for vulnerable areas, integrated farm management 
and integrated pest control techniques have been introduced. The principle of 
sustainability has therefore entered the production process:
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Natural capital (including soil, water, air, plants, animals and 
ecosystems) has to be integrated in agricultural systems in the form of 
regenerative technologies, such as: use of nitrogen-fixing plants for soil 
conservation, use of natural predators for pest control, integration of 
animals into cropped systems. Social capital entails utilizing: farmer and 
community labour, and knowledge and experience; and underpinning 
community cohesion. The aim is to achieve enhancement of both 
the quality and quantity of wildlife, water, landscape and other public 
goods of the countryside. (Lang et al, 2009, p 211)
Although we should also heed Kaufman’s (2012, pp 49-56, 65-72) warning that 
corporations have adopted the sustainability principle to forestall a more stringent 
approach forced on them by governments or consumers. They seek, in other 
words, to set the terms of the debate, control relevant information and data, co-
opt some green non-governmental organisations (NGOs), manage public opinion 
and so subtly ‘regulate the regulators’. Sometimes the strategy is not so subtle. In 
2010 the UK Coalition government was allowing major retailers to dominate a 
Whitehall project on health, smoking, alcohol and food policy – overseen by the 
Health Minister referred to in note 1 (Hickman, 2010). Clearly, the food supply 
chain in developed countries remains dominated by private corporate governance, 
the assumption being that, once standards, auditing regimes and labelling are in 
the place, consumers can be left to make appropriate choices.
Beyond the production process, steps to reduce adverse environmental impacts 
have been made in terms of water use, waste, recycling and packaging, and greater 
energy efficiencies. Since many initiatives emerge at the EU-level or higher, and 
given both the internationalisation of the supply chain and the dominance of 
big manufacturers and retailers, national states have adopted a horizontal form of 
‘mixed governance’ (Fitzpatrick, 2011d, pp 164-8). The main instruments have 
included stronger regulatory standards, landfill taxes, target setting and voluntary 
agreements.
Lang et al (2009, p 213) identify some positives here, with retailers recognising 
the business case for more responsible action. They are less complementary 
about attempts to place the emphasis on consumers’ capacity to make informed 
choices (through certification and labelling schemes) that will send the correct 
eco-friendly signals back down the supply chain. As noted earlier, they welcome 
attempts to more directly shape, edit and encourage consumers’ ecological values 
and choices, with retailers and public sector institutions having a central role to 
play. These upstream solutions involve what is called ‘choice-editing’, and we 
explore an aspect of this below.
In sum, Lang et al’s (2009, p 218) conclusion at the end of the 2000s was that,
... policy-makers have not found many of the answers yet; but some 
of the right questions are beginning to be asked. Step changes are 
needed to ensure the health of the environment and our ecosystems, 
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and the future quality of our food supply and human health; but these 
substantial step changes are still to be made.
Ecological public health
Clearly, then, for Lang et al (2009; see also Goodman et al, 2010, p 1783) the 
immediate task is to challenge the economic liberal orthodoxy of the last few 
decades with its emphasis on consumer choice and competences (or deficiencies) 
– where food is just another commodity – and its rejection of social rights and 
state welfare. Only in this way can we begin to reconcile social and environmental 
domains within what they call an ‘ecological public health’ (EPH) agenda (see 
also Barling et al, 2002; Lang et al, 2002):
… the pursuit of public health requires the analysis of the composite 
interactions between the material, biological, social and cultural 
dimensions of existence. This demands a new mix of interventions and 
actions to alter and ameliorate the determinants of health; the better 
framing of public and private choices to achieve sustainable planetary, 
economic, societal and human health; and the active participation of 
movements to that end. (Rayner and Lang, 2012, p 353)
‘Ecological’ thus refers both to the natural environment and to these complex, 
mutually determinate relationships (Rayner and Lang, 2012, pp 62-5, 92-102). 
Obesity, for instance, is made possible by developed nations monopolising the 
world’s resources, and should be understood, not as greedy people hoovering 
food into their mouths, but via the interactions of material, biological, cultural 
and social dimensions (Rayner and Lang, 2012, pp 316-21).
Lang (2010) summarises EPH’s main elements:
• food quality (fresh food, sustainable sources, local production)
• social justice (animal welfare, fairtrade, good work conditions)
• environment (water, climate change, land use, soil, biodiversity, organic)
• health (safety, nutrition, cultural practices, for example, marketing and store 
checkouts; see Haigh and Durham, 2012)
• social determinants (access, affordability, socioeconomic status).
There is already some evidence of development in this respect, with UK healthcare 
beginning to emphasise prevention rather than simply treating conditions once 
they develop.
Yet such integrative, joined-up strategies have been fairly modest simply because 
they neglect a wider set of contexts. How effective are education and information 
campaigns likely to be against a background of energy-dense supermarket choices 
(rich in fat and sugar), sedentary workplaces and high carbon economies (oil- and 
car-dependent)? In short, no choice or institution is separable from the broader 
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socioeconomic and cultural context. You can set up exercise classes for overweight 
people and you can reduce the footprint of the NHS, but such measures are 
of minor significance in the long term unless you attend to the entire system. 
Reducing the food chain’s negative social and environmental implications implies 
broader and more radical socioeconomic and cultural changes.
The need for integration quickly bumps up against obstacles that resist it, 
therefore:
• Market actors: supermarkets are likely to oppose anything that challenges their 
dominance or to co-opt change that cannot be resisted (‘greenwash’).
• Political inertia: politicians focus on the short term (elections) and governments’ 
policy processes are characterised by multiple layers of governance that 
engender policy drift without firm leadership.
• Cultural non-compliance: the needed political and social challenges conflict with 
the individualistic and consumerist assumptions of the last half-century.
• Scientific and social uncertainties:
... the need to work out a more subtle and complex way of judging 
what an adequate diet is, one that integrates not just nutrition and 
carbon but also issues such as place, time and mode of production.... 
This will be complex and suggests that future food policy will not 
be of a “one size fits all” variety. Different outcomes and approaches 
may be suitable for one policy issue but not for another. (Lang et al, 
2009, p 299)
Overall, then, policy and strategic integration must accompany an admission of 
complexity (uncertainty, conflicts, competing imperatives and lack of clarity). But 
EPH also assumes that resolving this ‘integration + complexity’ dilemma requires 
a renewed emphasis on food democracy rather than the fetishisation of consumer 
choice. Rather than merely providing ‘downstream’ solutions, for example, food 
labelling, there is a need to reframe consumers’ understandings of the social, health 
and environmental impacts of what they purchase:
… choice is too often presented as what consumers do, while down-
playing the choice-editing made “upstream” in food-supply chains 
by contracts and specifications from farm to shop…. The ecological 
impact of consumerism might be great, but that is not the same thing 
as building policy process on a myth that consumers are in charge. 
(Lang et al, 2009, pp 304-5)
In short, we can see EPH as corresponding to the ecosocial understandings 
I have been formulating and categorising throughout this book. Table 7.1 summarises 
and highlights the conjunctions without much need for further commentary.
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Two critical reflections
Free markets are comforting for many because they easily become our adjudicator 
not only of what is possible or impossible, but also of what is right and wrong; 
the attractiveness of at-a-distance corporate governance is that it allows others to 
make our decisions for us. But if what we need is to recognise market relations as 
a sub-set of morally informed social, public and environmental policies (Sandel, 
2012), then our task becomes one of reconciling a plurality of moral perspectives, 
methods and judgements. ‘Food ethics’13 has become a popular and alluring phrase 
(our food reveals what and who we care about), but it carries with it a weight of 
Table 7.1: The ecosocial poverty of food
Food poverty
Causes Symptoms Solutions
Quantity High food prices, 
especially relative to 
the lowest incomes
Malnourishment; poor 
nutrition; debt and heat-or-
eat trade-offs; greater risk 
of ill health
Higher wages, benefits, tax 
credits, etc. Price caps
Mobility Prevalence of 
supermarkets; 
restricted choice and 
diversity. Food deserts
Food insecurity. Limited 
availability of and access 




Revitalisation of high 
streets and other shopping 
boroughs
Value Individualisation 
of social problems; 
assumption of 
consumer freedom and 
market sovereignty
Psychosocial risks and 
anxieties; reliance on 
processed foods. Cultural 
disrespect. Reliance on 
charity
EPH. Renewed emphasis 
on social determinants. 
Upstream/choice-editing
Control Alienation and 





Dominance of big four 
chains. Poor households 




Sharing Domination by food 
corporations; consumer 
passivity. Over-
consumption of meat 
and dairy
Negative externalities, 
eg loss of soil and water 
capacity, and biodiversity. 
Avoidable waste 




New taxes, eg on waste
Caring Energy imbalance due 
to reliance on fossil 
fuels. Separation of 
social and ecological 
imperatives
Negative externalities, 
eg loss of soil and water 
capacity, and biodiversity. 
Avoidable waste 
contributing to carbon 
emissions, eg landfill
EPH. Scaling-up sustainable, 
conservation forms of 
agriculture and aquaculture. 
Low carbon food chains 
– including local sourcing 
and fewer food miles. New 
taxes, eg on waste
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social expectations and ethical diversity (Kaplan, 2012, pp 9-13). In short, there 
is an openness about both EPH and our ecosocial model which, while offered 
as a virtue (a society is only an ‘open society’ if it remains open), contradicts the 
2 + 2 = 4 certainties that so often characterise political debate.
I make this point because, in addition to many issues we cannot discuss here due 
to lack of space (see Lang, 2010, p 1819), Table 7.1 suggests two key questions 
(indicated by the italics in the table).
First, how can we ‘scale up’ from farm shops, farmers’ markets and organic 
box schemes while simultaneously ‘scaling down’ from supermarkets when food 
corporations and agri-business are so powerful? Lang et al (2009, p 286) stress 
the importance of social movements:
... the pursuit of food democracy is a ceaseless task, involving many 
interest groups, professions, trade unions, faith groups, voluntary 
organizations and community groups. The new language is of food 
citizenship, with rights and responsibilities. Citizens have capacities 
beyond those of consuming goods and services, they are active in 
society, which is more than simply a marketplace.
Indeed, we have already been here before – it’s simply that so many of us have 
forgotten. ‘Food democracy’ movements were a characteristic feature of early 
campaigns for welfare reform:
... in the early 20th century, for instance, the dietary consequences of 
poverty brought together an alliance of women campaigners, medical 
interests and unemployed workers. They worked hard to build a 
political consensus around the value of welfare reforms, food safety 
nets and the need to give ordinary people more dignified lives. The 
indignity suffered by poor people due to cash shortages and poor 
quality diets was a persistent theme.... (Lang et al, 2009, p 284)
This emphasis chimes with that of many others. Riches (1997, p 175: cf Hitchman 
et al, 2002, p 11) talks of empowerment strategies and reasserting ownership 
over the production and distribution system. Kneafsey et al (2008, p 170) say 
that alternative food schemes critique and resist structures of power, and propose 
new forms of reconnection between food producers and consumers, including 
partnerships and direct sell schemes. And for an overview of cooperatives (the 
UK movement is dominated by food co-ops), see Scott Cato and Bickle (2010).
The concept of food democracy taps into the growing realisation on the part 
of western publics that democracy and ‘free’ corporate-dominated markets often 
conflict. But this being the case, are social movements and so on enough? The 
problem is that without coordinated and cross-national efforts, the effectiveness of 
social movements and local initiatives may well be modest. Welfare campaigns did 
indeed prepare the ground for later social policy reforms, but a majority of people 
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only said ‘never again’ after a Great Depression and a world war gave them and 
politicians the impetus to propel social developments forward. Additionally, state 
welfare then often displaced community action in a centralising strategy which 
delivered universalism but which also suppressed ‘bottom-up’ initiatives, stifling 
social democracy’s capacity to renew itself and eventually leaving it vulnerable to 
Thatcherite conservatism. For democracy to prevail the countervailing weight of 
states is required, but states that will not thereby undermine the democratic gains 
achieved. A ‘food democracy’ – and an ecosocial system more generally – faces 
the same dilemma of how to centralise and coordinate without surrendering its 
democratising energies (Connelly et al, 2011).
Second, how can we address climate change while protecting, and preferably 
enhancing, personal and political freedoms? We have become used to the ‘choice = 
market choice’ and ‘freedom = market freedom’ equations of economic liberalism. 
The danger is that in opposing the latter we may continue to accept its premise and 
believe that regulated markets equate to regulated people. Compare the following:
If you enjoy unhealthy food so much that you are prepared to accept 
the risk of disease and premature death, then ... that is primarily your 
own business. Our focus is on the impact of your food choices on 
others. (Singer and Mason, 2006, p 4)
… [some people] just eat too much and should show more restraint....
the idea that it is wrong to be a glutton is in urgent need of revival. 
(Singer and Mason, 2006, p 278)
The first quote draws the self/other distinction that is central to Mill’s utilitarianism, 
one with which many non-utilitarians concur. Yet although it is prefaced with 
a discussion of healthcare costs, the second quote is taken from a passage about 
Christian sin. Since something is sinful even if no one else is affected, the authors 
risk abandoning a self/other distinction and sliding into a moralistic discourse.
This would be a minor quibble except that a similar slippage occurs within EPH:
... what some call paternalism, be it the improvement of school meals 
or the banning of tobacco advertising, may accord with the informed 
collective will. It is there to enhance the conditions of life confronting 
the individual. (Rayner and Lang, 2012, p 38)
The pursuit of public health continues J.S. Mill’s call for liberty to be 
the antidote to paternalism. (Rayner and Lang, 2012, p 303)
In both cases, Rayner and Lang are supporting individual wellbeing and 
democracy against smothering forms of state and corporate dominance. But in 
the second quote, liberty is presented as an antidote to something (paternalism) 
approved of in the first quote.
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The confusion may derive from the fact that they neither unpack the 
different kinds of paternalism that exist nor the diverse justifications for them 
(see Fitzpatrick, 2011a). For instance, in identifying a key problem with nudge 
economics and libertarian paternalism, that is, that it ignores corporate power, 
Rayner and Lang (2012, pp 272-5) appear to support a ‘soft paternalism’ (although 
without using that terminology). They support the Norwegian breastfeeding 
campaign of the 1970s, saying it succeeded because rather than seeing women’s 
behaviour as the problem, and hectoring them to change, it removed pressure – 
the commercial interests selling breast milk substitutes.
But here is the challenge. Where harm-to-others is at stake, soft paternalism 
has no problem with prohibition, regulation and hectoring. The test for soft 
paternalists arises when appropriate ‘structural’ reforms are made and some 
individuals still indulge in harm-to-self. Do soft paternalists have the courage 
to permit this?
All of which relates to the agenda of upstreaming and choice-editing, by which 
is meant,
... the use of product and process specifications to frame consumer 
choice by introducing tougher standards, before the consumer selects 
between items. In effect, this is using conventional business practice 
for socially and environmentally benign ends. (Lang, 2010, p 1825)
But what kind of upstream interventions are appropriate? The nudge paternalist 
might be content to place unhealthy foods on the ‘fat shelves’, hoping that this will 
dissuade some customers from purchasing them, without actually preventing them 
from doing so. Rayner and Lang (2012, p 328) would regard this as inadequate. 
All foods should conform to minimum health standards, they say, implying before-
the-shelf interventions which confront those commercial interests reinforcing 
‘anti-health behaviour’. Fine. But once market and social structures have been 
suitably altered, surely the soft paternalist has to leave individuals to make their 
own decisions. If some people want to quaff bags of sugar, then so be it.
We can therefore contemplate minimum prices for alcohol, tobacco and fatty 
foods. In Fitzpatrick (2008a, pp 103-8) I argue that the government has a right 
to protect its present and future citizens from the healthcare costs that such 
indulgences might impose on them. Similarly, when prohibiting harm to others 
we should often include non-humans as ‘others’. But if the self/other distinction 
is to be maintained, the government does not have a right to say ‘this is bad for 
you, therefore we are banning it’, nor to raise health taxes beyond what is needed 
to protect others. I am therefore nervous of Lang et al’s (2009, p 301; also Rayner 
and Lang, 2012, p 318) assertion that ‘Obesity is to health what climate change 
is to the environment.’ Where obesity harms others this may be the case. But in 
so far as obesity is merely harmful to the obese person, the assertion derives from 
the kind of paternalism from which we do indeed require an antidote.
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All of which reflects back on the kind of food democracy we want. Rolling 
back the free market, without creating a new space for the top-heavy, nanny-
knows-best state, implies some kind of deliberative democracy with greater 
participative inclusion in the policy process (Fitzpatrick, 2002) – including the 
food chain. Soft paternalism allows you to try and change someone’s preferences 
so long as you respect the rational agency of those with whom you are debating.
In any event, my main point is that these are difficult, intransigent questions. 
Both EPH and my own ecosocial model offer an agenda and set of aspirations 
through which they can be discussed and worked through. But allowing ethics 
to contextualise markets means accepting an openness far broader, less certain 
and more unnerving than the prescriptions that come from allowing markets to 
dictate our ethical compass. Those who deny this, or expect a fully elaborated 
blueprint of policy reforms for the 21st century, may have to look elsewhere.
Conclusion
I began by arguing that food has been de-socialised by economic liberalism and 
by the domination of food corporations within the food chain. We then sketched 
recent developments and priorities, concluding that we are ill equipped to deal 
with the challenges of the 21st century. We reviewed the extent to which an 
individualistic politics locates the causes of food poverty in poor people themselves, 
and we saw that the principle of sustainability has (if only marginally) begun to 
influence policy concerning food and natural environments. The following section 
then outlined the EPH approach developed by Tim Lang and others, and Table 7.1 
mapped this against the ecosocial themes developed in previous chapters. We 
concluded by raising two issues – concerning democracy and paternalism – that 
identify issues that will be central to the ecosocial politics of the 21st century.
Once more, we have seen that the destructive use of socionatural resources is 
connected to the social deprivations of that usage. In terms of food, the gluttony 
of developed countries has had obvious consequences for developing ones. Yet 
within affluent nations, too, the poorest have suffered. Economic liberalism has 
created both the corporatisation of the food chain and a culture in which ill health 
(especially when related to obesity) is blamed on consumption habits rather than 
on what happens before food reaches the shelves. Countries which have adopted 
a regulatory approach, focusing on public goods and public health, and concepts 
that must make increasing room for ecological objectives, do not demonstrate 
the same tendency to blame the victim.
Notes
1 Including a future Secretary of State for Health (Little, 2008).
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4 As Townsend (1979, pp 33-9; see also Dowler and Turner, 2001, pp 16-18) observed, 
even good faith attempts to define absolute needs in terms of nutritional subsistence have 
failed, from Rowntree in the UK to Orshansky in the US, since what people need varies 
according to what their society expects and enables them to do.
5 See www.trusselltrust.org – between April-June 2013, 150,000 people were referred 
to food banks, a threefold increase on the same period in 2012. This followed benefit 
changes including the Bedroom Tax mentioned in Chapter Three earlier (Butler, 2013a).
6 See www.fareshare.org.uk
7 See the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organization at www.fao.org/index_en.htm
8 Until 2007, the relative price of food had been falling for decades.
9 As well as the phenomenon noted by Kaufman (2012), where food prices are spiked 
by speculators in the global futures and derivatives markets. Or more simply, those with 
money try to make more money from those who have little or no money.
10 See the comments by MP Anna Soubry (Quinn, 2013).
11 Note that I will not be discussing animal welfare here.
12 See the 2009 documentary, The End of the Line.
13 See also the work of the Food Ethics Council at www.foodethicscouncil.org
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Land: housing and urban densities
Since buildings sit on it and food is grown in it, the last two chapters lead us 
towards another socionatural resource: land. Five topics seem relevant here. We 
deal with housing and urban density in this chapter, transport, flooding and 
waste in the next.
Britain has a higher population density than most European countries. If 
you took its 60 million acres and divided them between 40 million adults, the 
resulting 1.5 acres per person is equivalent to a box with sides that are 255 feet 
long. In fact, as noted in Chapter Two, Britons are packed into a space narrower 
than this for three reasons.
First, large parts of the country are owned by very few, whether corporations, 
such as the National Trust or the Crown, or family estates (since the Norman 
Conquest, in some cases). One-third of UK land is owned by just 1,200 
families (Cahill, K., 2006, pp 308-9; 2010). Second, the countryside has been 
relatively protected from development. Third, as the rest of us make do with 
the leftovers, pressure on space obviously builds up. The domestic residences we 
occupy are distributed either via housing markets (private residences and rented 
accommodation) or assessments of need (social housing). Over the last four decades 
the balance – including planning and regulatory frameworks (Luhde-Thompson 
and Ellis, 2008, p 47) – has shifted in favour of housing markets, permitting those 
with the financial resources and political voice to occupy greater space and more 
desirable locations.
We have encountered housing already in Chapter Three (place poverty) and 
Chapter Six (energy efficiency). How does housing relate to land? More houses 
obviously means more of the country is carpeted not just with buildings but also 
with the public and private infrastructures needed to support them. Furthermore, 
the number of single-occupier UK households looks set to grow. The question 
of urban density therefore arises, and we explore this shortly.
In this chapter we look at the social and environmental impacts of the housing 
market. What effects do those markets have on the rates and nature of UK poverty? 
Do housing markets contribute to unsustainable urban densities? How should we 
explain these effects, and what solutions might be proposed?
Housing and poverty
The British obsession with property has deep foundations. Asa Briggs (1990) 
records how industrialisation and urbanisation first created slums and then a sense 
of revulsion against squalor on the part of social philanthropists, enlightened 
employers, charities, civic reformers, revolutionaries (such as Friedrich Engels), 
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trade unionists, political campaigners and even, it seems, Queen Victoria. The 
dream of living somewhere better than what Nye Bevan condemned as ‘rabbit-
warren accommodation’ (Foot, 1975, p 56) motivated the post-Second World 
War social housing programme that he initiated. Unfortunately, Bevan’s emphasis 
on housing quality would be overtaken by a quantity-led approach, epitomised 
by stack-them-high tower blocks promoted by local governments too often 
mesmerised by modernist images of ‘cities in the sky’. What Thatcher skilfully 
did after 1979 was to rearticulate those historical desires, turning them against 
the legacies of a social democratic politics that had grown lethargic, by exploiting 
disaffection with social housing and uniting individuals’ aspirations to new visions 
of Britain as a post-industrial economy whose wealth would come from financial 
services and speculation. Share ownership and home ownership would be the 
New Jerusalem, delivered through the private sector.
The long-term consequences of this drove, and reflected, the shift in social 
values associated with economic liberalism.
Desert is now less a question of being than of displaying the outward 
manifestations of personal worth – conspicuous consumption, jobs, holidays and 
‘location, location, location’. You are what you are perceived to be by others in 
a marketplace. In previous, less affluent eras, you could be in need and still be 
judged as deserving. The respectable poor were valued, or at least patronised. But 
with the merger of ‘worth’ and ‘wealth’, to be in need increasingly became a sign 
of personal failings. If you need help, then clearly you are not working, or not 
working hard enough, and so, by definition, you don’t deserve any help. Even 
belonging to groups formally exempt from disapproval is no longer a guarantee of 
immunity. A child from a deprived neighbourhood might be feral. A person with 
a disability might just be ‘pulling a sickie’. The causes of, and barriers inhibiting 
solutions to, poverty barely register with two-thirds of the public (Hanley, 
2009).1 Poverty is regarded not as a series of awful – although often temporary 
– episodes that afflict millions periodically, but as a demon which, stalking our 
free market utopia, has to be exorcised again and again and again. The wealthiest 
have accelerated away, and if you cannot follow them financially at least you can 
assert your status by mimicking a widespread moral and cultural disdain for the 
disadvantaged. The poorest are punched and then blamed for their bruises.
That the welfare state has struggled to keep pace with these economic and 
cultural injustices can be seen in the area of housing. By 2013 the Housing 
Benefits bill stood at £23 billion,2 with over five million claimants, making it 
a frequent source of moral panic and inspiring the benefit caps and ‘Bedroom 
Tax’ mentioned earlier in Chapter Three. Stripped of context, those statistics lead 
easily to salivating headlines in a popular press that also stamps its foot menacingly 
when the obvious alternatives (such as rent control) are proposed. The fact that 
Housing Benefit goes into landlords’ pockets matters little, not when it is easier 
to rage at the (very rare) family living in mansions at taxpayers’ expense.3
That context goes unmentioned for the simple reason that it consists of the 
property boom from which millions have benefited. Development land is now 200 
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times more valuable than agricultural land (Evans and Unsworth, 2012, p 1166). 
This is not to view people as selfish, necessarily. With the state pension withering, 
it is understandable that so many have sought to finance their retirement through 
housing. You climb the housing ladder – buying low, selling high – before retiring, 
releasing the equity, enjoying the proceeds and bequeathing some to the children. 
With millions playing the same game, this propels house prices upwards. And 
the more people play the game, the more the game is worth playing. No wonder 
that housing markets are sometimes described as pyramid schemes (Mulheirn, 
2011). You might even become a buy-to-let landlord; with rising prices come 
rising deposits, meaning millions are forced to rent. The buy-to-let market takes 
properties off the market, demand outstrips supply even more, fuelling ever higher 
prices and deposits and rents. It’s a win-win merry-go-round.4
Except for those on low incomes and no ‘Bank of Mum and Dad’ to help. 
Before the 1980s housing subsidies were directed at bricks and mortar (Webb, 
2012, p 9). Since then, it is demand that has been subsidised to help tenants keep 
pace with soaring costs. Even with low take-up (up to a million people do not 
claim Housing Benefit), such entitlements led to the benefits bill that conservatives 
condemn (Fitzpatrick, 2012, pp 226-8), poverty traps being due not to low wages, 
but to ‘lazy people staying in bed while the rest of us leave for work at 4.30am’, 
etc, etc. Yet there is only so much that benefits can do to compensate for housing 
markets that powered the fantasy economy which crashed in 2007–09.
Overall, then:
• 43 per cent of social renters are living in poverty after housing costs;
• 38 per cent in the private rented sector are living in poverty after housing costs;
• 37 per cent of homeowners are in poverty if their imputed rent (see below) 
is not included in measures of household income. If it is included, few 
homeowners are in poverty (Tunstall et al, 2013).
Bramley (2012, pp 141-4) finds that, like poverty in general, there is quite a lot 
of ‘churn’ when it comes to housing needs. Most housing problems tend to be 
temporary because people:
• trade down to cheaper housing;
• adapt their spending to their income and/or housing needs;
• accumulate debt or run down savings;
• accumulate arrears on mortgage payments or rent;
• apply for state assistance;
• dissolve and/or become reliant on family support.
Yet these strategies may have adverse, knock-on consequences and, even if they 
are successful, problems can recur in later years:
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... households with a current affordability problem ... are five times 
more likely to find hire purchase repayments a heavy burden, four times 
more likely to spend more than 40% of their net weekly income on 
food, and 1.7 times more likely to have no car. They are also slightly 
more likely to say that they have not bought any of a list of consumer 
durables over the last year. (Bramley, 2012, p 142)
Not surprisingly, problems are correlated with low income, few assets, high 
rents and lower security of tenure: ‘Private renting has the highest incidence 
of problems, and owner occupation the lowest, with social renting occupying 
an intermediate position’ (Bramley, 2012, p 144). Lone parents, single-person 
households and younger people are particularly disadvantaged.
In addition to benefits, other aspects of the post-war system remain. Good 
quality, low-cost housing still exists with the social housing sector, accounting for 
18 per cent of all households, having a fairly redistributive effect. Through area-
based initiatives and urban regeneration, New Labour sought a ‘neighbourhood 
renewal’ (Cole and Goodchild, 2001). It also required builders to include affordable 
housing in their development plans in order to receive planning permission (Monk 
et al, 2006).5 This was not simply about ensuring a supply of good, low-cost 
housing, but about trying to facilitate social integration through a mix of tenures.
One effect of the 1980s sale of council housing was that it helped to disperse 
different housing types into separate social spaces (Lee, 1994), although this 
point about social distancing should not be overstated. Clarke and Monk (2011, 
p 422) warn against making simplistic associations between spatial deprivation 
and concentrations of tenure. The vast majority of social housing residents 
‘live in areas with between 10 and 60 per cent social housing.’ Although areas 
with high proportions of social rented housing suffer disproportionate levels of 
poverty, tenure is only part of the problem, and we should not equate ‘poor 
neighbourhoods’ with ‘socially rented housing’. Targeting residualised areas makes 
no sense when there are few such areas to be found.
That said, there is little to challenge the thesis, evidenced in earlier chapters, 
that Britain is a more disconnected country than it once was, with housing 
reforms adding to the cumulative effects of low wage employment, education 
reforms and rising inequalities. For several decades after the Second World War 
there was much less disconnection:
... 55% of British people born in 1946, and 48% of those born in 
1958, spent at least some time in social housing in their childhood. 
(Lupton et al, 2009, p 3)
But the explosion in home ownership and the evisceration of local authority 
housing reversed this trend (Beaumont, 2006; Lee et al, 2006), aided by changes to 
labour markets (Hills, 2007). The North–South divide is largely due to property 
prices, with low-skilled and public sector workers in the South increasingly 
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disadvantaged (Strelitz and Darton, 2003, pp  91-4). This divide should not 
blind us to intra-regional variations yet, overall, there are fewer in-between 
neighbourhoods than was once the case.
That bifurcation then becomes a source of the simplistic and highly politicised 
associations that Clarke and Monk warn against. New Labour’s attempt at 
neighbourhood renewal was a worthy but tricky undertaking (Bretherton and 
Pleace, 2011; see also Darcy, 2010). Researchers disagree about its accomplishment, 
with some calling it a qualified success (Shaw and Robinson, 2010) and others 
more sceptical, arguing that, despite welcome extra finance, New Labour fuelled 
the demonisation of those seen to have excluded themselves from social norms 
(Mathews, 2010).
According to the Conservative-led Coalition government, most social problems 
are due to 120,000 ‘troubled families’ (Casey, 2012).6 Thus social housing has 
become associated with ‘sink estates’, antisocial behaviour and benefit dependency. 
When political parties talk about troubled families we all hear the dog whistle and 
know who, and where, they mean (Hanley, 2007).
Housing and the natural environment
In addition to its social effects, housing has implications for the natural 
environment, as we saw in Chapter Six. Those impacts can be direct (housing 
developments) or indirect (resources diverted away from ecological sustainability). 
Ten buildings do not necessarily have a worse impact than five buildings. Quantity 
matters, but what matters more is the geographical distribution of those buildings.
There is disagreement about how much sprawl exists in the UK. Officially, 
about 9 per cent of England’s land area is urbanised (Stratton, 2012), but the 
Campaign to Protect Rural England contests this: ‘the UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment shows that 14.6% of England’s land area is already classed as urban 
– the third highest figure in Europe after Belgium and Holland.’7 It depends on 
where you perceive sprawl as ending. A road takes up a fixed area, but the noise 
and pollution it generates spreads farther. The trend everywhere, however, is 
towards more sprawl. Since the 1950s,
European cities have expanded on average by 78%, whereas the 
population has grown by only 33%. (EEA, 2006, p 11)
Even so, 14.6 per cent hardly seems like much. Due to restrictions on development, 
builders economise on plots: ‘… the average size of new homes has got smaller, 
so that the smallest new homes in western Europe now appear to be being built 
in England’ (Evans and Unsworth, 2012, p 1166). If what counts as ‘high’ or ‘low’ 
density varies from place to place (Cheng, 2010, pp 13-16), perhaps Britain is 
already dense enough. So why be concerned?
The consensus is that, beyond a certain threshold, lower density housing is 
worse for the environment than higher density housing (Bulkeley, 2013, pp 64-5, 
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119-21).8 This challenges the ‘garden cities’ approach of Ebenezer Howard (1985, 
p 11, emphasis in original): ‘Town and country must be married, and out of this 
joyous union will spring a new hope, a new life, a new civilization.’ But by and 
large, most regard higher densities as desirable:
With low population density there are simply not enough people to 
make public transport a viable alternative to cars. We need to achieve 
a density of 50 homes per hectare as a minimum sustainable density 
to support a regular bus service…. Existing areas of terraced housing 
and low- and medium-rise blocks of flats normally far exceed this 
density, reducing energy use in transport, encouraging local shopping 
and offering easier conditions for high-efficiency renovation. Higher 
density also helps social integration and reduces isolation by supporting 
mixed uses and better services. Existing suburbs in cities and towns 
have an average density of 35 homes per hectare or less. They could 
be made more environmentally sustainable through subdivision of 
property and infill building, creating enough density to support local 
services and public transport within walking distance. (Power, 2008, 
pp 4489-90; see also Power and Houghton, 2007, pp 108-9)
If Power’s minimum threshold is correct, then parts of the UK need to achieve 
higher densities.9 Even central London is nowhere near the ‘superdensities’ of 
central Paris and Barcelona, for instance (Kohn, 2010, pp 50-7; see also Wyatt, 
2008). In short, higher densities involve:
• lower consumptions of fossil fuels as people travel across shorter distances, 
often on public transport;
• more efficient heating and cooling systems (shared walls and floors/ceilings, 
urban heat islands; see Kohn, 2010, pp 37-41) (combined heat and power 
systems become more viable, as do district cooling networks);
• fewer cars, as well as more walking and cycling, often in shared public spaces 
that can facilitate social capital, communal integration and cultural diversity.
Higher densities can yield ecological, health and social benefits. I say can because 
we should be wary of making casual generalisations. As Mitrany’s (2005) research 
in Haifa suggests, much depends on planning and design; high density in residential 
areas alone was widely perceived as negative, but in public and social areas, the 
response was more positive. Inputs from users and residents also matter. Forsyth 
et  al (2010) draw on evidence from the Corridor Development Initiative, in 
Minneapolis-St Paul (Minnesota), to show that with community participation and 
control in the planning process, support for high-density housing can be built (see 
also Bulkeley and Mol, 2003). But the nature and efficacy of the planning system 
will itself depend on broader socioeconomic structures and political processes 
(Winston, 2010). Quastel et al (2012) show how ‘densification’ in Vancouver 
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has a distinct class dimension, benefiting homeowners much more than renters. 
Poor, working-class and ethnic communities have been displaced from inner-
city neighbourhoods (the process known as ‘gentrification’). Thus, densification 
has been separated from environmental concerns (reductions in emissions) and 
social concerns (social housing needs) (see also Rachel Lombardi et al, 2011, 
p 292). Unsworth (2007, pp 741-2) found similar limitations in Leed’s ‘city living’ 
apartment schemes.
Therefore, higher density per se is not a magic bullet.10 As we saw in the last 
chapter, there is a need to reconnect people to the food chain, something that 
is central to the garden cities vision (Vale and Vale, 2010, p 24). And all cities 
require a degree of unplanned spontaneity, of chaos and excitement, where 
people encounter unknown others, and the identities of communities are open 
and organic (Heng and Malone-Lee, 2010). The needs for privacy, for contact 
with nature and to control spatial boundaries must be part of any higher density 
aspiration (Lawson, 2010). Nor should higher densities compromise the need, 
discussed in Chapter Three, to allow the poorest more domestic space than many 
of them currently have. Resentment, anxiety and social conflict can be the result 
of forcing people together. And while public spaces and parks are vital, Stenner 
et al (2012) and Coolen and Meesters (2012, p 65) suggest that private domestic 
gardens are both desired and desirable.
This more rounded appreciation of what urban reform could mean often 
motivates the drive for ‘transition towns’ in which all parts of a community 
work together to address climate change (Lockyer, 2010, pp 208-14; Bulkeley, 
2013, pp 217-23). This means supporting local economies, for example, local 
food chains, energy generation and local currencies, building self-sufficiency and 
resilience, and experimenting with new communal and civic projects.
Similarly, many search for an ideal that combines features of both compact 
cities and garden cities. Holden (2004, p 106) refers to this as the ‘decentralised 
concentration’ of small, high-density cities with short distances between housing 
and services. Such ‘polycentric cities’ imply either dense centres within large cities, 
or groups of compact towns, although that is not our concern in this chapter.
If housing density lower than a sustainable minimal threshold is ecologically 
damaging, what should our response be? What creates low densities exactly?
Let’s first dispel the opinion that we are powerless to do anything about sprawl. 
Gordon and Cox (2012, pp  567-8) argue that urban planning policies have 
relatively little impact given the workings of market forces, the inertia created 
by political-legal systems (based on private property rights) and the importance 
of cultural norms and standards; for example, it is easier to get Europeans into 
cars than to get Americans out of them. Increasing sprawl has been a feature of 
European and American cities for generations, they observe. Cities sprawl because 
that’s what a capitalist economy requires. Gordon and Cox therefore salute the 
free market, anti-government bias that has characterised much (but not all) of 
the US experience.
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But where other socioeconomic principles prevail, planning does make a 
difference (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003, pp  142-3). According to Evans and 
Unsworth (2012), after 2001 housing density increased in England compared 
to Scotland due to planning guidance issued in the former but not the latter. 
Standards, taste and choice are important but are always shaped by differing social 
contexts into which policy interventions can be made (Evans and Unsworth, 
2012, p 1175).
If we can re-engineer housing densities, therefore, what should we do? What 
should our policies target? There are many causes of urban expansion, suburban 
growth, commuter belts and edge towns (cf EEA, 2006, p 17), but key factors 
include:
• Demographic change: higher birth rates; more post-divorce households; more 
single-person households as people delay or avoid marriage; more single-person 
elderly households as people live longer and women typically outlive men.
• Rising affluence and consumerism: as more people can afford cars, more people 
buy them and more roads are then built (see Chapter Nine).
• Technological change: for instance, as cars become more fuel-efficient so they 
become easier and cheaper to run.
• Policy priorities: planners and policy-makers have been fairly conservative. 
Seen as a solution to congestion, road building frequently just fuels more 
congestion. Public transport has also suffered in the UK (we also review this 
in Chapter Nine).
• Path dependency: the past is sticky. Although planning can make a difference, 
it is often easier to prefer the line of least resistance. A common illustration 
of this is the rebuilding of London after the 1666 Great Fire when proposals 
to widen London’s streets were rejected in favour of following the old layouts 
(Inwood, 2002, pp 95-6).
• Unintended consequences: Owen (2009, p 25) quotes an unnamed environmentalist: 
‘Sprawl is created by people escaping sprawl.’
The housing markets of the last three or four decades must be added to this 
list, if only because they haunt the items above. Demographic change boosts 
increased demand; increased wealth and consumer expectations drive housing 
aspirations upward; policy-makers seek the votes of homeowners as the latter 
become a powerful lobby; and people spread out in search of privatised forms 
of security as social rights are dismantled, social inequalities grow and notions of 
the common, public good erode.
There is an additional characteristic of housing markets, however, one that 
Brueckner and Helsley identify. Where the literature has normally regarded blight 
as causing sprawl – affluent families escaping inner-city conditions that attract low-
income households – Brueckner and Helsley (2011, p 212) view both as being,
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… responses to fundamental market failures affecting urban land 
markets. The analysis shows that distortions commonly identified as 
causes of inefficient spatial expansion of urban areas (unpriced traffic 
congestion, uninternalized open-space externalities, and underpriced 
suburban infrastructure) also cause an inefficient shortfall in housing 
reinvestment and maintenance in the central city.
In other words, private benefits to commuters and builders are higher than the 
social costs of, respectively, commuting and land development, because those costs 
are distributed throughout the community as a whole. This leads to excessive 
suburban development, depressing city centre housing prices and undermining 
incentives to invest in inner cities. Raising the private cost of sprawl – Brueckner 
and Helsley recommend congestion pricing and an open-space amenity tax – 
will rebalance those incentives and reduce urban blight (see also Bednar-Friedl 
et al, 2011).
Given the emphasis on externalities in Chapter Four, my endorsement of this 
argument will come as no surprise. Markets involve more than failures in the 
price mechanism, however. In theory, these are easily correctable. But at a more 
fundamental level, there is something irrational about the behaviour of market 
agents that price corrections may not address. In short, what also matters is the 
‘positional racing’ of which housing markets are a key manifestation. To understand 
this and its social impacts, for example, poverty, and its ecological impacts, that 
is, low urban densities, we first have to understand the relevance of rent-seeking.
Rent-seeking
Rent is payment for the consumption of a resource made to that resource’s 
owner. I own the home that I rent to you for £500 per month. I maximise my 
income by keeping your rent high, although not so high that I price myself out 
of the market.
Renters try to lower their rents by:
• moving from place to place, seeking the lowest viable rents;
• entering the social housing sector, in which rents are protected;
• saving, so that they can eventually become owners.
Where the user and the owner are the same, the ‘imputed rent’ is an opportunity 
cost: the owner-occupier foregoes the income to be derived by renting their house 
to others. When housing demand exceeds supply, my home’s resource value may 
well increase above the standard rate of inflation, meaning that the imputed rent 
falls relative to the increasing wealth stored in the resource.11
In other words, rising house prices means that renters typically face rent 
increases while owner-occupiers face decreases in the relative imputed rent. (When 
supply exceeds demand the reverse happens.) Non-owners seek low rents in 
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competition both with landlords seeking high rents and with owner-occupiers 
seeking lower imputed rents. This is why social democrats stress the importance 
of social housing, capital gains tax, rent control and tenants’ entitlements – each 
offers some protection for non-owners from markets in which owners seek the 
highest possible returns. In a system where the sheer ownership of something 
confers such returns, it is therefore no surprise that people seek them, especially 
when government subsidies are attached. Until house prices dipped at the end 
of the 2000s the housing ladder was really a housing escalator where all you had 
to do was stand still while the laws of supply and demand carried you upwards.
But there is more. Some resources are ‘absolutely scarce’. Absolute natural 
scarcity occurs when, for example, only so many people can experience a view 
of a particular landscape. The more people crowd in to enjoy the view, the less 
of a view there is to enjoy. Absolute social scarcity occurs because, for example, 
only so many people can occupy leadership positions. The more leaders there 
are, the less of a leader any one of them can be.
There are also relative scarcities. A relative natural scarcity retains some of its 
value regardless of crowding. A millionaire may choose the most expensive dish 
but the actual taste of the food does not alter even if everyone else in the restaurant 
buys the same item. A relative social scarcity also retains value. Leadership roles 
must be limited in number, but those roles can be rotated periodically.
A taxonomy of scarcities is represented in Figure 8.1.
But there’s a catch. Those who occupy privileged positions will typically try to 
defend them. I don’t want my view to be ruined by others; I don’t want others 
undermining my leadership. Privilege extends to relative scarcities, too. I order the 
most expensive dish not just because of its taste but because I want to consume 
other diners’ envy of my worth. If everyone else is eating the same food, much 
of its value is reduced. In short, what does and does not count as an absolute 
or relative scarcity depends not just on the thing itself, but also on the conflicts 
between those trying to use or own the thing. Scarcities are partly manufactured 
scarcities, matters of interpersonal and political conflict.12
How are scarcities manufactured? First, by restricting access: those who possess 
resources wield considerable power over how and how far those resources are 
distributed.13 Second, by managing perceptions: I try to convince you that 
absolute scarcities cannot be made relative, or that what you think of as relative 
scarcities are really absolute ones. Manufactured scarcities are resources that are 
made to be, and/or made to seem, scarce. Inegalitarian societies are characterised by 
manufactured scarcities. Some are right-wing, for example, where the unequal 
distribution of wealth is represented, not in terms of power, inheritance or luck, 
but as the product of merit and fair competition. Some are left-wing, for example, 
where a communist party controls the distribution of offices. Genuinely egalitarian 
societies – by making natural resources, social resources and public goods available 
to everyone – are characterised by fewer manufactured scarcities.14
Rent-seeking behaviour should be understood in these terms. Owners raise 
the value of their resources by manufacturing the scarcity of those resources. 
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They restrict access to them and represent that restriction as desirable and/
or inevitable. Think of land. In one sense land has absolute limits, there being 
only so much habitable land on the planet’s surface. But land is also subject to 
manufactured scarcity, as we saw in the ‘Housing and poverty’ section on page 
143. The property boom of the last few decades, and the shift away from social 
housing, first kicks low-income individuals down the housing ladder and then 
blames them for being too lazy to climb. The rent-seeking of owners therefore 
involves not just acquiring a resource with rentable value, but the acquisition of 
a privileged position that allows them to control the opportunities for others to 
acquire resources.
As such, my rent-seeking as an owner is socially insensitive. Anything 
that reduces demand (or increases supply) is detrimental to my interests. If a 
government institutes a massive housebuilding programme, then the equity in 
my house falls and my stock of wealth tumbles. I am therefore going to kick up 
a political stink. Although the fact that the programme may be designed to help 
the poorest appeals to my social conscience, I cannot help but be conscious that 
my wealth is under threat.
My rent-seeking is also ecologically insensitive. If cutting down a tree to make 
room for a conservatory increases my house’s equity, then so be it. In truth, since 
people seem to like trees, I have to bear this in mind too. But the point is that 
the intrinsic value of the environment is subordinated to marketable values. If 
people were happy to pay for conservatories and holographic trees, then owners 
would be incentivised accordingly.
Governments committed to social and environmental justice therefore have to 
address rent-seeking. Marxists propose to abolish the class of private owners so 
that productive property is owned collectively; social democrats prefer to increase 
social (and ecological) sensitivity while preserving private property. Both strategies 
are problematic. Abolition in the former Soviet Union just created different 
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forms of privilege and rent-seeking. For social democrats the obstacles are also 
considerable. Spreading assets sounds attractive but, as noted in Chapter Two, 
since genuine asset distribution threatens the privileges of existing asset-owners, 
you fairly soon bump up against the limits of economic and political power. That 
is precisely why, seeking to expand the size of what the Left historically derided 
as the ‘rentier class’, conservative governments did so with smoke and mirrors. 
The privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s spread some wealth thinly while also 
allowing lots of wealth to be concentrated in the hands of the already wealthy.
In short, land is a socionatural resource, which, partly through housing 
markets, is manufactured into a scarcity by rent-seeking practices that encourage 
insensitivity to desirable social and ecological goals. Therefore, what Brueckner 
and Helsley view as a ‘fundamental market failure’ is only part of the story. A 
negative externality is not simply about the price mechanism failing to internalise 
costs, it is also about the social values and practices of individuals, in competitive 
pursuit of goods that ultimately bring less satisfaction than they expect (see below). 
In the conflicting, rent-seeking behaviour of competing groups, capitalism depends 
on market failures in which some are systemically disadvantaged.
None of this would have sounded particularly original in the 19th century to a 
pro-capitalist such as David Ricardo, a communist such as Karl Marx or a radical 
liberal such as Henry George. But the return of economic liberalism, the decline 
of labour movements, the timidity of social democratic parties, the collusion of 
the media, the corrosive effects of social inequalities and the evisceration of our 
political vocabulary has left us without the power to translate such understanding 
into real social change.
Positional racing
Some academic debates try to keep the flame alive. A positional good is a good 
whose value depends on its scarcity and whose value would therefore be reduced 
– and perhaps destroyed – if that scarcity was compromised. My house is expensive 
because its countryside view adds a value that a similarly sized house in a city 
street cannot have. If others build new houses so that they can enjoy the view, 
then pretty soon there would be no view to enjoy and no added value to be 
derived (Hirsch, 1977, pp 36-41). Let me adapt a common example.
In a stadium there are only so many seats that can occupy row 1, nearest the 
pitch. I pay the highest price because I want a good view and because it confers 
on me a higher status than those in the cheaper seats. If people from rows 2-50 
were to crowd into row 1, no one would have a decent view. But this is unlikely 
to happen since each row has a positional advantage or status compared to those 
behind (row 2 compared to rows 3-50, row 3 compared to rows 4-50, and so 
on). Therefore, while envying those in front of them, the inhabitants of each 
row defend their territory from those behind. Radical social change is unlikely 
because everyone has a positional advantage to defend and because we often fear 
losses (from those behind us) more than we desire gains (from those ahead of us) 
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(Kahneman et al, 1999). This affects even those with little to defend; the less you 
have, the more small advantages become a source of self-respect in a system that 
devalues you. So, the very inequality that makes economic reform necessary also 
makes it psychologically and politically difficult.
The stadium example is stationary, of course. In reality, the members of each row 
try to keep up as those in front risk pulling away and those behind risk catching 
up. Positional advantages are maintained through competitive, positional racing.
Positional goods, then, are always socially exclusive in that they depend on 
others not having them. Economic growth can improve the comfort of everyone’s 
seat, but there will always be a distinction between the better and the cheaper 
seats which rising prosperity does not alter. In Hirsch’s (1977) famous phrase, 
there are social limits to growth.
The Right often denigrate this analysis, of course. In their attack on Robert 
Frank, Kashdan and Klein (2006) assume that,
(1) people desire consumption goods due to inherent characteristics of human 
nature;
(2) markets are always self-correcting (they ‘spontaneously adjust’);
(3) government action makes problems worse; and
(4) we should not exaggerate the damage positional competition causes.
As they say in relation to an example of Frank’s, ‘Buying expensive gas grills is a 
relatively harmless way for people to flatter the will to eminence’ (Kashdan and 
Klein, 2006, p 431).
Points (2) and (3) have, of course, been vindicated in 2007–09 by one of the 
worst economic crashes in history. Or not. I forget.15 Points (1) and (4) treat goods 
as static. They assume that conflicts are resolved by markets for the benefit of all, 
ignoring the extent to which markets are dominated by actors defending their 
advantages to the detriment of those below, for example, through manufacturing 
scarcities. The desire for position drives competition; in turn, the outcomes 
of competition socially construct positional desires and capacities. Point (4) 
further downplays social and environmental costs. Too many grills may tip the 
environment beyond a point that can be corrected.
Kashdan and Klein therefore ignore the realities of socioeconomic conflict, 
for example, positional externalities (see also Hirsch, 1977, p 53). A positional 
externality is created when, because of inequalities in resources, opportunities 
and powers, the quantity and severity of the negative externalities I impose on 
you exceeds the quantity and severity of the negative externalities you impose 
on me. To put it crudely, I maintain my position by getting those in the rows 
behind me to swallow my rubbish. Take three examples.
First, food poverty can be interpreted in this way. Greenhalgh (2005, p 1101) 
traces how the time-saving demands of the rich drove innovations such as prepared 
food, the cheapest versions of which now dominate the diets of the poorest. 
Second, the labour market is thought by some to constitute an insider-outsider 
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system (van Parijs, 1995, pp 211-14). The monopolisation of jobs and wages by 
some creates the systemic low wages and unemployment experienced by others 
(the ‘reserve army’). Finally, positional advantages are often intergenerational. 
The implications of poverty and class for educational attainment have long been 
understood (Reay, 2006). Bramley and Karley (2007) find that housing tenure 
provides an additional, independent factor. Your choices disadvantage other 
people’s children.
In short, we cannot simply offer a bit of market tinkering as a solution to the 
problem of negative externalities when the competitive, positional racing which 
characterises market societies, and which market societies encourage, depends 
on the proliferation of those very externalities. Something more fundamental 
is required.
To sum up: to maintain positional advantage you must engage in a competitive 
race that involves avoiding the negative externalities of others and trying to impose 
your negative externalities on them. Positionality therefore adjoins the earlier 
discussion about rent-seeking.
To own a house is to occupy the front rows. This confers a positional advantage 
vis-à-vis renters – especially in the absence of state intervention – who lose (in 
higher rents) from the rising house prices that benefit landlords (via higher rents) 
and owner-occupiers (lower relative imputed rents). Furthermore, positional 
advantage denotes a power to manufacture scarcities and thereby to impose 
negative externalities on those less advantaged. I can lower supply by, for instance, 
campaigning against proposed housing developments, or against the social 
expenditure needed for social housing, or against Council Tax revaluation and 
property taxes, or indeed any scheme that threatens my advantages. Otherwise 
my positional status risks slipping, with all the emotional-psychological trauma 
that can create in a society characterised by competitive racing (Frank, 1999, 
pp 187-93).
As noted earlier, the housing market in one sense can be a win-win game I 
gain from people stepping on to the housing ladder so long as they do so below me, 
pushing the ladder higher and allowing me to rise accordingly. But the debate 
about positional goods highlights the extent to which this improvement is a 
comforting illusion (Frank, 1999, p 159). The same rising prices which privilege 
me relative to those on the lower rungs also make it hard for me to climb the 
rungs above. Leaving the race would therefore be better, yet it is somehow easier 
to cling to comforting illusions, no matter how irrational this may be.
Positionality and rent-seeking through housing markets therefore have drastic 
consequences.
Greenhalgh (2005, pp 1100-2) argues that markets are largely geared to satisfying 
the demands of the wealthy for positional goods that are time-saving and resource-
heavy. This has two effects. First, the needs of the poorest are neglected. Second 
and third homes proliferate, with holiday homes typically under-utilised, even 
as homelessness persists. Second, with labour being diverted into delivering 
positional goods, the relative price of skilled labour rises, labour-intensive services 
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become more expensive and so further labour-saving innovations are devised. 
Resources that could serve ecological ends are therefore directed towards satisfying 
lucrative but wasteful desires.
Such effects are variously malign and benign so far as the natural environment 
is concerned. Positional advantage encourages sprawl (I and those like me seek 
desirable locations far from the madding crowd) but may also limit it (my location 
is only desirable if it remains exclusive). Sprawl creates the low densities that add 
carbon emissions to the atmosphere due to the increased use of transport and 
domestic energy, but positionality can also contain sprawl as the wealthiest try 
to inhibit nearby housing developments.16
In terms of social justice the effects are less ambivalent. As everyone runs in 
order to stand still, runaway housing markets, as well as the shift away from social 
housing and ‘bricks and mortar’ subsidies, create the poverty detailed above. But 
the effects are also generational, affecting the middle classes too, the irony of 
which would taste delicious if it weren’t so bitter:
Owner-occupiers … approved the increase in the value of their 
homes…. [Yet] The same person will object to new homes being built 
in their area while regretting that their graduate son or daughter is still 
living at home or has to be subsidised to be able to afford “decent” 
living space. (Evans and Unsworth, 2012, p 1167)
What solutions can be imagined (see Hirsch, 1977, pp 182-90)? Are we on the 
positional treadmill forever?
The Marxist’s solution is to abolish the rows, but the disadvantages of this 
are noted above. A compensatory alternative, one commensurate with existing 
practices, comes via the tax system. Through redistribution we might reduce the 
number of rows by pushing them closer together. However, when advocating 
taxation Robert Frank argues that one further consequence might be to slow 
the treadmill down and provide people with greater opportunities to jump off 
it. Frank (1999, p 222; 2011, pp 76-81) advocates increasing taxes on positional 
goods in order to encourage consumption of those goods such as time which 
are not subject, or less likely to be subject, to positional racing and manufactured 
scarcity. By limiting the consumption expenditures of the wealthiest we reduce 
the ‘expenditure cascade’ where, in order to keep up, the middle class must spend 
more, work more hours and save less (Frank, 2011, pp 61-2). Frank believes that 
economic instruments can effect changes to our social values and practices:
... the fact that people at the top save more and spend less on 
[housing] will shift the frame of reference that influences the housing 
expenditures of those just below the top. So they, too, will spend less 
on housing, and so on all the way down the income ladder. (Frank, 
2006, p 442)
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Redistribution is not simply about compensating the least advantaged, but about 
redirecting resources and social priorities towards social and environmental ends 
(Frank, 1999, pp 207-10).
From an ecosocial perspective the objective must be not simply to slow the 
treadmill and provide people with non-positional alternatives, but to do so in 
ways that serve social and ecological principles directly. A general expenditure 
tax on luxuries may or may not do this. A specific proposal that many favour is 
that of a Land Value Tax (LVT).
Land value taxation
Dolphin (2013, p 14) says that LVT ‘… would be progressive, as richer people 
are more likely to own expensive land…. And it would be impossible to avoid. 
In many respects, an LVT is the ideal tax.’ Similarly, the Mirrlees Review says 
that since land does not move, and its ownership is generally visible, it is relatively 
easy to levy taxation on land (Mirrlees et al, 2011, p 368).17
The Mirrlees Review offers two main justifications for a LVT (Mirrlees et al, 
2011, pp 371-2). First, it would not distort behaviour nor discourage economic 
activity. Second, the rental value of land is socially determined rather than being 
due to landowners’ efforts.18 Since land which benefits from good infrastructure 
(such as transport links), property booms or proximity to community facilities rises 
in marketable value, a LVT returns some of those benefits to the social community.
The Mirrlees Review was concerned with market values and did not consider 
issues of ecological sustainability, or the intrinsic values defended in Chapter Two. 
This obviously adds another layer of complication to any efforts to determine 
the site value of land. Those activities which contribute to sustainability, benefit 
further ‘external developments’ and/or recognise and preserve a piece of a 
land’s intrinsic value could be rewarded with a LVT rebate (see below). Those 
activities that do none of these things might be subject to higher rates of LVT. 
(This would introduce complexity into a LVT system, but the practicalities of 
determining and organising this we leave to one side here.) In short, there is a 
third, environmentalist argument for LVT.19
In terms of housing, these arguments for LVT mean that it would need to 
satisfy three objectives.
(1) Generate revenue that can be directed towards the poorest. If you want to live 
in an exclusive, low-density part of the country, you should pay the full social 
and environmental costs of doing so. Those not prepared to do so can reduce 
their tax burden by relocating.20 The revenue generated can be distributed 
either directly (to low-income households) or indirectly (by increasing the 
supply of housing), or both. In short, rather than actually giving everyone 
a box of land whose sides are 255 feet long, LVT is the nearest equivalent, 
connecting individuals to a key socionatural resource that could generate a 
dependable stream of income. And if one further effect (as Frank alleges) is 
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to restrain the property bubbles that disadvantage the poorest, drive positional 
competition and stifle the development of non-positional goods, then great.
(2) Contain sprawl and facilitate higher density housing. If additional taxation 
encouraged large estates to be broken up and sold for development, so 
generating sprawl, then that might conflict with the need for higher density 
housing. So the design of LVT would need to be ecologically sensitive. 
Since the most valuable real estate is often found in city centres, a proper 
restructuring and revaluation could help to encourage the more efficient use 
of land.
(3) Assist other ecological objectives. The revenue generated by LVT could assist 
the energy efficiencies and building retrofits reviewed in Chapter Six. Such 
revenue might assist other reforms. Take one example. A lot of resistance to 
sustainability projects such as wind farms is a NIMBYist defence of property 
values.21 Yet not all of that opposition is necessarily antisocial. The profits 
from wind farms typically flow away from the community that has to live 
near them. Since affluent areas are more successful at resisting developments, 
developers target poorer ones:
… areas less likely to oppose wind energy development tended to 
have populations with lower life expectancies, a lower propensity to 
vote in elections, and higher crime. (Cowell et al, 2011, p 7)
Therefore, development that diverts benefits to the local community can 
build support, redistribute resources, enable local ownership and control and 
improve the long-term social and environmental resilience of poorer areas:
One exciting vision is that benefits flowing to communities from 
large, commercial wind farms could, over a 25-year period, leave the 
communities with a more sustainable, autonomous, locally embedded 
energy system, which retains more local employment and generates 
funds for other goals. (Cowell et al, 2011, p 4)
Arguably, then, LVT could be designed to further recognise and reward the 
contribution of those areas to increasing the availability of clean, renewable 
energy. In wealthier areas this could offset some of the surcharge levied on 
low-density communities and help to build the political support noted earlier 
in note 17.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed land, focusing on housing markets and urban densities. 
It argued that housing-related poverty has risen due to a property boom, the 
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decline in social housing and a shift in state subsidies towards Income Support. We 
saw that recent housing can also affect the natural environment adversely through 
the urban sprawl that creates densities lower than are ecologically sustainable. One 
key driver of urban sprawl is the housing markets of the last few decades. Poverty 
and sprawl therefore have a common denominator: the rent-seeking behaviour 
that typically favours owners above non-owners. This behaviour involves the 
manufacture of scarcities so that those enjoying a positional advantage can maintain 
their advantages despite the social and environmental harms such behaviour often 
creates. The solution is to rebalance priorities so that non-positional goods come 
to the fore. One way of assisting this is through LVT, although much depends 
on its design. See Table 8.1 for a summary.
This analysis suggests that, for all their good intentions, even the most progressive 
social policies have contributed to an enduring problem: a disenfranchisement 
from a key socionatural resource that affects the poorest most adversely. As Davy 
(2009, p 253) observes:
... the fiscal supremacy of tax-based or contribution-based social 
security prevented land reform in most Western countries.... The 
Table 8.1: The ecosocial poverty of land 1
Land poverty 1
Causes Symptoms Solutions
Quantity Property booms. 
Emphasis shifted away 
from bricks and mortar; 
inadequate Income 
Support
Millions locked out of 
the housing market; high 
rents. Residualisation of 
social housing
Revenue from LVT diverted 
to social and ecological 
ends
Mobility Demand exceeding 
supply. Rising cost 
of housing and 
development land
Inability to save; 
rising housing costs as 
proportion of income
New rights and powers 
regarding housing and land
Value Sociostructural and 
political factors 
(including the effects 
of economic liberalism) 
effaced
Moral panics about benefit 
costs, sink estates, etc. 
Housing-related poverty 
treated as a sign of 
personal, moral failure
Shift in social, economic 
and political priorities 
towards social and 
environmental needs and 
new forms of citizenship
Control Dominance of market 
values. Empowerment 
of homeowners and 
developers at expense of 
non-owners




in housing reform and new 
urban redevelopments





Low densities affecting 
energy use, eg transport 
and domestic heating
Revenue from LVT diverted 
to social and ecological 
ends
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payment of housing benefits is supposed to satisfy the need for housing, 
either by the market or the social housing sector. In exchange, land 
policy and planning in Western countries take little notice of “secure 
land rights for all” ... and effectively keep the poor from the ownership 
of land....
In short, the socially careless and ecologically destructive use of land is closely 
connected to the housing deprivations experienced by millions. Overuse 
accompanies misuse. The UK welfare state has adopted ex-post compensations 
that leave the unequal ownership and control of a socionatural resource such as 
land more or less intact. The task ahead therefore requires us to be much more 
ambitious than simply raising benefits, altering tax thresholds or even subsidising 
new housing or deposits for first-time buyers. Will we shift our priorities and 
practices? Or will be continue to use the bruises we inflict merely as targets for 
the next punch?
We have not finished with land, however. Do the disadvantages accruing from 
positional, rent-seeking behaviour attach to housing alone? In Chapter Nine we 
turn our attention to three further issues: transport, flooding and waste.
Notes
1 And with many policy-makers, although their ignorance is either deliberate or feigned; 
see ‘DWP adds to confusion over consultation on child poverty’ by Nick Bailey and Mike 
Tomlinson at www.poverty.ac.uk
2 See Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit expenditure tables, at www.dwp.gov.uk
3 The Coalition government looks set to change this, despite evidence that when the 
benefit is paid to tenants they often go into arrears, having to juggle other needs and costs 
on a limited budget. But that’s fine. If you give money to claimants and they default, that 
can’t be anyone else’s fault but theirs, can it?
4 Nor is there any sign yet of the financial crisis during 2007-09 altering Britain’s love 
affair with property markets, although a future slump in prices cannot be ruled out.
5 Based on Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The requirement 
was suspended in 2012.




8 And a neighbourhood with greater density and a wide variety of housing types is likely 
to have a greater quantity of affordable rental units than a low-density neighbourhood 
(Aurand, 2010, p 1032).
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9 On my calculations, Howard’s (1985, pp 13-17) ideal (30,000 people per 6,000 acres) 
works out at 12.35 individuals per hectare; 6,000 acres represents the entire estate, but 
even with housing confined to 1,000 acres, that still results in 74 individuals per hectare, 
which is lower than Power and Houghton’s threshold of 120.
10 Nor should ‘higher density housing’ be confused with high-rise tower blocks; the two 
are not synonymous.
11 In 2013, UK houses were still overvalued by 20-30 per cent (see www.planetpropertyblog.
co.uk/2012/09/19/uk-house-prices-set-to-collapse). Between 2001-11 average house 
prices rose 94 per cent compared to 29 per cent increases in average wages. It now takes 
first-time buyers an average of eight years to save a deposit, compared with one year in 
1995 (see www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/mortgageshome/article-2262064/First-time-
buyers-times-longer-save-home-deposit-did-1995.html). Imagine a standard inflation rate 
of 5 per cent and house price inflation of 10 per cent. The rent I charge you for occupying 
my £100,000 house rises from £500pm to £525pm. If I remain an owner-occupier, my 
imputed rent also rises to £525pm but this is a fall relative to the new value of my house 
(£110,000) – 100,000 ÷ 500 = 0.5; 110,000 ÷ 525 = 0.477 per cent.
12 A point ignored by Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) in their otherwise interesting book 
on scarcity. I cope with my scarcities by exporting some of them to you. My row exports 
scarcities to your row. And the group of rows to which I belong exports scarcities to your 
group. We can call these groups ‘social classes’.
13 Wealthy homeowners have successfully resisted a revaluation and restructuring of UK 
Council Tax bands since 1991, although the 1991 valuation was inadequate even at the 
time. The tax bands were concentrated at the lower end of the property scale, meaning 
that relatively modest rises in the price of lower cost housing was met with a series of 
tax increases, but these tail off with the second highest and the highest bands, beginning 
at £160,000 and £320,000 respectively (in 1991 prices). Effectively, with two-thirds of 
households valued within the bottom three bands, the majority were paying to reduce 
the tax liability of the wealthiest, making Council Tax regressive even in 1991 (let alone 
following the explosion in house prices between 1995-2007).
14 We do not have the space here to discuss the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy is 
in part due to fixed natural limits, but also due to collective action problems. Inegalitarian 
societies try to avert tragedy by effectively excluding many from the commons, for 
example, through privatising its resources and operating inequalities in private property; 
egalitarian ones try to find inclusive forms of organisation, for example, through 
cooperative control over and use of common resources (Ostrom, 1990).
15 A quick scan of their recent publications suggests their faith is alive and well. Call this 
‘Matt Ridley syndrome’. Despite being chair of Northern Rock when it was bailed out 
by the UK taxpayer, Ridley’s faith in free markets remains undimmed. This is because 
his is a genetic deterministic justification (see Fitzpatrick, 2005b, pp 117-21).
16 This is my hypothesis at least. It would take more time than we have here to test it.
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17 So far as domestic housing is concerned, the Mirrlees Review does not advocate a tax 
on land separate from that of the building(s) sitting on it, although it leaves open the 
possibility of a full-blown LVT being introduced at a later date. In the short term, land 
taxation principles could at least justify tax restructuring, for example, the long-overdue 
revaluation of UK properties for Council Tax purposes, or a ‘Mansion Tax’. If these are 
targeted on the super-rich – those whom economic liberalism has benefited the most and 
who have barely been affected by recent economic difficulties – then political support 
for more ambitious ecosocial reforms could be built.
18 This has been argued by many, from anarchist communists like Kropotkin (2007, 
pp 118-19) to social conservatives like Winston Churchill (Brittan, 2012).
19 Many will identify an oxymoron here. If value is intrinsic, then surely it has to be 
appreciated for its own sake; inserting monetary devises into the picture feels like a 
contradiction. However, recall that Chapter Two rejected an ethos of non-domainship on 
the grounds that the power we possess over nature can and should be wielded responsibly. 
Monetary instruments and incentives should certainly not exhaust our politics, but if they 
can assist the defence of intrinsic values, then they ought to be considered.
20 This raises the problem of rural poverty, that is, those occupying low-density regions 
because of limited choice. A redistribution of LVT revenue would have to assist such 
households rather than penalise them.




Land: transport, flooding, waste
In this chapter we tear through three more land-related themes. We discuss 
transport because in addition to the carbon emissions it produces, land is 
something we travel across, around, over and occasionally beneath to reach the 
places that matter to us. We discuss flood risks because as the world warms, land 
is increasingly subject to coastal, fluvial and pluvial flooding. How we adapt to 
those risks clearly affects the wellbeing of people who live and work in flood-prone 
areas, particularly the poorest. And we discuss waste because ours is a throwaway 
society that burns or buries its detritus on or within the land, affecting the health 
of those who live near incinerators, landfills and similar facilities.
Our dash through these themes will probably deny the topics the full attention 
each deserves, but it will enable our understanding of how and why climate 
change and poverty are increasingly interrelated to expand. The following sections 
review some recent debates, presenting and discussing the most relevant research. 
We then return to the thesis of rent-seeking and positional racing, pondering 
whether and to what extent the issues of transport, flooding and waste disposal 
can and should be understood in those terms.
Transport, poverty and social exclusion
Our principal concepts are as interrelated as ever (Cahill, M., 2010). Lucas and 
Currie (2012, p 155; cf Lucas, 2011) define ‘transport-related social exclusion’ 
as affecting people,
… on or below the poverty line, who do not usually have access to 
a car and many of whom will also be too old or too young to drive. 
Affected individuals therefore mainly rely on walking, public transport 
or lifts from others in order to participate in everyday economic and 
social activities.
Not everyone who experiences ‘transport social exclusion’ will be socially 
excluded in other respects, and it is possible to be socially excluded while suffering 
no or few transport problems. Overall, however, transport-related exclusion will 
significantly reduce one’s ability to access jobs, healthcare, education and crucial 
social activities, and that reduced participation will, in turn, affect one’s transport 
experiences.
For Hine, ‘transport poverty’ implies a deprivation in accessibility and mobility 
that reinforces, and is reinforced by, other key deprivations. Mobility implies the 
‘ability to get around’ while accessibility is more about the ‘get-at-able properties 
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of a place’ (Hine, 2008, p 50). A bus route may take you from work to your GP, 
but if you cannot afford to miss work, it is not accessible. If the surgery is open 12 
hours every day then it may be accessible, but if you need to take two buses (or 
a taxi, or a very long walk) to get there, then your mobility is restricted. Three 
processes interact in relation to transport poverty, Hine concludes: the ways in 
which households organise themselves, the nature of the transportation system 
and the time-space organisation of the facilities people are trying to access.
This interaction between multiple deprivations implies various types of 
exclusion (Hine, 2008, pp 51-2):1
• physical – the barriers inhibiting access to services;
• geographical – poor transport provision (especially in rural and urban fringe 
areas);
• facilities – considerable distances between residence and important facilities;
• economic – high travel costs constraining access to facilities and jobs;
• time – demands on time restricting the time available for travel;
• psychocultural – perceptions of certain places and times (especially late-night 
travelling) as dangerous and so restricting access (also OFT, 2010, p 71);
• space – the management strategies of public and private systems.
Let’s break transport poverty and social exclusion down into four headings: costs, 
mode, convenience and effects.
Costs
According to the Campaign for Better Transport (2008, p  1), from the late 
1980s to the late 2000s, a period when the overall costs of motoring fell, UK 
public transport fares increased significantly to more than 20 per cent above 
the European average. Bus fares in England rose by 51 per cent between 1985 
and 2009; in London, where fares have been regulated, the increase was slightly 
less severe (46 per cent).2 Average rail fare prices increased by 60 per cent from 
2002–12 alone. However, recent spending on transport shrank as a proportion of 
total household expenditure (from 14.5 per cent in 2001–02 to 13.4 per cent in 
2009–11), although the percentages for rail, bus and coach spending remained 
the same. One possible reason is that some people changed their behaviour, that 
is, travelled less as a response to rising fares (O’Leary, 2013).
Low-income households:
• need to spend a higher proportion of their income on bus travel;
• struggle to access the best deals, for example, season tickets;
• experience added costs when paying for children’s travel.3
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Since low-income households are those most burdened by transport costs, the 
behavioural changes made in response to rising fares may involve even less access 
than before to the activities central to social participation and personal wellbeing.
Overall, then, the highest costs for accessing even the most basic public and 
private services are experienced by those least able to afford them (Clifton and 
Lucas, 2004, pp 25-6).
Mode
Those on low incomes rely more on bus services. Compared to people in the 
highest income quintile, those in the lowest make 58 per cent fewer trips as car 
drivers, 75 per cent fewer by rail, 50 per cent more trips on foot and 206 per 
cent more by bus or coach.4 Just over half of the poorest fifth do not own a car, 
compared to 26 per cent of the total population, rising to more than two-thirds 
of unemployed people.5 And the lower your income, the more likely your car 
will be an older, second-hand vehicle which is less fuel-efficient, more expensive 
to maintain (adding to financial burdens and stress) and more polluting (Clifton 
and Lucas, 2004, p 22). The working poor are also more likely to work non-
traditional hours (shift work) when public transport services are less frequent 
(OFT, 2010, p 70).
Convenience
Docherty et al (2008, pp 85, 88-93) summarise the malign cycle at work in a 
car-dependent society. As cars enable and encourage sprawl, public transport 
becomes harder to organise and so less popular, that is, unless a bus takes forever 
winding its way down every other road, many rural and urban fringe areas will 
be under-serviced. To compensate for this, more people buy cars, more roads and 
car parks are built, land use becomes characterised by even more sprawl, public 
transport appears even less popular and flexible, and so it goes on.
Car dependency therefore becomes self-reinforcing and – in a Top Gear culture 
– one of those ‘good dependencies’ that is politically and culturally sanctioned.6 
This dependency is thus represented as symbolic of personal choice and freedom 
(Docherty and Shaw, 2012, pp 136-8). Indeed, Thatcher dreamed of Britain as a 
‘great car economy’ and observed that anyone over the age of 26 using a bus was 
a failure.7 Her deregulation of buses in the 1980s (outside London and Northern 
Ireland) reduced local authority control over bus operators, making corporate 
profit rather than social need the priority (Hine, 2008, pp 56-8).
Public transport (whether subject to public, private or not-for-profit ownership) 
then becomes a symbol of inflexibility, inefficiency, congestion, price gouging or 
(travel on a British train if you are puzzled by the next four words) all of the above. 
It is possible to have public schemes that are flexible, convenient and driven by 
social priorities, for example, community-based transport (Lucas, 2004, passim), 
but they require long-term dedication and funding.
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The irony of all this is that car dependency leads to congestion and gridlock 
(see Chapter Three and below).
Effects
There are several key effects of all this.
First, the lower your income, the more likely you are to be killed or seriously 
injured on the roads (Clifton and Lucas, 2004, p  27), face worse air quality 
and have higher exposure to other negative impacts of transport.8 The World 
Health Organization (WHO) (2004, pp 14-15) confirms that the least well-off 
socioeconomic groups are at greatest risk of injury and death from road accidents.
Second, for lower-income groups transport costs present significant barriers.9 
Lacking a car means that some jobs, salaries and promotion opportunities are 
outside their reach. Hine (2008, p 54) analyses income in terms of the time it takes 
to do certain things. The poorest individuals are disadvantaged when it comes to 
accessing local shops, post offices, supermarkets, doctors and hospitals, chemists, 
cinemas, pubs, libraries and council offices. The picture is more variable when 
it comes to banks, leisure centres, railway/bus stations and primary/secondary 
schools. Only in the case of one service – the dentist – were the wealthiest most 
disadvantaged. There are consequences for family life, too. Since a car uses as 
much petrol for one person as for four, those relying on public transport face 
higher relative costs when it comes to family holidays and outings.
Third, those experiencing transport poverty are also more likely to suffer 
disproportionately from environmental degradation (Kennedy, 2004, pp 157-
61). We look at the principal instance of what Potter and Bailey (2008, pp 32-5) 
call direct, ‘first-order impacts’ in the next chapter: air pollution. ‘Second-order 
impacts’ refer to social and economic adaptations. For instance, as humans 
became dependent on fossil fuels and cars, so lifestyles become more sedentary, 
leading to less physical exercise, more obesity and rising levels of heart disease 
and type-2 diabetes (in conjunction with the food-related processes explored 
earlier in Chapter Seven). Local areas are hollowed out, with deprived households 
effectively forced to travel elsewhere for services, particularly healthcare, shopping 
and leisure (Clifton and Lucas, 2004, pp 15-19, 29-32; Power and Houghton, 
2007, pp 191-4). The amount of walking and cycling in the UK has declined 
significantly since the 1950s (Tight and Givoni, 2010). The average time spent 
travelling on foot or bicycle decreased in England from 12.9 minutes per day 
in 1995-97 to 11 minutes in 2007.10 Those on low incomes tend to walk more 
and walk further, but this fails to offset their greater overall risk of experiencing 
ill health and reduced longevity.
In sum, there is every reason to suppose that Lucas’s (2004, p 291) depiction 
still applies:
… people living on the lowest incomes … spend a far greater (and 
often punitively high) proportion of their income to travel less often 
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and over shorter distances than the average population. They also 
disproportionately suffer the disutility of our car-dominant transport 
systems. This is not only in terms of their over-exposure to noise, air 
pollution and accidents, but because of diminishing and increasingly 
unaffordable public transport services combined with a decline in 
local shops and amenities in the areas where they live. The effect 
of this ‘travel poverty’ is to significantly reduce their life chances 
because of a reduced opportunity to access a decent education, 
gainful employment, healthcare services and other amenities. In this 
way, the inequalities that are already evident within this sector of the 
population are reinforced.
Transport and climate change
According to the Department for Transport (2011, pp 2-4; see also DECC, 2013c, 
pp 16-17), in 2010 transport was responsible for 21 per cent of the UK’s carbon 
emissions (it was 16 per cent in 1990 and 19 per cent in 1999), cars and taxis 
alone being responsible for 12 per cent (compared to 11.5 per cent in 1999).11 
Not only are we emitting more carbon (especially due to growth in international 
air travel), but the transport sector has not matched improvements found in other 
sectors. Furthermore:
• if emissions from the processing of transport fuels (for example, petrol or 
electricity) are included, transport accounts for 24 per cent of domestic GHG 
emissions;
• yet in terms of domestic transport emissions per person, the UK had the third 
best record of the EU15 in 2009 (behind Portugal and Germany).
Within the domestic sector as a whole,
… emissions from passenger cars … account for 58% of domestic 
transport emissions (ie excluding international aviation and shipping). 
Lorries and vans account for a further 31% of emissions, and public 
transport (including both rail and buses) for 4%. (Sloman et al, 2010, 
p 606)
In order to reverse the direction in which we have been travelling, the Department 
for Transport’s (2009) priorities include:
• a shift to cleaner technologies and fuels (ultra low emission vehicles, rail 
electrification, sustainable biofuels);
• promoting lower carbon choices (public transport, integrating travel modes, 
better information);
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• market mechanisms (trading systems, price incentives, affordable public 
transport).
Sloman et al (2010) found that systematic efforts to reduce travel by car and to 
increase the use of other modes can be highly successful. However, unless transport 
reforms are attached to broader initiatives related to housing and land use, they 
are unlikely to be effective (Newman et al, 2009). This is because we are still 
suffering from the poor decisions made in previous decades. The Campaign for 
Better Transport (2012, p 7) underscores the points made in the last chapter:
Since the 1980s, many cities have allowed large retail developments 
with swathes of free car parking to spring up on greenfield land far from 
the centre and poorly served by public transport. Large, low-density 
housing estates have added to this problem and helped to damage 
the prospects of city centre shops and businesses. In recent years we 
have also seen the centralisation of many essential local services, for 
example with large new hospitals being built on greenfield sites far 
away from where people live.
Ideally, then, new developments should be (Campaign for Better Transport, 
2012, p 8):
• located around existing centres and public transport hubs;
• close to jobs, services and facilities that can be reached by foot, bike or local 
public transport;
• designed so that walking and cycling are safer, faster and more convenient 
than driving;
• built with lower levels of parking provision, which mainly serves to encourage 
car use and is a use of land that helps to reduce urban density.
Fortunately, such initiatives also assist efforts to reduce poverty and social 
exclusion. Families living in neighbourhoods with greater residential density, a 
greater diversity of land uses and transit services spend just 9 per cent of their 
income on transport as compared with 19 per cent spent by the average family 
(Aurand, 2010, p 1034). Also note that,
… emissions from transport show the largest variation across the 
income spectrum, with the highest income decile emitting seven to 
eight times as much as the lowest income decile for private road travel, 
and ten times as much for international aviation. (Hargreaves et al, 
2013, p 5; see also Brand and Boardman, 2008)
There is thus more of a direct link between introducing carbon taxes in order to 
reduce emissions, on the one hand, and progressive redistribution, on the other. 
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Fuel duty escalators, congestion charging, parking charges, aviation taxes, and 
so on should reduce transport emissions and generate revenue that can help the 
least well-off but also help those on higher incomes, for example, by reducing 
congestion and travel time (Docherty et al, 2008, pp 97-9).12
Any regressive effects of carbon taxes can be reduced through investments in 
public transport that enable low-income households to abandon their cars. The 
Campaign for Better Transport (2008, p 2) estimated that a 20 per cent reduction 
in public transport fares would increase bus travel by 13 per cent and rail travel 
by 17 per cent, reducing carbon emissions in the process. All of this has long 
been appreciated by many local authorities, of course, the best of which try to 
unite housing, urban planning and transport policies systematically (Campaign 
for Better Transport, 2012). Although since national government, still wedded 
to free market ideals, has frequently hampered such initiatives, Docherty and 
Shaw (2012, pp 144-6) are not alone in believing that a genuine devolution and 
revitalisation of local government is essential if a ‘public value’ ethos is to revive.
Other measures would also pay multiple dividends. Proper speed enforcement 
has social benefits (the higher the speed, the greater the risk of severe injuries and 
death). If added to other transport measures, carbon savings would increase by 
15 per cent if the 70mph motorway speed limit was more rigorously enforced, 
and 29 per cent if a new 60mph limit was introduced.13 Brand et al (2012) find 
that electric vehicles would be the single most effective strategy for reducing 
emissions over the next 35 years. In addition to rail electrification, Sentence (2009, 
pp 404-5) also recommends the widespread use of a new generation of electric 
road vehicles, supported by an expanded supply of decarbonised electricity, in 
order to improve energy efficiency.
Flooding
According to the Association of British Insurers (ABI):14
• One in six homes is at flood risk – as many as one in four in London 
(Carrington and Salvidge, 2013).
• Over 2.4 million properties are at risk of flooding from rivers and seas, with 
500,000 at ‘significant’ risk. A further 2.8 million properties are at risk of 
surface water flooding.
• Over 5 million people live or work in flood-risk areas.
• Fifty-five per cent of water treatment and pumping plants, 14 per cent of the 
electricity infrastructure and 2,358 schools are in flood-risk areas.
• Domestic flood damage claims typically range from £20,000 to £40,000.
Flooding has become associated with climate change in the public mind since the 
brutal floods of 2007, many people now recognising that it will become more 
frequent and severe in the decades ahead. For instance, pluvial flood risk (surface 
water flooding caused by intense rainfall overwhelming drainage systems) already 
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accounts for one-third of all UK flood risk, and may leave 3.2 million people 
vulnerable by 2050 (Houston et  al, 2011). According to Hammond (2009), 
10 million people will be at risk from flooding by 2030.
Such predictions must be approached tentatively, if only because much depends 
on the strategies and policies we adopt. The obvious solution is to build and 
improve flood defences but, since it increasingly seems that climate change involves 
an oscillation in extreme events which, while occurring more frequently than 
in the past, will still be characterised by infrequency and uncertainty, knowing 
exactly how to juggle priorities and target resources is not easy. The Environment 
Agency reports that in 2012 the UK experienced flooding one in every five days 
and drought one day in every four!15 Personal and social costs are therefore likely 
to escalate in ways that are difficult to anticipate. The cost of the 2007 floods 
in England, about £3.2 billion (Brisley et al, 2012, p 36), may become a more 
regular occurrence, but the precise consequences are difficult to predict.
That said, few doubt that the poorest and most disadvantaged will be adversely 
affected. There is a firm correlation between social deprivation and flood risk, 
although exactly how firm is disputed and requires further research (Houston 
et al, 2011). It is undoubtedly the case that groups are vulnerable to differing 
degrees and in differing ways, according to gender, age, dis/ability and ethnicity, 
but by and large, the lower your income,
• the greater your risk of being flooded. For instance, low-cost housing has often 
been built on low-lying flood plains where construction costs are cheaper, 
while expensive houses may occupy more elevated positions due to the better 
views (Houston et al, 2011, p 19; Walker and Burningham, 2011, pp 228-9);
• the less able you are to afford insurance (see below);
• the more severe the consequences will be for your finances and health. Low-
income households are generally more vulnerable to stress and trauma (Walker 
and Burningham, 2011, p 224), and those with pre-existing health problems 
are worst affected by flooding (Zsamboky et al, 2011, pp 30-1).
Walker and Burningham (2011, p  232) conclude that, ‘this form of “triple 
injustice” does not at all equate with the global-scale rifts between those producing 
and suffering the consequences of climate change…but does mirror them to 
some degree.’16 Additionally, low-income households are those least likely to 
demonstrate an awareness of flood risk (Burningham et  al, 2008) which, in 
addition to the widespread perception that climate change is not an immediate 
problem, may be due to a fear that, once an area is identified as being at risk, 
insurance premiums could go up and house prices tumble (Zsamboky et  al, 
2011, p 46).
In the future we are therefore likely to experience flooding that is more frequent 
and severe, with the probability that those least able to bear the brunt will pay 
the highest price.
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In his summary of recent research, Walker (2012, pp 133-5; cf Lindley et al, 
2011) adds another interesting dimension. The risk of ‘fluvial’ (river) flooding 
according to income decile is very flat. This means that the risk to the most 
deprived from being flooded is more or less the same as that to the most affluent. 
River flooding is egalitarian! By contrast, the most deprived deciles are at 
significantly greater risk from sea flooding: 750,000 from the poorest two deciles 
are at risk compared to 80,000 from the richest two. Not everyone agrees with 
these findings, however. Fielding (2007) concludes that poorer social groups 
and the unemployed are at greater risk from both fluvial and sea flooding. Much 
depends on the methods used and further research is needed. But if Walker is 
correct, how might the discrepancy be explained?
Walker suggests that historic settlements with high property values are often 
located on river flood plains. Not only is housing in Oxford expensive, but it also 
buys you no protection from flooding. But in coastal regions things are different. 
First, many industrial ports have large working-class populations. Second, within 
coastal cities and towns cheaper housing has often been built on lower lying land, 
for example, reclaimed marshland. Finally, having declined in popularity with 
the increase in people taking foreign holidays, seaside resorts have experienced 
rising deprivation.
Location data only tells us so much, of course. Even if rivers are egalitarian, 
the distribution of social and economic resources and rights is not. Some have a 
greater capacity to cope with risks than others in two senses. ‘Resistance’ means 
the capacity to withstand the impact of a hazard and ‘resilience’ implies the 
ability to cope with or adapt to the stress caused by hazards. Once these factors 
are introduced, inequalities in river flood risks are more evident and inequalities 
in coastal flood risks are more pronounced (Walker, 2012, pp 135-9, 150-4).17
Ideally, flood defences should be so secure that community-wide resistance is 
guaranteed. Yet effective defences are expensive. Who is to shoulder the cost? 
How can we guard against affluent communities grabbing a disproportionate 
share of public resources? And defences can always be breached. The Thames 
Barrier may only be ineffective against a once-a-millennium tidal surge, yet this 
is still an appreciable risk. Vulnerabilities can be reduced but never eliminated 
entirely; those defences that are effective today may not protect against the rising 
sea levels and increased rainfall expected in the future.
In terms of resilience, having already noted the links between flood risk and 
social deprivation, let’s examine the issue of flood insurance.
Flood risk and insurance
In the decade before 2013 flood insurance in the UK was provided under a 
Statement of Principles (SoP) that set out the insurance industry’s commitment to 
providing flood insurance as a standard feature of home insurance for properties 
at some risk of flooding, and to continue to offer flood insurance to properties 
at significant flood risk (Defra, 2011). In return, the government promised to 
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build flood defences and improve planning and management systems.18 Even with 
the SoP in place, the UK’s flood insurance system was still highly indebted to 
free market principles, in contrast to those nations where the state plays a greater 
role (the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, France, USA and Spain) 
whether in the form of market intervention or by taking full responsibility for 
flood damage (O’Neill and O’Neill, 2012, p 4).
With the SoP ending in 2013, industry and government have spent years locking 
horns over how to replace it. The conflict has concerned where the financial 
liability for future risks should fall, but the public debate played out in the media 
has usually been an unedifying game of chicken, with each side ramping up 
anxieties and daring the other to blink first. In truth, neither side is in favour of 
abandoning the UK’s markets-first approach. The ABI is more interventionist, 
acknowledging that,
No country in the world has a free market for flood insurance which 
successfully preserves widely available and affordable flood insurance 
for those at high flood risk without some form of government 
involvement.19
They are still committed to a fully competitive market for 98 per cent of properties, 
as well as a not-for-profit insurance fund to cover the 2  per cent (200,000 
properties) at significant flood risk and for whom an open market would therefore 
be problematic. Those properties would pay a set price, varying according to 
Council Tax band, and the fund would reimburse insurers in the event of claims 
(with the government offering a reimbursable overdraft facility to cover major 
flooding). The fund would be financed by the high-risk premiums but also by a 
levy raised from all insurance premiums.
The problem with a competitive market system that largely passes the risk to 
individual householders is that it makes them bear the costs of something for which 
they are not responsible. They are obviously not responsible for acts of nature, 
nor for the adequacy (or otherwise) of the social, technological and managerial 
systems, procedures and practices that have accumulated over many decades and 
that either raise or lower the risks associated with acts of nature. Since deprived 
households are already more vulnerable to the social deprivations associated with 
flooding, making them bear all or most of the actuarial costs perpetuates the 
social injustices of poverty. We could introduce some redistributive mechanism, 
but this is not what the ABI proposal does – Council Tax bands are regressive, 
as noted in the last chapter, and the 98 per cent cross-subsidise the 2 per cent, 
regardless of income levels.
Whatever the scheme adopted after 2013, if insurance reforms lead to a more 
risk-sensitive differentiation in insurance coverage, housing in floodplains will 
become less insurable. Hammond (2009, pp 17-18) anticipates that uninsurable 
houses could fall in value by as much as 80 per cent, a prospect that could face 
800,000 by 2035. Middle-income households would be hit by rising premiums 
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and a slump in property values, but at least they will have the resources to cope 
and adapt. The greater damage would be done to those on lower incomes who 
can neither afford higher premiums nor sell their homes. There is thus a real 
danger that new forms of social blight will emerge, with the concentration of 
the poor in areas of higher flood risk (Lindley et al, 2011, p 24).
As O’Neill and O’Neill (2012, pp 8-15) observe, this is ultimately a question 
of social ethics. If there are many circumstances for which individuals are not 
responsible and over which they have little or no control, then an ethic based 
entirely on individual choice and obligation not only misunderstands the nature 
of human agency but also risks imperilling those who are most disadvantaged by 
those circumstances (Fitzpatrick, 2008a, pp 74-80). O’Neill and O’Neill therefore 
recommend a solidaristic, risk-insensitive insurance scheme, in which the basic 
requirements of social justice would be provided independently of individuals’ 
choices. This would take the UK closer to those nations where the state plays a 
greater role, and dovetails with the public’s opinion that the main responsibility 
for flood protection lies with government (Bichard and Kazmierczak, 2012).20 The 
operational details of any such scheme must address a series of difficult questions.
How should flood insurance relate to other forms of insurance? How can we 
design a system that accommodates all of the imponderables we face over the 
coming decades? Should state assistance apply to all those at risk of flooding, 
including middle-income households, or only those disadvantaged due to income, 
dis/ability, age, and so on? Should someone who chooses to live in a flood plain 
be eligible for state-subsidised flood insurance? And if it’s also the case that higher 
density neighbourhoods are more prone to pluvial flooding because they have 
fewer porous surfaces (Houston et al, 2011, p 19), how can the higher density 
developments advocated in Chapter Eight take this into account?
Nonetheless, O’Neill and O’Neill highlight the basic choice facing this 
country between insurance systems that pass most of the risks for social events 
(unemployment, accident, illness, old age) and natural events (flooding, droughts, 
heat waves, pollution) to consumers and those that, stressing our mutualities and 
interdependencies, are closer to the collective, social insurance principles to which 
the UK at least used to aspire.
Waste
Chapter Seven established that the food sector alone creates immense amounts 
of avoidable waste (Steel, 2007, pp 278-81). Stuart (2009, p 91) estimates that 
at least 18 million tonnes of carbon emissions (including 2 million from landfill) 
derive from wasted food, equivalent to 21 per cent of UK cars. Indeed, the 
true figure could be at least twice as high, meaning, on his figures, that 10 per 
cent of total GHG emissions come from producing, transporting, storing and 
preparing food that is never eaten (Stuart, 2009, pp 92-3). Once we take other social 
practices into account – paper and packaging, disposable electronic items and 
components, other business and household consumables – it becomes clear that 
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waste accounts for an immense amount of the resource depletion and pollution 
that drives ecological degradation.
The social effects are also likely to be acute, although some of the details are 
hazy and the social determinants still poorly understood.
In their review of American and European research conducted since 1983, 
Martuzzi et al (2010) show that waste facilities (incinerators, landfill, hazardous 
waste sites) are disproportionally located in areas characterised by deprivation 
and/or minority ethnic households (see also Stephens et al, 2007; Richardson 
et al, 2013). It is likely that there are some geographical variations, however. 
Macintyre et al (2008, p 910) found that in Glasgow, ‘Waste disposal sites were 
closer to more affluent quintiles.’ And Fairburn et  al (2005, p 79) found less 
evidence of a correlation between landfills and deprived areas in Scotland than 
Fairburn and Smith (2008, p  5) found in South Yorkshire, where the most 
deprived populations are:
• two to three times more likely to be living near a waste or landfill site than 
the rest of the population;
• most likely to be living next to multiple waste sites;
• most likely to be living near to non-active landfill sites.
Adverse health conditions deriving from such proximity (such as congenital 
anomalies, cancers, low birth weight and stillbirths) then compound the health 
effects of broader social disadvantages (Walker et al, 2005; Martuzzi et al, 2010, 
pp 23-5). Note, however, that some research suggests that the health risks from 
landfills are minimal (Jarup et al, 2002). Briggs et al (2008, p 1627) confirm the 
existence of environmental inequities associated with socioeconomic deprivation, 
particularly with regard to air pollution, but conclude that proximity to emissions 
sources was not significant, and that associations were in any event generally 
weak, subtle, variable and complex: ‘there is no universally consistent system of 
environmental inequity.’ Thus, even according to Martuzzi et al, because of the 
considerable methodological and data-gathering hurdles that exist, we still lack 
the evidence needed to address some key questions:21
• Are disadvantaged people, besides being disproportionally exposed to waste-
related environmental risk, also more vulnerable to its impacts?
• Do risks vary in different social groups living in the same exposed place and, 
if so, to what extent?
• Is there a synergistic relationship between the adverse health effects of waste 
exposure and of the disadvantaged social environment, or do health risks 
associated with socioeconomic conditions act as multipliers for environmental 
factors?
• How preventable are the observed inequalities?
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Nonetheless, they propose that given the broad picture, there is no reason not 
to act. The ecosystem needs to absorb less waste, and the poorest individuals need 
less of whatever waste remains to be located near them:
Exposure inequalities can and must be reduced by appropriate measures 
of mitigation and abatement of emissions from potential sources. This 
includes not only established noxious agents (for example, particulate 
matters, persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals) but also emissions 
interfering with residents’ quality of life (for example, odours, noise). 
(Martuzzi et al, 2010, p 25)
Such has been the agenda of social and environmental campaigners for many 
years, of course. It is because of controversies over waste management and 
location that the environmental justice movement emerged in the US (Cutter 
and Solecki, 2006). Whether it was living near the pollution coming from 
sewage outflows, being unable to stop the nearby construction of landfills and 
incinerators, or experiencing the noise and health-impairing fumes from freeways, 
the accusation was that rich white Americans were forcing their toxins and 
waste on, predominately, poor black Americans. The concept of environmental 
injustice quickly spread to activists and practitioners across many other countries. 
Governments and businesses have been forced to respond, to some extent, at least 
(Wheeler, 2011, pp 221-2).
To what extent is the basic accusation accurate, however? Walker (2012, pp 88-
93) distinguishes between two processes: (1) waste facilities being located near 
disadvantaged residential communities, and (2) disadvantaged households being 
attracted to the low-income housing found near waste facilities, that is, because 
affluent individuals have the resources to locate elsewhere (‘vote with their feet’). 
Point (1) resembles the place poverty introduced on page 59, such that due to 
existing disadvantages (in terms of jobs, housing, income, and so on) impoverished 
communities have little power to resist the siting of such facilities, adding to 
already-existing disadvantages. Point (2) corresponds more with the concentration, 
segregation and polarisation that we associated with ‘people poverty’.
In his review of US research Walker concludes that evidence for both can 
be found, but with different ‘patterns and dynamics at work’ (for an opposing 
conclusion, see Oakes et al, 1996). There is no straightforward answer, in other 
words, at least not on the basis of existing data, and it may be that (1) and (2) are 
knotted together in ways that are inherently difficult to disentangle. Similarly, 
Richardson et al (2010, p 223) found that deprived areas are disproportionately 
exposed to municipal landfills in Scotland:
… area deprivation may have preceded disproportionate landfill 
siting to some extent, particularly in the 1980s, but landfill siting also 
preceded a relative increase in deprivation in exposed areas. Areas that 
became exposed to a municipal landfill in the 1980s were subsequently 
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1.65 times more likely to be classified as deprived by 2001 than areas 
that remained unexposed.
None of this necessarily proposes deliberate bias. Offering an analysis of 
institutional processes and dynamics, Stephens et al (2007, p 22) argue that waste 
disposal policies are not designed to hurt poorer communities but can do so as the 
outcome of a series of long-term, unintended consequences. In the absence of 
a countervailing force, policy processes and legal systems will disadvantage those 
who already lack political voice, legal expertise, economic power and social capital.
Let me cite a recent example from my region, the East Midlands. In 2009 
Derby City Council considered a proposal for a waste incinerator to be located 
in Sinfin. The council rejected the plan because of health and environmental 
concerns, and in 2010 the UK’s Planning Inspectorate also turned the scheme 
down. In 2011 the High Court overturned this decision after an appeal by the 
incinerator’s proposers, Resource Recovery Solutions. In 2012 a second public 
inquiry approved the incinerator, a decision campaigners failed to overturn in the 
High Court in 2013.22 The firm’s assumption that the plant could be built and 
operated without ‘significant risk’ to public health was accepted. The decision to 
proceed also assumes that recent improvements in waste recycling will stall and 
that Derbyshire will continue to burn up to 50 per cent of its waste rather than 
reusing, recycling or composting it.
These background assumptions therefore drive a proposal that will have an 
impact on a ward, which, according to Derby City Council (2011, pp 12, 16, 
28, 41), contains the city’s highest proportion of:
• vulnerable children
• children with special educational needs
• lone parents
• Income Support claimants.
Sinfin, one of England’s 10 per cent most deprived wards, also has large numbers 
of non-white residents and low levels of affordable childcare (Derby City Council, 
2011, pp 23, 30, 46, 51).
Therefore, while we cannot rule out a narrative populated by evil corporations, 
supine politicians, deaf-blind judges and heroic activists, human perceptions, 
motivations and practices tend to be more mundane and less dramatic than this. 
Places like Sinfin are more likely to be targeted for incinerators than those like 
Kensington and Chelsea because injustice is sedimented. The flawed assumptions 
and decisions made yesterday become the context (the unexamined norms, frames 
and structures of institutional decision-making) driving forward today’s equally 
flawed assumptions and decisions – and so the stage for tomorrow’s too. Injustice 
does not always have to be present in any one act or decision for injustice to have 
accumulated, usually across many decades and generations, through the accretion 
of multiple layers of individual acts and decisions deposited on top of one another. 
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Thus I can find no evidence that Resource Recovery Solutions’ assessment of ‘no 
significant risk’ takes the existing deprivation profile of Sinfin into account (see 
Resource Recovery Solutions Limited and Derby City Council, 2009), that is, 
the greater risks of ill health to which its residents are already prone according to 
every piece of credible research into health inequalities ever conducted.
Overall, we can conclude that waste is a major source of GHG emissions and 
that, while the details and lines of causation are still somewhat hazy, dealing with 
that excessive and often avoidable waste leaves the poorest to carry the greatest 
burdens to their health and general wellbeing.
Positional racing revisited
Let’s summarise the preceding sections.
• Low-income households need to spend a high proportion of their income on 
transport, including the public transport modes on which they are more likely 
to be reliant. As society’s car dependency has become self-amplifying, the least 
well-off have been further disadvantaged in terms of mobility, income and 
jobs, access to essential services and other participative activities. Transport 
is, meanwhile, responsible for 21-24 per cent of the UK’s carbon emissions. 
Better planning and fuel-efficient technology can help, but ultimately what 
matters is the integration of transport policy with higher-density housing and 
land use policies. Given the large variation in transport emissions between the 
highest and lowest deciles, it is reasonable to posit that appropriate taxes and 
charges could not only reduce carbon emissions but, if the revenue is invested 
in public transport, also be fairly redistributive.
• The risk of flooding is likely to become more acute over the coming decades. 
There is every chance this will most adversely affect the poorest given the 
correlation between social deprivation and flood risk that already prevails. The 
lower your income, the greater your risk of being flooded, the less able you 
are to afford flood insurance, and the more severe the consequences for your 
finances and health. Adapting to increased flood risks requires both resistance 
(improved defences) and resilience, especially a sustainable and more progressive 
insurance system. Unfortunately, the UK remains attached to market-based 
principles of insurance, which pass much of the risk to individuals rather than 
to progressive solidaristic principles that spread the risks of social and natural 
hazards across the community.
• Much of the UK’s carbon emissions is due to food that is never eaten. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a correlation between the siting of waste 
facilities and areas of high social deprivation, although regional variations exist. 
Whether and to what extent such proximity compounds the health problems 
of communities already at greater risk of ill health remains contested. It is 
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also difficult to disentangle (1) the siting of waste facilities near disadvantaged 
communities from (2) disadvantaged households being attracted to the low-
income housing found near such facilities; each process may accompany the 
other, if only because of the legacy of historical injustices that continue to 
accumulate.
Thus transport and avoidable food waste alone account for somewhere between 
one-fifth and one-third of UK emissions.
Now, to what extent have the above sections presented evidence for the critique 
advanced in Chapter Eight?
Chapter Eight proposed that owners seek the highest possible rents in the 
form of above-inflation price rises that disadvantage non-owners. Through the 
operation of economic and political power, including the monopolisation of key 
markets, manufactured scarcities and inequalities are created which allow owners 
to maximise their returns. Via urban sprawl and by shifting the political emphasis 
away from social housing, for example, owners have benefited from the resulting 
property boom to the detriment of those on lower incomes. Rent-seeking is 
therefore insensitive to desirable social and ecological goals.
Such rent-seeking can be understood as an attempt to maintain one’s relative, 
competitive advantage in a race. But there are social limits to that race such that 
maintaining your advantage often involves running ever faster just to stand still. 
The competitors power a process that locks them into ever more competition. 
This race to nowhere demands that I impose more negative externalities on 
you than you can impose on me. The positional race involves illusions that are 
comforting (I stay ahead of you in the race) but irrational (the race can never offer 
real satisfaction and the negative externalities generated will resurface and hit the 
advantaged sooner or later – we might call this the ‘return of the externalised’).
For instance, sprawl and low urban densities are created in part by people 
seeking desirable locations. In turn, this sprawl produces negative natural 
externalities by increasing the pollution that doesn’t care how expensive your 
house is and the emissions that drive global warming for which you (and your 
children and grandchildren) will pay a price. Negative social externalities are 
also created. Poverty and unjust inequalities also disadvantage the affluent, if the 
‘spirit level’ thesis holds. And recall page 157 where we noted how some of those 
excluded from the housing market by rising values are the children of those same 
homeowners who then have to be subsidised through the Bank of Mum and Dad.
There are thus three processes:
(1) Racing and rent-seeking
(2) Negative, positional externalities
(3) Return of the externalised
Do the sections above provide evidence for these?
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Transport
As both cause and effect of urban sprawl, car dependency has enabled the housing-
based rent-seeking of the last half century. But perversely, as Docherty et  al 
(2008, pp 93-4) highlight, for many journeys the marginal benefit to each driver 
is less than the marginal costs to society, thereby wasting resources and lowering 
productivity in ways that harm us all. As has often been observed, building roads 
doesn’t relieve congestion; it just creates more (Goodwin and Noland, 2003). 
Supply creates demand and so more vehicles and more emissions. Congestion 
involves a battle between liberty and the common good where neither wins, the 
outcome of a comforting but irrational illusion.
There are thus many negative externalities that come back to haunt us all. For 
example:
• We are not free to enjoy the romance of the open road when others, seeking 
the same freedoms, are squashed into the same space.
• What was at first the convenience of driving to supermarkets became a necessity 
as those corporations squeezed local shops and small retailers out of business.
• We drive to the gym or pool to burn off the fat accumulated, in part, by sitting 
behind a wheel for so long.
• Designed to help solve the problems of excessive local authority rates, bus 
deregulation led to more buses from more bus firms competing on the same 
profitable routes and taking up more road space than before – and neglecting 
the unprofitable routes unless subsidised by local authorities.
In short, to live, work and shop in desirable locations we may have to use more 
fuel and energy (and therefore money), spend more hours every week in transit, 
often have to stand because of a lack of seating, spend more on maintenance, 
repairs and insurance (in the case of car owners), cope with the anxieties of 
inevitable delays, diversions and missed connections and, in general, crowd on top 
of one another and then complain about crowding!
Perversely, however, it is the comfort of the illusions which habitually prevails 
– or perhaps it’s fear of the discomforts that abandoning illusions can bring. We 
may well regard an expensive home in an exclusive location as a well-earned 
reward for the time, effort and money expended in journeying there. The problem 
of exclusivity becomes its own solution, especially once we have scapegoated 
those who occupy non-exclusive space/time zones. We thrust roads through 
communities and complain about soulless neighbourhoods that lack communal 
identities and social loyalties. We come to equate mobility with virtue and 
condemn as undeserving those whom our positional competitiveness has rendered 
immobile (the unemployed, the low paid). We privatise ourselves, complain about 
the shabbiness of public spaces and so withdraw into private enclaves still further.
This is a classic collective action problem, which uncoordinated agents create 
and are then powerless to resolve. What makes sense for individuals in terms of 
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their own personal needs and interests leads to a state of affairs from which we 
benefit less than we imagine. We may at some level recognise the sheer irrationality 
of excessive travelling, but what can any of us do? Instead, we keep pushing the 
same buttons as before, hoping for better results next time, despite the higher 
fares, oil price rises and longer jams that chip away at earnings and free time. And 
as transport emissions rise, so we rack up a carbon debt that future generations 
will be left to pay.
This is why for sociologists such as Urry (2007, pp  120-2) transportation 
technologies, processes and systems represent the intersection of competing 
tendencies within modernity. Cars signify a democratisation of mobility, an 
enablement of personal freedoms and the elongation of social relations across a 
diverse globe; yet they also bring the privatisation of experience, the retreat from 
shared publics, the conquest of otherness, an accelerated sameness, a distancing 
from a world rushing by that is projected onto screens which reveal and yet 
conceal that world. Cars intern their owners in the very act of liberation. You 
speed up because the others around you are speeding up, just as in a crowded 
room everyone must speak louder in order to be heard. The need-for-speed 
invests our social cultures, our consciousness and habits, our interior narratives.
In short, added to Chapter Eight’s analysis of housing and urban density, I 
propose we can reasonably associate transport with our three processes (rent-
seeking, positional externalities and return of the externalised).
Flooding
What of flooding? If Walker’s distinction between coastal and fluvial risks is 
correct, then rent-seeking applies here too. River flooding is in part more 
egalitarian because flood plains have offered more exclusive locations than coastal 
resorts. True, many villages and towns located on flood plains will have grown 
from historic settlements, but this may just signify earlier forms of rent-seeking 
behaviour. If you could afford to own a country retreat to escape from the perils 
of London – its plagues, its violence, its overpowering stench – then yes, why 
not escape to St Albans or Stratford or Oxford?
It is perhaps more tenuous to draw a line from such rent-seeking to positional 
externalities and the return of the externalised. In the case of transport there is a 
firmer connection between the perverse incentives to travel and the consequences 
(congestion, carbon emissions, and so on). We might construct such a link in 
the case of flooding. Perhaps the economic liberal willingness to sacrifice public 
squalor for private affluence has undermined society’s motivation and ability to 
build adequate defences or to respond effectively when disaster strikes. Such was 
the case in New Orleans. The resulting catastrophe then affects all Americans, 
not just the poorest and not just those living in the affected region. Furthermore, 
a profit-based, market-driven insurance system may over-burden individuals’ 
finances, propelling the race up the housing ladder and so leading to the kind of 
financial bubbles that burst so spectacularly in 2007-09.
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Nonetheless, scientists warn us against making too casual an association between 
climate change and this or that flood. The storm surge that hit the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Britain in 1953, killing 2,500, was one of countless catastrophes 
that have affected fragile and all-too-mortal humans throughout history. We don’t 
need an elaborate theory to count the cost, mourn the dead or prepare for the 
future. The corpses floating in the water in New Orleans was a simple outrage 
regardless of the knock-on effects for the national economy, insurance premiums 
or the country’s international reputation.
Waste
Similarly, until waste facilities start springing up in Kensington and Chelsea we can 
propose that rent-seeking applies here too. We do not have to find evidence that 
the Mayor of Richtown passed bags of cash to PolluteThePoor plc. All we need 
is an analysis of institutionalised bias, legacy and inertia. The resulting negative 
externalities are obvious. The food we never eat contributes to the emissions 
driving global warming. And if proximity does generate health problems, then 
the options involve either leaving the affected communities to cope for themselves 
or providing the services – including but not limited to healthcare – to treat 
the resulting conditions. There is thus either a moral or a financial cost to our 
throwaway economies and cultures.
That said, since some of those who suspect a strong link between ill health and 
proximity to landfills argue that more research and data is required, here, too, we 
might doubt the need to over-conceptualise the causal relationships.
In sum, the critique of rent-seeking and positional racing applies most directly 
to housing, urban densities and transport. In the case of flooding and waste we 
can see evidence of rent-seeking although the overall critique is perhaps more 
tentative and requires more research.
Conclusion
Our two chapters on land are now complete and, summarising the key points 
from the above discussion, Table 9.1 supplements Table 8.1.
The general conclusion advanced at the end of Chapter Eight holds and so does 
not need to be restated at length: the socially careless and ecologically destructive 
use of land is intimately connected to the deprivations experienced by millions 
of the least advantaged, particularly regarding housing and transport, but also in 
terms of flooding and waste facilities. Yet by neglecting the importance of land to 
questions of social and ecological justice we have deprived ourselves of the means 
to address the biggest problem we face in the 21st century. Social policy reforms, 
research and debates have long concerned themselves with housing and sanitation 
(it was such public health concerns that often inspired early campaigners), and has 
more recently acknowledged the importance of transport, but the tools needed 
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to integrate those issues into the correct ecosocial context have been lacking. 
This is a neglect that we need urgently to repair.
Notes
1 Hine acknowledges his debt to the work of Andrew Church.
Table 9.1: The ecosocial poverty of land 2
Land poverty 2
Causes Symptoms Solutions
Quantity Emphasis shifted to 
profit-based services, 
with subsidies for 
particular groups. 
Inadequate flood 
defences and waste 
recycling
Residualisation of 
publicly funded public 
transport
Investment in public 
transport, flood defences, 
sustainable waste solutions. 
Improved opportunities for 
walking and cycling
Mobility Expensive fares  




Lack of accessibility and 
mobility. Inconvenience 
regarding shops, 
workplaces and services. 
Behavioural changes in 
response to higher fares
Higher urban densities. 
Cheaper fares. Shift away 
from car dependency and 
privatised insurance
Value Deregulation and 
profit-based services 
rather than social 
needs
Disparagement of public 
values and social needs. 
Health vulnerabilities 
from flooding and waste 
facilities
Socially inclusive policies 
regarding transport and social 
insurance, so risks are shared 
communally
Control Dominance of market 
values. Emphasis on 






and oversight of key 
services. Collective action 
problems
Revitalised local and regional 
democracy; spatial and 
temporal coordinations. More 
effective and participative 
political and legal processes
Sharing Sprawl and exclusivity Lack of participative 
inclusion in key social 
activities. Detachment 
between spatially distant 
places
Recentralisation. Higher 
density housing, private 
and public services. 
Integrated housing, land 
use and transport policies. 




High carbon emissions. 
Negative externalities 
pushed towards 
vulnerable groups and 
future generations
Cleaner technologies and 
fuels. Flexible, community-
based transport; smart 
technologies. Enhanced sense 
of responsibility; development 
of coordinated, collective 
solutions
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2 See ‘The effect of bus fare increases on low income families’ at the webpage of the 
Passenger Transport Executive Group, www.pteg.net
3 See note 2.
4 See note 2.
5 See www.poverty.ac.uk/report-social-exclusion-transport-necessities/lack-affordable-
transport-hitting-low-income
6 Good dependencies include car dependency, wage dependency, house price dependency 
and consumption dependency (overspending and debt). Completely different to benefit 
dependency, you understand, because that’s a matter of personal moral failure.
7 Two phrases certainly attributed to her (see www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/
pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030702/debtext/30702-10.htm). There is thus a parallel 
here between transport and housing. Instead of keeping fares (or rents) low, the emphasis 
shifted to targeting subsidies and concessions for rising fares on needy groups (just as 
Housing Benefit was meant to compensate for rising rents). Transport has not produced 
the same moral panic about costs and dependency, but similar elements are detectable. 
For example, ‘why should everyone over 65 receive a bus pass when some don’t need 
it?’ The more welfare expenditure is used to compensate for a deregulated system, the 
more expensive it becomes and the more it offers a target for those wishing to dismantle 
universal benefits and services.
8 See note 5.
9 See note 2.
10 ‘No time for physical activity? The answer’s on your doorstep, says NICE’, www.nice.
org.uk
11 See also ‘The problem with aviation’, www.greenpeace.org.uk/climate/aviation
12 The London Congestion Charge was introduced precisely because traffic through large 
parts of central London had slowed to a 19th-century crawl.
13 UK Energy Research Centre, Quick Hits: 2 Limiting speed, www.ukerc.ac.uk
14 See www.abi.org.uk
15 See www.environment-agency.gov.uk/news/146242.aspx
16 The least developed countries have a higher share of their population living in low 
elevation coastal zones (14 per cent) than OECD countries (10 per cent), with even greater 
disparities in urban distribution (21 per cent compared to 11 per cent) (McGranahan 
et al, 2007; cf Few, 2007).
17 The 2005 New Orleans flood illustrates this (Walker, 2010, pp 139-48), and obviously 
many examples from developing countries could also be cited.
18 See note 14.
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19 See note 14. For Defra’s analysis, see O’Neill and O’Neill (2012, p 6).
20 My quibble is that O’Neill and O’Neill (2012, pp 10-12) somewhat misrepresent luck 
egalitarianism by relying on Rakowski’s free market version. For an analysis of Rakowski 
and others, see the draft paper ‘Modified luck egalitarianism and entitlements to a social 
minimum’, available from the author.
21 For instance, see the work on the health effects of landfill sites by the Small Area Health 
Statistics Unit at www.sahsu.org/content/sahsu-research-and-policy






The 350-400 cubic feet of air an adult breathes every day has already been exhaled 
by countless others, including non-humans. Air is therefore a tangible reminder 
of our delicate interdependencies. What we breathe depends intimately on what 
others do and do not do. Much the same is true of water. People have been able 
to survive for two weeks without food, but without water you will probably 
die within days. And all water is recycled, passing through organic systems (and 
certain organs, let’s admit it) that we tend not to think about closely.
Air pollutants are different to carbon emissions, that is, GHGs such as CO
2
. 
The five main air pollutants are ‘particulate matter’ (also called ‘particulates’, 
which can be up to 30 times thinner than the width of a human hair), carbon 
monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, ground-level ozone and sulphur dioxide:
Air pollution is a local, regional and international problem caused by 
the emission of pollutants, which either directly or through chemical 
reactions in the atmosphere lead to negative impacts on human health 
and ecosystems. There are many sources of air pollution, including 
power stations, traffic, household heating, agriculture and industrial 
processes.1 (Defra, 2013, p 2)
In developed nations air quality standards have generally been improving over the 
very decades when carbon emissions have been increasing. According to Defra’s 
(2013) statistics for 1987–2012, ‘urban background’ and roadside particulate 
pollution have shown long-term improvement, although they remained stable after 
2008. From 1990 to 2010, emissions of sulphur dioxide fell by 89 per cent and 
emissions of nitrogen oxides by 62 per cent.2 (Urban background ozone pollution 
has shown a long-term increase, however.) Defra attributes such improvements to 
the move away from coal to gas in electricity generation, and to the introduction 
of emission standards for vehicles. Nevertheless, the UK still has one of the worst 
records in Europe, and in 2013 it was reported that air quality laws would be 
breached in 15 regions until 2020, with Londoners having to wait until 2025 for 
pollution to enter legal limits.3
Climate change and air pollutants are linked, as we shall see shortly, but while the 
former can sound abstruse to many people, air pollution has a more immediate, 
visceral recognition. From the London smogs of 1952, which killed at least 4,000 
people, to cross-national worries about acid rain in the 1980s, those 350-400 
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cubic feet of air speak to our bodies, our fears, our sheer sense of mortality, more 
than abstracts such as ‘climate’ or ‘atmosphere’.
Not surprisingly, then, it is the health implications that have dominated 
public debates, and we review this in the first section. Then we move on to the 
connections between air pollution, climate change and poverty, and to what I 
call the ‘knotted complexities’ that any attempt to understand them must grapple 
with. Due to the relative absence of research into UK water poverty, this section 
is shorter, but leads us into our final discussion that concerns the extent to which 
air quality can be an object of rights and of social control.
Pollutants and health
The health implications of air pollution are wide-ranging.4 For instance, air 
pollution is correlated with low birth weight, and babies born below 5lb 8oz are 
more likely to suffer from conditions such as heart disease, strokes and chronic 
illnesses later in life (Collins, 2013), including cognitive impairment (Gray, 
2011). Defra (2010) estimates the annual health costs of air pollution to the UK 
at roughly £15 billion.
Although the long-term health effects of exposure to it are still not well 
understood, abundant statistics can be found. Air pollution is thought to reduce 
the life expectancy of every UK person by an average of 7-8 months (Defra, 
2007, p 7), and cutting long-term exposure to particulates by half could increase 
life expectancy by an average of 1-11 months (Defra, 2002). Air pollution may 
take two years off the lives of 200,000 people (Gray, 2011). The House of 
Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2010) estimated that air pollution 
could contribute to 50,000 deaths in the UK every year; and 29,000 deaths per 
year may occur due to human-made particulate pollution (Moore, 2012, p 8). 
London Councils (an organisation representing all London boroughs) states that 
poor air quality in London is responsible for the premature deaths, by an average 
of 11 years, of 4,300 people every year.5 Janke et al (2007) estimate that reductions 
in particulates and ground-level ozone could save 4,600 lives per year in England 
alone. Across Europe,
… it is currently estimated that around 21,000 hospital admissions 
a year can be linked to ozone exposure, and admissions linked to 
particulate matter exposure are almost five times greater. (European 
Commission, 2010, p 7)
What explains figures such as these?
For those in poor health, pollutants can cause eye irritation, coughing and 
breathing difficulties (Defra, 2002). Nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide and 
carbon monoxide irritate airways and increase the symptoms of those suffering 
from lung diseases. Carbon monoxide can lead to a significant reduction in the 
supply of oxygen to the heart, particularly in people suffering from heart disease. 
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Particulates cause inflammation of the lungs and the worsening of lung and heart 
diseases, with elderly people particularly susceptible. Nitrogen dioxide increases 
the symptoms and severity of asthma and can even trigger an attack:
… more than 320,000 children (including more than 180,000 children 
under the age of 11) attend schools in London within 150m of roads 
carrying more than 10,000 vehicles per day. This is the level of traffic 
that has been found to increase risk of developing or exacerbating 
asthma in children. (Moore, 2012, p 9)
And ground-level ozone affects cardiovascular and respiratory systems. In addition, 
those who live close to busy roads but also far from green spaces – such as parks 
– experience a double affliction since green spaces help to disperse pollutants, as 
well as facilitating exercise (Coombes et al, 2010, p 821).
So far as the future is concerned, although concentrations of most pollutants 
are estimated to decline by the middle of the century, the concentration of ozone 
is expected to rise, leading to 1,500 extra deaths and hospital admissions per year 
(Ross Anderson, 2008).
Climate change
None of this means we can afford to separate policies relating to air quality from 
those relating to climate change. Air pollution and climate change are distinct 
phenomena, as acknowledged above. Action to tackle pollutants can have more 
immediate results. They exist closer to the surface and do not last long in the 
atmosphere, compared to GHGs that are more active in the upper atmosphere 
and endure for much longer.
Nevertheless, air pollution and climate change are both essentially created by 
the burning of fossil fuels, and neither is respectful of national borders (Jacobson, 
2012). In addition, air pollution makes climate change worse. Black carbon is 
thought to be responsible for approximately 15 per cent of the current excessive 
warming of global temperatures (European Commission, 2010, p 4). And global 
warming can exacerbate air pollution. Ground-level ozone peaks during the 
summer months, and if heatwaves (such as the one that hit Europe in 2003) 
become more frequent and severe, so various parts of Europe, especially southern 
regions, can expect to experience more of it. Furthermore, ‘60% of sensitive 
habitats exceed the critical load for nitrogen’ (Moore, 2012, p 20).
When it comes to the solutions here, too, we find similarities. If properly 
designed, measures to tackle climate change may assist measures to address air 
pollution, and vice versa. One of the world’s leading authorities on the links 
between both has offered an assessment of the main energy alternatives in terms 
of their likely effects on water supply, land use, wildlife, resource availability and 
undernutrition, among several other criteria (Jacobson, 2009). Jacobson concludes 
that the following provide the most benefits:
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1. wind





Wind power is the clear winner. Hydropower, carbon capture and storage, and 
nuclear power are at the bottom of Jacobson’s (2009, p 170) list.
Such recommendations are more sympathetic to renewables than most 
governments seem willing to accommodate. Nonetheless, the European 
Commission (2010) advises that reductions in carbon emissions and in air 
pollution must accompany one another, since doing both is likely to produce 
greater benefits over the long term than the total gains that would accrue from 
pursuing each policy independently of the other.
Through improvements in air quality alone, Defra (2010) anticipates savings of 
£24 billion per year (at current prices) by 2050, created by promoting ultra low 
carbon vehicles, renewable (and non-combustible) sources of electricity, energy 
efficiency and reducing the agricultural demand for nitrogen. London Councils’ 
recommendations include:
• more walking and cycling;
• incentives and infrastructure for low emission vehicles;
• traffic reduction programmes;
• greater energy-efficiency schemes and technologies;
• rail electrification.
And the Greater London Authority (GLA) (2010, p 2) cites recent initiatives:
• development of an electric vehicle infrastructure;
• congestion charging and a low emission zone;6
• a shift to greener modes of transport;
• car clubs;
• reducing the contribution of particulate matter from road surface wear;
• traffic smoothing;
• a bus emissions programme.
Since much of this echoes what has been said in previous chapters, there are 





However, rather than assuming that those synergies will arise automatically, they 
must be carefully assembled and constructed as matters of social, economic and 
public policy.
This is, first, because some pollutants are more dangerous to the climate than 
others. Ground-level ozone and black carbon store heat and ozone reduces 
the capacity of vegetation to absorb carbon, reducing crop yields. Yet sulphate 
aerosols emitted from industrial smokestacks reflect sunlight and so have a cooling 
effect (Mann, 2012, pp 15-16). (This does not imply that we should simply pour 
industrial sulphates into the atmosphere, although some do recommend a ‘sulphate 
sunshield’; see Eggleton, 2013, pp 207-9.) Second, as we shall see shortly, because 
the social effects of air pollution manage to be both simple and yet complex, our 
policy responses must be appropriately fit for purpose.
My basic point is that we should seek synergies between the climate change, air 
pollution and anti-poverty agendas while being sensitive not just to complexities 
but also to the knottedness of those complexities. By a ‘knotted complexity’ I 
mean any system which:
1. is characterised by multiple strands, which
2. are densely interconnected and interwoven, to the extent that
3. it can be difficult to know which strand is which or even what the knot 
signifies (for example, danger versus security), so that
4. by contributing to the complexity of the system our interventions may unravel 
the knot, or tighten it, or do both simultaneously, meaning that the system
5. is pervaded by uncertainty, which might
6. demand a precautionary (safety-first) approach.
The atmosphere is such a dynamic, holistic system. The positive and negative 
feedbacks operating within it can be modelled to some extent, although the level 
of interactive complexity is often too knotted and ‘chaotic’.7 For example, the 
repairs to the hole in the ozone layer may have led to reductions in the moist, 
bright clouds that have offered some protection for Antarctica from GHG warming 
(Korhonen et  al, 2010; see also Mann, 2012, pp 201, 331, note 31). Similar 
knotted complexities characterise many of the social-natural interdependencies 
with which this book has been concerned. Therefore, solutions here will have 
an impact elsewhere in ways that should be carefully considered and monitored.
This may sound like a mundane point, yet UK governments can still seem a 
long way from appreciating it. The air quality strategy of the London Mayor 
contains not one mention of poverty, deprivation or low income (GLA, 2010), 
while the 2007 strategy of the 1997–2010 Labour government gave it only a 
brief reference (Defra, 2007, p 41).8 The official assumption appears to be that 
because the poorest are most adversely affected by air pollution – and at least 
this recognition is thankfully widespread – dealing with the latter will create 
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‘hey presto’ improvements for the former. Perhaps so. But what is clear from 
the literature on the social contexts of air pollution is that although the general 
picture is straightforward, various complications appear once you drill into the 
details (Diekmann and Meyer, 2010). Take two examples.
The first concerns spatial diversities. According to McLeod et al (2000, pp 83-4),
… there appear to be three separate clusters of regions, in order of 
increasing pollution: (1) Wales, South West, North; (2) East Anglia, 
South East, North West, East Midlands, West Midlands, Yorkshire, 
Humberside; and (3) Greater London.
Therefore, if crudely designed and implemented, carbon taxes may have a 
regressive effect (the poorest pay too) that increases the poorest’s vulnerabilities 
(by reducing their income), while preserving environmental inequalities (the 
relative distance between clusters is maintained). Furthermore, in some cities 
affluent households are more likely to be found near the centre – perhaps trading 
exposure to pollution for access to amenities – while the poorest are often pushed 
to the fringe where pollution levels can be lower. Here, too, a crude reform, for 
example, traffic restrictions, may benefit the wealthiest by reducing city centre 
pollution, but be potentially iniquitous for those on the fringes if it reduces their 
access to the centre.
Thus pulling on one strand by introducing ‘blanket’, spatially insensitive carbon 
taxes and traffic restrictions may disadvantage the already disadvantaged and only 
increase their vulnerability to climate- and pollutant-related hazards. One possible 
alternative is to prioritise those ‘hotspots’ where air pollution and social deprivation 
both peak; McLeod et al recommend contemplating differential carbon taxes 
for different regions, for example. Therefore, policy-makers must incorporate a 
rigorous understanding of the complex, intricate and interactive links between 
air pollution, geographical location and social class into the policy process.9
The same applies to a second example, returning us to the subject of health. The 
variables and causal factors that relate to ill health are often multiple and entangled. 
Power et al (2011, pp 170-6) show that depression and anxiety are driven by a 
variety of neighbourhood and family pressures. Some of their interviewees lived 
near major roads, incinerators or airports, and could cite apparently minor events 
relating to air pollution – needing to keep windows closed, having to use a nasal 
spray, constant dusting – that nonetheless compounded the strains they felt and 
that had an impact on their wellbeing. Health problems are therefore multifaceted, 
each one embedded in and by many others. We can recommend exercise as a 
remedy for obesity or depression, but a daily walk near a busy road may increase 
your exposure to pollutants even as it burns away calories. A better diet may 
improve your immune system but you will still have to shop in supermarket-
dominated cities that require many people to take long, often expensive journeys 
that increase their exposure to pollutants, in addition to the pollution created 
by getting the food to the store in the first place (see Chapter Seven earlier).10
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We can therefore see what knotted complexity regarding air pollution can mean 
with reference to space and health. What of the more general picture?
Air pollution and poverty
For years, most of the research into social deprivation and air quality was 
conducted in the US, reflecting that country’s particular patterns of poverty and 
racial segregations. By and large a correlation between social deprivation and air 
pollution was identified.
For instance, Pastor Jr et al (2006) found that schools located in areas with higher 
respiratory hazards also tend to have higher proportions of poor and minority 
ethnic students, ‘respiratory risks’ helping to explain lower academic performance. 
Grineski et al (2007) found that poorer neighbourhoods are disproportionately 
exposed to higher levels of nitrous oxides, carbon monoxide and ozone (see also 
Grineski and McDonald, 2011, p 385).
What might explain such correlations? Does social deprivation help create air 
pollution, for example, low-income households owning cars with fuel-inefficient 
engines? Does air pollution help create social deprivation, for example, affluent 
households fleeing areas with inadequate air quality, leaving those places to the 
less well-off? Some are insistent that air pollution in socially deprived areas is a 
product of continued racial discrimination and class oppression:
… white privilege has driven urban development since the late 19th 
century and is reflected in urban settlement patterns, residential and 
job segregation, social exclusion of minorities, industrial location, 
and the emplacement of urban infrastructure…. (Grineski et al, 2007, 
pp 549-50; see also Collins et al, 2011)
However, in his literature review, Walker (2012, pp 107-23) conveys a sense of 
something both straightforward and yet deeply complex, for reasons we outline 
shortly:
Any form of simple generalisation about what the body of analysis 
says about the relationship between air quality and social difference 
in the US is ... problematic. (Walker, 2012, p 111)
In the UK research did not really commence until the latter part of the 1990s 
and confirmed the general conclusions of US researchers.11 According to Friends 
of the Earth (2001, p 1):
• 66% of carcinogen emissions are in the most deprived 10% of wards;
• 82% of carcinogen emissions are in the most deprived 20% of wards;
• Only 8% of carcinogen emissions are in the least deprived 50% of 
wards.
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The Environment Agency stated that people in the tenth most deprived areas in 
England experience the worst air quality, including concentrations of nitrogen 
dioxide from transport and industry 41 per cent higher than the average.12 Wheeler 
and Ben-Shlomo (2005) found that in urban areas the poorest households live 
in wards with the worst air quality, adversely affecting respiratory functions 
(especially for men), although not asthma, probably reflecting cumulative life 
course disadvantages. They invoke an ‘inverse air law’: ‘people with the worst lung 
function tend to live in areas with the worst air quality, and the health effects of air 
pollution seem to be greatest among those (men) in lower social classes’ (Wheeler 
and Ben-Shlomo, 2005, p 953). However, rural households demonstrated a reverse 
gradient, perhaps because rural areas include both wealthier commuter populations 
and deprived populations in more remote, less polluted places.
Much research has focused on particular cities and regions, in order to try to 
map geographical disparities such as these. The data throws up some surprises. 
The Environment Agency has said that in Wales the highest concentrations of air 
pollution are found in the least deprived wards.13 And King and Stedman (2000) 
found tentative evidence that deprivation was correlated with air pollution in 
London, Belfast and Birmingham, but not in Glasgow.
Often, however, geographical studies confirm the general picture. Fairburn 
and Smith (2008, pp 82-3) found the poorest two deciles account for 65 per 
cent of those living in areas with the most pollution (nitrogen dioxide and 
particulates), while the richest half accounted for just 7 per cent. Of the population 
experiencing the very worst air quality, approximately 12,000 of them were 
children. In Birmingham, Brainard et al (2002) found that a disproportionate 
burden of pollutant exposure was being borne by non-white communities and 
populations exhibiting higher levels of deprivation. They raise a distinction, 
similar to the one encountered in Chapter Nine, between (1) air pollution being 
located near disadvantaged communities, and (2) disadvantaged households being 
attracted to areas with poor air quality due to its cheap housing. Since both are 
undoubtedly relevant,
… future policies to reduce inequities in exposure to these pollutants 
should place a particular emphasis on the mechanisms driving 
changes in land-use patterns, urbanisation, and the development of 
transportation corridors. (Brainard et al, 2002, pp 713-14)
In his recent review of the UK literature Walker (2012, p 111; Deguen and 
Zmirou-Navier, 2010, p 33) echoes these earlier research findings, going on to 
say that, although the poorest communities generally experience the worst air 
quality, ‘this is not always and everywhere the case, or necessarily a simple linear 
relationship.’ For instance, while air quality improves as income improves, some 




Walker accounts for this by observing that since most UK deprivation is found 
in urban areas, and since transport and industrial emissions will concentrate in 
urban locations, taking longer to disperse than is the case in the countryside, those 
wealthy enough to escape from cities have also been escaping pollution. But in so 
far as air quality worsens again, for the most affluent this is because some of the 
richest communities can be found in cities (particularly London). In other words, 
spatial, social and geographical contexts always matter. And as with his account 
of fluvial flooding (see Chapter Nine), Walker observes that exposure to a hazard 
should not be confused with its impact. Many variables matter, including: daily 
and hourly variations in levels and spatial concentrations of pollution; bodily and 
mental health; lifestyle; household composition; neighbourhood environments; 
and socioeconomic circumstances. Air pollution, in short, implies different things 
for different people.
In general terms, then, there is a clear negative externality, one that is also a 
positional externality if the arguments of the last two chapters are credible. In other 
words, those who create the most air pollution, in their attempt to stay ahead of 
the rows behind, suffer the least harm from it. As noted in Chapter Nine, deprived 
households are much less likely to own a car. Is it therefore the case that affluent 
drivers – driving into city centres from their commuter towns, villages and leafy 
suburbs in the morning and out again in the evening – leave behind pollutants 
that have a most severe impact on the poorest? Some argue this depiction is by 
no means a simplification (Grineski et al, 2007, p 550).
However, because places differ, and because a minority but sizeable proportion 
of low-income households own cars too, we might hesitate to imagine that things 
everywhere are so straightforward:
…in general across Britain the poor contribute a significant proportion 
of the pollution that they are exposed to (although we do appreciate 
that drivers who lack the income to move to a cleaner area may also 
be unable to purchase cleaner vehicles)…. The exception, however, 
is for a minority of the poor who experience high pollution exposure 
but who contribute little in the way of emissions. (Mitchell and 
Dorling, 2003, p 926)
Not everyone, even in deprived neighbourhoods, will experience pollution to 
the same extent or in the same way
We can therefore conclude that poverty and air pollution accompany one 
another, but establishing how, why, to what extent and therefore which kind of 
intervention is best is not always a clear-cut exercise. We are facing something 
that is straightforward in general terms and yet also deeply complex and intricate.
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Solutions?
So how should we respond to such problems in our social and public policies? 
In addition to the above measures (see p 190) there are a range of useful policy 
recommendations that have been summarised by Moore (2012, Chapter 5), 
including: reducing perverse incentives for polluting technologies, expanding 
low emission zones, relating vehicle emissions to parking charges, retrofitting 
and improving public awareness. Moore, however, does not locate such 
recommendations within a wider context of justice.
In his discussion of justice, Walker argues that everyone has a right to a minimum 
of decent clean air. One advantage of this ‘minimal decency’ approach is that it 
appeals to established understandings of rights and entitlements. Variations in air 
quality are permitted, and perhaps inevitable, so long as the minimal threshold 
is not breached. This might require policies to observe and enforce not just a 
decent minimum but also a sufficient margin of error (a cordon) so that the basic 
threshold is properly protected. But Walker emphasises the importance of context, 
rather than a one-size-fits-all minimum. Since vulnerabilities and resilience vary, 
we might have to countenance differing minimum thresholds, with some areas 
subject to more stringent standards than others.
If Walker is correct, this could imply identifying poverty-pollution hotspots 
for immediate attention, as indicated earlier; other areas (where deprivation is 
high but air pollution is low, or vice versa) would be of secondary priority; and 
some areas (with low levels of deprivation and pollution) might be safely ignored.
Walker’s findings are confirmed by another recent literature review that relates 
air quality firmly to the kind of critiques explored in previous chapters:
The housing market biases land use decisions and might explain 
why some groups of people suffer from both a low socio-economic 
status and bad air quality at their place of residence. One reason is 
that the presence of pollution sources depresses the housing market 
and provides an opportunity for local authorities to construct council 
housing at low cost. Symmetrically, the presence of council housing 
in a given urban area tends to depress the price of land over time, 
encouraging the setting up of activities and facilities that generate 
pollution. (Deguen and Zmirou-Navier, 2010, p 33)
And although many affluent households reside in city centres, some also possess 
second homes, thereby reducing their overall exposure to pollution:
Conversely, subjects in deprived areas live in old dilapidated homes 
with poor ventilation and insulation, factors which favour the 
concentration of indoor pollutants. Moreover, they may be more likely 
to spend time close to or in the traffic, for example, working on the 
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street rather than inside office buildings, or doing long commuting in 
public transport. (Deguen and Zmirou-Navier, 2010, p 33)
Deguen and Zmirou-Navier (2010, p 34) support something resembling the 
‘decentralised concentration’ mentioned in Chapter Eight:
… ‘multipolarity’ calls for urban poles that provide a range of 
amenities (housing, workplaces, commercial, cultural or leisure sites) 
tending to reduce the need for long distance commuting in polluted 
environments. Diversity is a complementary principle of multipolarity, 
where each pole would provide the widest possible variety of activities 
and, most importantly, of housing profiles, places for the rich being 
intermingled with council residence. This diversity scheme would 
prevent the formation of peripheral clusters of poor housing, which 
is typically associated with lack of access to good education and other 
cultural amenities….
Wood et al (2007) concur, echoing the broad recommendations of the last chapter, 
specifically: targeting short journeys by facilitating a modal shift to walking, 
cycling and public transport; effective public communication; and reducing the 
need to travel through spatial planning.
The basic lesson would appear to be that the more we treat a host of issues 
– energy use, food chains, housing development, land use, transport and air 
pollution – in isolation from one another, the more we make it harder to resolve 
the problems afflicting each. If a system demonstrates knotted complexity, we 
must at least attempt a holistic understanding of it. This demands an integrated, 
cross-sectoral and cross-disciplinary approach, one concerned not only with 
‘policy’, but also with relevant social and environmental conditions.14 Yet if policy 
and domain integration is the desired end, what should the means be? We return 
to this issue shortly.
Water poverty
Before we do this, let’s examine our final socionatural resource: water. This 
section is brief because although water poverty occupies a large role in the social 
development literature, it is quite new so far as the UK is concerned. Sewerage 
and water hygiene have long been recognised as issues of concern to public health, 
but debates about water poverty have several distinct, contemporary elements.
A common definition regards those households that spend 3 per cent or more 
of their income on water, after housing costs, as experiencing water poverty. On 
that basis, Fitch and Price (2002) identified a considerable overlap between those 
in water poverty and those in fuel poverty. More recently, Snell and Bradshaw 
(2009) estimated 14.6 per cent of the population to be in water poverty, with 
some significant regional variations (ranging from 20 per cent in Wales to 11 per 
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cent in London), while Benzie et al (2011) found that approximately four million 
households in Britain are water-poor. According to Bradshaw and Huby (2012), 
23.6 per cent of English and Welsh households were in water poverty in 2009-10.
As always, certain groups are particularly vulnerable. Fitch and Price (2002, 
p 3) found that ‘UK households in the lowest three income deciles spend on 
average 3% of their net income on water bills whereas the average spend for all 
households is just 1%.’ Snell and Bradshaw (2009) state that single pensioners, 
workless households and those on means-tested benefits are twice as likely to be 
water-poor. Also:
• 54.9 per cent of those in the lowest income quintile are in water poverty;
• 71.3 per cent of those in water poverty are in the lowest income quintile.
Ofwat’s (nd, p 8) calculations for water poverty are shown in Table 10.1, based 
on data from 2008–09.
Bradshaw and Huby (2012) found that single adults (especially lone parents) 
and those on benefits are three to four times more likely to experience water 
poverty. They highlight how rates of water poverty will climb if, as has happened 
over the last quarter of a century, water prices continue to increase faster than 
average earnings and inflation.
Ofwat (nd, p 4) also observes that low-income households are likely to use 
more water, being less able to afford water-efficient appliances and fittings. 
Furthermore, direct debit discounts are less available to those who lack credit 
cards, bank accounts or simply need to juggle priorities – perhaps by going into 
arrears. In their qualitative research for the Consumer Council for Water, Creative 
Research (2009) found that, out of 14 items of household expenditure, water 
debt occurred most frequently. People will delay paying water bills because of a 
perception that the consequences are less drastic than for, say, energy bills (despite 
many people assuming that water services can be disconnected, something which 
has not been true since 1999). Creative Research (2009) also found that:
Table 10.1: Percentages of different household types in water poverty (using 3% and 
5% of household income as water poverty thresholds)
Household type 
After housing costs Before housing costs
>3% >5% >3% >5%
Multi-unit 10  5  7  3
Single without children 36 22 23 11
Couple with children 14  7  7  3
Lone parent 42 18 22  6
Couple without children 13  6  9  4
Pensioner couple 16  5 13  4
Pensioner single 36 14 26  9
Grand total 23 11 15  6
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• People with meters feel that behavioural changes seem to make no difference 
to their bills (possibly because standing charges represent a floor below which 
bills cannot fall).
• There was a lack of awareness of various support schemes (see below).
• There was a general feeling that water companies should fund such schemes 
– rather than other customers or the government, that is, taxpayers.
• Small reductions in bills have little impact on vulnerability.
• Companies could do far more to help customers in financial difficulty.
In terms of climate change, the implications for water resources are likely to be 
highly variable (Archer and Rahmstorf, 2010, pp 181-3). Water supplies in North 
America are increasingly affected by diminishing snow packs – water levels in 
lakes and rivers are expected to fall, with consequences for electricity generation. 
Southern Europe will probably become drier and northern Europe wetter (leading 
to more flooding). Water stress in the former may increase the risk of wildfires, 
decrease hydropower generation, reduce crop yields, increase soil erosion and 
compromise biodiversity. In decades to come changes to the saltiness of the oceans 
may increase rainfall in the higher latitudes, while their acidification will affect 
marine life and so a vital element of the food chain (Archer and Rahmstorf, 
2010, Chapter 5). Nichols and Kovats (2008) observe that global warming may 
have various effects on supplies of drinking water, increasing pressure on water 
treatment processes. The UN’s (2012, p 197) view is that:
While climate change is likely to have positive effects in the short 
term in Northern Europe, these are expected to be outweighed by 
negative effects as climate change progresses.
At the very least, since we are almost certain to face more pressure on, and 
volatility in, water supplies, we need a distribution and use of water that is more 
efficient and climate-sensitive.
The existing approach relies on monetary incentives, although more for 
customers than companies. Although it still loses 3.36  billion litres of water 
every day in leaks (enough to supply 22.4 million people),15 fines are not always 
levied on the water industry lest companies simply pass them on to customers 
through their bills.16
For customers, however, the story is increasingly different: water metering is 
being rolled out nationally (due for completion in 2020). If individuals prefer to 
maximise their income by spending less money wherever possible, then charging 
for water usage is presumably advantageous. The assumption is that people will 
monitor their meters and adjust their habits accordingly in the light of their 
budgets, either by using less water, for example, taking showers rather than baths, 
or recycling water whenever possible. This contrasts with the current arrangement 
– where most people are still charged a flat rate irrespective of usage – which 
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encourages waste. If droughts, heatwaves and ‘water stress’ increase in frequency 
and severity, a sustained change in habits could be required.17
Yet if households are charged according to usage, might poorer households 
alter their practices in ways that could compromise their health and quality of 
life, for example, drinking less water? Indeed, some with health problems may 
simply be unable to reduce water usage at all:
This tends to mean that low income groups, single-occupier 
households, pensioners and large families are more likely to be 
vulnerable to affordability problems, as are people who need more 
water for health reasons (eg to support additional clothes washing or 
bathing). (Benzie et al, 2011, p 6)
Bradshaw and Huby (2012) reveal that those with water meters experience less 
water poverty than those without, but only further research can reveal whether 
this is due to greater efficiency or a form of reduced usage in which the already 
vulnerable are left more vulnerable.
As is the case with other public utilities (such as energy and transport), the 
market-led approach includes schemes designed to assist some of those on low 
incomes. Benzie et al (2011, p 7) studied several measures introduced by South 
West Water – block tariffs (see below), bill capping18 and supporting those in debt 
– concluding that without adequate support schemes, water metering is likely 
to be regressive. Furthermore, where households are slightly above the poverty 
threshold they may be hit twice, disadvantaged by metering without qualifying 
for support. Yet overall:
… the current support schemes protect at least some vulnerable people 
from any adverse effects of differential water charging … the challenge 
for the future is to improve the coverage of existing support schemes 
and ensure that pricing and efficiency measures reflect the true value of 
water yet protect consumers from water poverty…. Water is an essential 
resource for life; it is imperative to ensure that customers’ access is 
not determined by their ability to pay. (Benzie et al, 2011, pp 7-8)
Bradshaw and Huby (2012, p 13) also advocate the use of tariffs where these are 
consistent with climate change goals:
Current tariffs are mainly regressive, with small consumers paying more 
for each unit of water used…. Under rising block tariffs, the high 
volumetric rates paid for luxury high use could be used to subsidise 
very low rates for low levels of essential water use or unavoidably high 
use by low income households.
201
Air and water
This idea therefore resembles the reverse tariffs (where ‘essential’ use is charged 
at a low rate, and further consumption is charged at a higher rate) defended in 
Chapter Six when we discussed energy usage.
But there are also more traditional responses that we should not neglect:
• Rather than discount and support schemes, which target those in difficulty, 
we could increase the incomes of the poorest households so that they are less 
likely to encounter difficulties in the first place.
• What about publicly funded reductions in water bills relative to inflation and 
earnings, backed by rising block tariffs to make usage more climate-sensitive?
Bill reductions would obviously benefit the affluent too, but this can be 
counterbalanced through progressive taxation. For social democrats, a system 
that targets the affluent in this way is more consistent with a universalist ethos 
than one that constantly interferes in the lives and lifestyles of those whom the 
principle of social justice demands should not be poor in the first place (Barry, 
2005, pp 171-85). This ethos and principle may also demand that while we cannot 
avoid some monetary incentives – if it reduces waste, differential charging makes 
environmental sense – public goods should largely be run on a not-for-profit basis.
There are clear tensions in the existing market-led system between long-term 
investment needs, consumers’ interests and commercial imperatives. Through 
their water bills customers make a contribution to maintaining and renewing 
the distributional infrastructure, yet are they bearing too high a burden given 
water companies’ emphasis on profits and share values? Can UK households trust 
a public resource to be bought and sold as a marketable commodity – often by 
non-UK investors and private equity funds – without public values, standards 
and interests being compromised? Much clearly depends on the extent to which 
statutory oversight is genuinely robust, but regulatory agencies meant to oversee 
privatised utilities can be charged with being too soft on the firms they are meant 
to regulate. Water companies have been accused of prioritising shareholders to 
the neglect of social and ecological goods, and building up debt rather than 
reserves for future investment in the belief that the latter will be underwritten by 
government guarantees and financial assistance (Hutton, 2012).19 What makes the 
‘free market’ ideology doubly pernicious is the fact that water companies have a 
monopoly over local supplies, for example, you cannot shop around and decide 
to buy your water from the Outer Hebrides. Regional variations in water bills 
are nothing that customers can do anything about.
In conclusion, existing water charges are effectively a local tax paid to private 
companies making a profit for shareholders for managing a socionatural resource 
on which we all depend and cannot choose not to use.
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The atmospheric commons
Whether you agree with this conclusion or not we are faced with an obvious 
difficulty. We do not pay for air since nobody collects, purifies, distributes and 
monitors it in ways equivalent to water.20 In what way, then, does it make sense 
to apply debates about ownership and control to air? Does this mean that the 
argument advanced and question posed at the end of the previous to last section 
– if policy and domain integration is the desired end what should the means 
be? – are irrelevant?
Yet recall Walker’s insistence that everyone has a right to a minimum of 
decent clean air. This right is not an abstract one, but something that relates to 
important, material circumstances. We do pay for air, after all. As the statistics 
presented earlier highlight, we all pay for unhealthy air quality with a proportion 
of our lives, the poorest usually paying the highest price of all. And this does have 
monetary implications. If air pollutants damage the health of vulnerable people, 
then this obviously has an impact on their earning capacity, expenditure and future 
prospects. Since pollution is a product of social and economic activity, the nature 
of those socioeconomic practices, and the property regime that underpins them, 
is relevant to a discussion of air pollution. Perhaps air is not so very different to 
energy, food, land and water after all.
It would be impossible here to discuss in any detail the socioeconomic and 
property regime most appropriate to Walker’s ‘decent minimum’, but we can 
explore some contrasting ideas. Two basic options seem available.
The first is the deregulated option. Block and Barnett (2005) advocate a laissez 
faire capitalism in which the state is at best a referee, setting up rules and regulations 
for market exchanges, but not a market ‘player’. Environmental problems such 
as air pollution are due to the absence of private property rights, they argue, 
especially ‘punishment for trespass’. If your pollution invades my air space then 
that represents a trespass for which you should pay a penalty, enforceable in law. 
Trespass does not apply, however, if you were polluting an unowned space into 
which I subsequently decide to locate. Since I chose to live in a place I knew 
(or should have known) was polluted, I have no right of redress. Government’s 
role should be limited to analysing dust particles, determining their source and 
imposing penalties on perpetrators. And laissez faire should extend to every public 
good. Block and Barnett recommend the privatisation of waste management 
facilities, natural resources and public transport.
To the objection that the poorest would suffer from these reforms, there is a 
simple answer:
The reason people are poor is because: their God-given mental and/
or physical capabilities are low; they are indolent; they are imprudent, 
and do not invest in their own human capital; and/or, the government 
short-circuits the market…. It has little or nothing to do with whether 
they are minority-group members. (Block and Barnett, 2005, p 37)
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All forms of discrimination should be permissible – including racism and sexism – 
because some employers will hire those discriminated against by other employers, 
raising wages and counteracting the original discrimination (see Friedman, 1962, 
pp 109-10). Because it is poor people themselves and the resource-hungry state 
that create poverty, the solution is to abolish minimum wages (which price the 
unskilled out of labour markets), welfare programmes and social security (which 
undermine the family). The best safety-net is private charity, since this embodies 
moral instruction (many charities are religious organisations), highlights the origins 
of funds (recipients should be required to thank donors personally) and enforces 
the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor.
The second, regulated option rejects such market libertarianism.21 Empirical 
evidence can be cited, first of all. Since Block and Barnett (2005, p 31) evoke 
the demise of the former Soviet Union and the failures of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) during Hurricane Katrina,22 we can counter 
with the events of 2007-09 which consisted of market failures driven by too 
little regulation, not too much. Or we can revisit the evidence from the last few 
chapters. If the already advantaged are able to maintain their relative advantages 
through positional racing and externalities, then poverty is due in part to the 
monopolisation of resources by the non-poor. There is less social mobility in 
competitive market societies (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, Chapter 12),23 which 
supplements a general point that socioeconomic status is largely, if not entirely, 
driven by undeserved luck (particularly inheritances of birth) (Fitzpatrick, 2011c, 
pp 35-6). That being the case, to say that some air pollution is unproblematic 
because people choose to be polluted could apply to affluent households but not 
to the socially deprived who suffer the greatest exposure and the highest risks.
But the economic liberal argument fails even on its own terms. Free markets 
only work if there is perfect information (transparent information available to 
all parties) and perfect competition (market forces are unrestricted). Block and 
Barnett thereby advocate the abolition of anti-trust legislation on the grounds 
that monopolies are a product of freedom of association.24 But if monopolies are 
permitted, then market distortions are inevitable as corporations collude with 
one another to protect their mutually advantageous dominance, for example, 
through price fixing and alignment, aggressive practices, privileged access to the 
legal system, advertising, political lobbying, agenda setting and sometimes outright 
conspiracy (as in the LIBOR scandal). Instead of the state becoming first a referee 
and then a player, it is powerful corporations that become the de facto referees, 
shaping the conditions that ensure their continuance as the dominant players. It 
is therefore market outcomes themselves that undermine the very conditions on 
which free markets depend. We can authorise government to deal with market 
distortions, but, as the 2007–09 crisis confirmed, this requires that the state be 
more willing to regulate and be more independent of corporate interests than 
has been the case throughout the era of economic liberalism.
If a regulated approach is therefore preferable, what might this imply for air 
pollution? Many advocates of market regulation prefer cap-and-trade policies 
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(Burtraw and Evans, 2009). There are several versions of a cap-and-trade approach 
(Fitzpatrick, 2011d, pp 77-9), but the essential idea is for a system of tradable 
permits in which high polluters have to buy permits unused by low polluters. 
The latter benefit financially while the former either have to pay for the privilege 
of polluting or pollute less, whichever is most cost-effective. The state intervenes 
but does not undermine the basic logic of capitalist dynamics. Cap-and-trade 
became a popular solution to climate change precisely because many saw it as 
working in the 1990s to reduce air pollutants in the US, addressing the problem 
of acid rain (Libecap, 2009, p 136).
There are two key problems with tradable permits, however (cf Hansen, 2009, 
pp 212-22). First, there is the risk of market manipulation where powerful actors 
shape the scheme to ensure that their interests prevail above social and ecological 
needs. The European Emissions Trading Scheme is almost universally perceived 
to have failed because it allocated too many permits at too low a value (The 
Economist, 2013). But second, permits are only as effective as the objectives they 
are designed to achieve. Even if the state counteracts market manipulation and 
genuinely tries to internalise those social and environmental costs that are currently 
externalised, there is the sheer difficulty of estimating the relevant values. If the 
price of a unit of oil, or anything which creates air pollutants, is to be determined 
not just by the cost of fossil fuel extraction but by its ‘lifetime’ impact on the 
natural environment and society (particularly the lives of the poorest), then there 
are so many variables that estimates are likely to vary widely.
This, in other words, is a knotted complexity! Scientific methods can take us 
part of the way, but ultimately it’s matter of moral judgement; for example, there 
is no ‘scientifically correct’ discount rate. Simms (2013, pp 59-62) argues that 
markets work best when they serve a precautionary principle. We cannot afford 
to overshoot the 2ºC of warming (above pre-industrial levels) beyond which 
we may face disaster, and then scale back later, because negative environmental 
feedbacks are unpredictable and uncontrollable, for example, a catastrophic release 
of methane as permafrost melts. Simms’ argument is about carbon markets, 
and we acknowledged earlier that air pollution and climate change are distinct 
phenomena. Nonetheless, given the connections between the two (their similar 
causes and solutions), there is every reason to also apply its precautionary logic 
to the latter. In short, as Jacobson proposes, we need a much more urgent push 
towards renewable sources of energy than governments and businesses have 
initiated to date.
So, in terms of air pollution, the state can set, monitor and enforce pollution 
standards, while facilitating R&D (research and development), knowledge 
transfer and requiring that industrial and consumer practices be orientated 
towards the long term. Markets can incentivise, for example, those with low or 
non-polluting engines can sell permits to others in a system of exchange (similar 
to personalised carbon trading). And communities could be given powers of 
veto against any project with pollutants above a particular threshold and/or be 
entitled to appropriate compensation, with such rights weighted towards the least 
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advantaged communities (recall the experience of Sinfin in Chapter Nine). Yet, 
to repeat, unless the scale of the problem – the job these sectors are designed to 
perform – is appreciated, all of this is moot.
There is thus a difference between regulated markets in a market-led context 
and regulated markets that serve well-defined social and ecological goals. Daly 
(2007, pp 96-9, 109-11) argues that economics has emphasised allocation and 
distribution of resources to the neglect of scale, that is, the physical size of the 
economy relative to the natural ecosystem. Quantitative restrictions on markets 
cannot come through efficiencies due to the rebound effect, he says. Instead, 
self-imposed limitations (frugality) will create new efficiencies and innovations, 
and demand that we stop trying to fund social justice from economies that 
can no longer afford to expand in the old way (that is, GDP growth).25 The 
precautionary principle means setting the price of carbon and air pollutants at 
levels high enough to ensure that the atmospheric commons is not overloaded 
by either, altering our priorities and practices accordingly – how gradually, to 
allow citizens, businesses, policy-makers and consumers time to acclimatise, is a 
matter of debate. ‘The point is to stay afloat, not just to make sinking expensive,’ 
says Simms (2013, p 62). Emphasising social and ecological imperatives may or 
may not help us to make sense of the knot, but it is based on the view that the 
values, practices, institutions and aspirations that created global warming are 
unlikely to resolve it without new moralities of scale. Technological solutions, 
price mechanisms and statutory regulations are vital, but markets and states are 
not going to do a thing unless we grab the wheel and make them change course.
Therefore answers to the question we started with – what should the means be? 
– are dependent on getting all sectors to align in pretty much the same direction 
(Victor, 2008, pp 207-8). It really is the end that matters above all: the protection of 
the atmospheric commons. I elaborate on this point in the Conclusion in relation to 
what I think the purpose of an ecosocial politics should be in the 21st century.
Conclusion
Table 10.2 offers a schematic summary of this chapter.
We began by reviewing air pollution and health, then established the connections 
between air pollution and climate change. I proposed that the synergies at work 
here have to be carefully understood and constructed as matters of policy 
intervention because systems often exhibit a ‘knotted complexity’. This is certainly 
true of ecosystems (such as the atmosphere) and social systems, and all the more 
so when we consider their interrelations and interdependencies. Research into 
deprivation, spatial distribution and air quality reveals a general picture in which 
those who typically produce the least pollution suffer the greatest consequences. 
However, the research also draws attention to complexities that warn us against 
overly simplistic interventions. The section on solutions recommended a holistic, 
integrated approach that incorporates lessons from across several chapters in this 
book, including housing markets, land use, urban density and transport policy. 
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Table 10.2: The ecosocial poverties of air and water
Air and water poverties
Causes Symptoms Solutions
Quantity Industrial development, 
land use and car 
dependency
Spatial concentration of 
pollution and poverty 
(‘hotspots’). Greater risk of ill 
health, related to pollutants, 
for low-income individuals. 
Rising water charges and 
debt
Green transport and 
spatial planning. Greater 
sensitivity in policy 
processes to the links 
between pollutants, 
geography and social 
deprivation
Mobility Air pollution 





to areas with poor air 
quality due to cheap 
housing
Ill health has an adverse 
impact on earning capacity, 
employment and other 
opportunities
Policy priorities given to 
hotspots. Integration of 
policy domains across 
multiple socionatural 
resources
Value People at greatest risk 
of pollutants generally 
create fewer of them
Ill health has an adverse 
impact on quality of 
life, compounding and 
compounded by other 
deprivations
Policy priorities given to 
hotspots. Reduction in 
water bills
Control Inadequate and non-
integrated attention 
given to social and 
environmental justice 
in pollution strategies. 
Water companies 
stressing profit over 
social and ecological 
needs
Injustice regarding exposure 
to and impact of pollutants. 
Water company monopolies
Rights to a decent 
minimum of clean 
air. Tradable permits 
in effective ecosocial 
context. Not-for-profit 
water system
Sharing Air and water treated 
as economic resources 
without sufficient 
reference to climate 
change
Air pollutants as positional 
externalities. Increasing 
water stress and volatility in 
supply
Precautionary 
principle; protection of 
atmospheric commons. 
Regulated approach. 
Coordination of state, 
market and civic forms 
of action. Not-for-profit 
water system
Caring Indiscriminate burning of 
fossil fuels. Separation of 
air pollutant and climate 
change strategies
‘Polluter pays’ principle 
dominant. Patchy and 




principle; protection of 
atmospheric commons. 
Greater emphasis on 
renewables to reduce 
pollution and not simply 
pay for it post facto
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The section on water argued that reducing waste through water metering makes 
environmental sense, yet the risks to the poorest are real (even with compensatory 
support schemes) and exacerbated by the profit motive of water companies. 
The final section argued that we should indeed relate air to discussions of rights, 
ownership and control, something that demands a regulatory approach so long as 
this makes markets the servants of well-defined social and ecological objectives. 
As important as they are, technical, technological and administrative measures 
will only work if we set them in an appropriate moral and precautionary context.
Recall my claim that the ecologically excessive, careless and destructive use of 
key socionatural resources is connected to the social deprivations that characterise 
that usage for millions of those on low incomes. We have long treated air as 
a costless, self-replenishing resource that is the same resource for all, that is, 
insensitive to social context. Given the visceral, health-related impacts of air 
pollutants, this cavalier approach has been altered over the last few decades, 
although still with limited progress and still with insufficient attention to the 
needs of the poorest. Much the same is true of water and water poverty. There 
is an urgent need to establish synergies between the air pollutants and climate 
change agendas given that solutions to one are appropriate for the other, namely, 
renewables. This implies types of long-term planning, regulation and investment 
– and the prioritisation of social and ecological ends – for which our economic 
liberal assumptions and habits appear particularly ill suited.
Notes
1 Ground-level ozone does not have a source per se. It is formed when sunlight acts on 




4 Although note that it is the world’s most impoverished who are at greatest risk from air 
pollution, due especially to the indoor burning of wood in solid fuel stoves.
5 See www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/policylobbying/environment/climatechange/
heathairquality.htm
6 Owners of vehicles that do not meet emissions standards must pay a daily charge if they 
wish to enter the zone.
7 Chaos, in the sense understood by mathematicians and scientists, means that systems 
are highly sensitive to relatively small variations, making the knock-on effects of those 
variations difficult to model.
8 Defra (2006) produced a report on social deprivation, but this is only mentioned once in 
the 2007 publication. Furthermore, the 2006 report neglected to analyse pollution-poverty 
hotspots (see below) and examined environmental inequalities, claiming that terms such as 
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‘equity’ or ‘injustice’ ‘are subjective … and therefore requiring value judgements’ (Defra, 
2006, p 3). The technocratic avoidance of value judgements (except when designed to 
appease the prejudices of conservative newspapers) was unfortunately endemic to the 
New Labour project.
9 To be fair, New Labour’s emphasis on ‘accessibility planning’ nodded in this direction, 
although with inconsistent results at local authority level (Lucas, 2011, pp 213-15).
10 Now add another strand, deriving from the same source as air pollution: noise pollution. 
In Birmingham, Brainard et al (2004, p 2594) found that ‘some inequalities may exist, but 
not strong ones.’ Some affluent populations live close to airports and busy roads, perhaps 
prepared – as in the case of air pollution – to accept noise disturbances in return for access 
to good transport links. And some deprived neighbourhoods can be very quiet. Yet recall 
the distinction between exposure and vulnerability (resistance and resilience). Cheaper 
housing may also be less well insulated from outside noise, including loud neighbours, and 
much depends on personal tolerance and social circumstances. Those who are housebound 
due to age, disability or chronic ill health could be exposed to higher levels of noise that, 
in turn, might increase their vulnerabilities since constant, excessive noise affects sleep, 
induces stress and engenders feelings of disempowerment (see www.euro.who.int/en/
what-we-do/health-topics/environment-and-health/noise/facts-and-figures).
11 Townsend (1979, Chapter 14) referred to air that is ‘dirty, smoky or foul-smelling’, but 
contemporary pollutants are not always as visible or malodorous as this.
12 See www.environment-agency.gov.uk/research/library/position/41189.aspx
13 See note 12.
14 New Labour believed in what they called ‘joined-up policy’ but seemed less attracted 
to the idea of joined-up social conditions.
15 See www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17622837
16 ‘Water companies being let off leak targets “to spare customers higher bills”’, The 
Telegraph, 9 May 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk
17 But as Creative Research highlights, realities do not always mirror such cost-benefit 
assumptions about behaviour change.
18 England’s WaterSure scheme caps water bills at the amount of the average household 
water bill for their water company. There is a similar scheme in Wales.
19 As those of us around at the time can testify, these are the very kind of state handouts 
that the architects of the mass privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s claimed would no 
longer be needed.
20 It is also distinguishable from land and food for the same reason. Air and energy are 
the more immaterial of our socionatural resources, but energy resembles water in that 
getting it to your home requires human intervention.
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21 This is the point to acknowledge the simplicities of this distinction. Obviously, there are 
many types of regulation and deregulation and many frameworks to which they can apply, 
but exploring a more comprehensive spectrum is not something we have space for here.
22 When FEMA was overseen by a laissez faire government – not that Block and Barnett 
allow this fact to break their stride.
23 See the 2012 paper ‘The rise and consequences of inequality in the United States’ 
by Alan Krueger, Chair of the Whitehouse’s Council of Economic Advisers at www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/.../krueger_cap_speech_final_remarks.pdf
24 In other words, they echo Hayek. The trouble with Hayek’s (1976, Chapter 11) argument 
that we should never impose ends on ‘voluntary’ actions is that ends are always imposed 
on actions by those with the power to do so. Unfortunately, in their obsession with 
political power, economic liberals ignore economic power, waving private monopolies 
and corporate dominance away as unintended and as entities that the market will correct, 
given time.
25 This ‘post-productivism’ obviously requires international agreement, otherwise countries 
try to out-compete one another through forms of productivity growth that ignore and 




The first four chapters are summarised in Chapter Five, and so there is no need 
to repeat what was said there.
The remaining chapters, Six to Ten, have demonstrated that an ecosocial 
framework can:
• summarise, catalogue and classify key literatures, relevant evidence and 
recent developments relating to those resources that are socially and naturally 
interdependent;
• enable us to critique diverse research fields so that we can understand the 
causes, symptoms and possible solutions to the poverty and deprivations which 
pertain to those resources;
• allow us to read across those fields, which often remain isolated from one 
another, suggesting a more integrated agenda that can shape future thinking, 
research, collaboration, campaigning, lobbying and organising.
The specific task set in Chapter Five was to fill the empty cells in Table 5.2. Are 
we now in a position to do this? Chapters Six to Ten have been summarised in 
the tables at or towards the end of each chapter. Imagine that we stack these tables 
on top of one another vertically. Now let’s read down the columns, one by one.
Table C.1  summarises the ‘causes’ column, and we might extrapolate the main 
points accordingly:
Quantity: widening gaps between income/assets and prices of the relevant 
services or goods.
Mobility: rising costs and so restricted choice.
Value: disadvantages neglected or pathologised, leading to policy agendas and 
priorities which further disadvantage.
Control: exclusion from resources and relevant political processes.
Sharing: short-term, anthropocentric selfishness.
Caring: ecological bases of social wealth taken for granted and consequently 
depleted through excessive demand.
The ‘symptoms’ column is summarised in Table C.2:
Quantity: unmet needs, limited access and increased vulnerabilities.
Mobility: various traps impair opportunities for social participation.
Value: residual assistance; burdens of poverty falling disproportionately on poor 
people themselves.
Control: dominance of consumerist values emphasising market choice at 
expense of users’ voices.
212


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Climate change and poverty
Sharing: negative externalities passed on to others.
Caring: persistent social degradation and depreciation of ecological resources.
Finally we come to the ‘solutions’ column in Table C.3:
Quantity: new forms of revenue raising and expenditure; needs of the poorest 
prioritised.
Mobility: renewed emphasis on social needs.
Value: rights and entitlements to key resources.
Control: democratic and communal forms of participative inclusion in 
generation and distribution of resources.
Sharing: re-socialisation and regulation of collective social and ecological risks.
Caring: recognition of social and natural interdependencies; integration of 
ecological imperatives into social institutions and economic practices.
This account now permits us to fill in those empty cells (see Table C.4).
Based on these various tables, the arguments made in Chapters One to Four 
can therefore be reaffirmed. For social democrats, social injustice denotes a lack 
of fairness in the distribution and control of those resources that are essential to 
social wellbeing. The ecosocial critique does not, as promised, reinvent the wheel, 
but it does add an important missing dimension such that social and environmental 
injustices denote a lack of fairness in the distribution and control of those socionatural 
resources which are essential to the wellbeing of all human and non-human lives to whom 
we owe obligations (a duty to value and a duty of care).
As such, because they relate to the socioeconomic determinants that 
shape wellbeing, deprivations connected to socionatural resources should be 
acknowledged as vital within any general account of poverty.
Therefore, ecosocial poverty
• is caused by forms of economic organisation and growth which are neither fully 
inclusive spatially (many people are excluded from their benefits) nor sustainable 
across time. Our market-dominated societies are driven by assumptions and 
practices that facilitate and require excessive demands on the ecosystem and by 
political and cultural systems of disrespect and exclusion.
• is manifested as both distributive and procedural forms of injustice in the 
reduced capacity of disadvantaged individuals to cope with the rising costs of key 
socionatural resources, control their circumstances and so determine their futures 
as social agents in conjunction with, and with responsibilities for, other social agents 
and the natural world they inhabit, depend on and affect. Excessive ecological 
demand is therefore linked to important social deprivations.
• is something that can only be addressed through new forms of economic 
organisation and growth which are socially inclusive and egalitarian, deriving from 
renewable, low carbon sources of energy and dedicated to the restoration of natural 
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This definition reflects and consolidates that given in the final row of Table 5.1. 
It incorporates recognition of social-natural interdependency into the social 
democratic account of poverty.
At the end of the Introduction I stated my main thesis: the ecologically excessive, 
careless and destructive use of key socionatural resources is connected to the social 
deprivations that characterise that usage for millions of those on low incomes. The 
conclusions of Chapters Six to Ten have reiterated this claim for each resource, 
and so I trust that enough has now been said to justify this association. The 
overuse of a resource (excessive demand) in conjunction with the profit-making 
practices of those – typically corporations – that control it produces scarcities and 
price rises for which inadequate wages and forms of welfare assistance struggle to 
compensate, particularly in the UK, which has come to favour residual, targeted 
and underfunded forms of assistance. Overuse and misuse go together. The 
resulting deprivations are so damaging to individuals’ wellbeing that people are 
impelled towards a continuation of the very social practices and habits that generate 
overuse in the first place. In the chapters on land this was theorised specifically in 
terms of rent-seeking and positional racing. But the basic point is that since life at 
the bottom of the social ladder is so impoverished and disrespected, people (poor 
and non-poor) spend much of their lives trying to scramble up the ladder to avoid 
the bottom. Excessive ecological demand is therefore linked to important social 
deprivations. And so the circle goes round. If we wish to dampen the excessive, 
careless and destructive use of resources, we should devise new, socially just and 
typically egalitarian institutions and practices in an economic context that takes 
the principles of sustainability and precaution as central.
In the ecosocial frame, poverty is thus caused by systemic distributive and 
procedural inequalities in resources. Those inequalities are driven by a desire for 
security and status in economies dominated by goods that, because their value 
derives from their exclusivity, can guarantee neither. The oppressive practices 
experienced by poor individuals are related to those to which the non-human 
world is subjected because both derive ultimately from irrational practices 
developed to cope with the concentration of power, wealth and resources in the 
hands of the relatively few. This squandering of human and non-human life is 
endemic to our social and economic cultures. We cope with mortality by denying 
its inevitability and lavishing the few years we have on profligate, destructive, self-
indulgent habits. The culture of waste creates poverty – low-income individuals are 
most vulnerable to air pollutants, for instance – and is created by it, since fear of 
poverty (fear of joining the ranks of a population judged surplus to requirements) 
encourages people to try to outdistance others in a scrambled race to join the 
ranks of the affluent few. Those positional drives occlude what all lives share in 
common: the need to flourish, to care for and be responsible for those whose 
lives are affected by our own. Life has a responsibility to life.
As such, poverty implies a lack of sufficient opportunities to flourish in 
association with others, that is, to realise existing goals and capacities and to 
develop new ones. The ‘others’ with whom we should associate, and on which we 
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are dependent, include fellow members of the natural environment, the multitude 
of ecological communities with whom we share limited planetary space. Poverty 
therefore represents forms of estrangement within our social environments and 
a detachment from the natural conditions of those social environments. It is 
contrary to wellbeing where, among other things, wellbeing implies being well 
for and with nature.
But this convergence of social democratic and ecosocial understandings does not 
constitute a call for a new ideological pigeonhole. Instead, it implies three things.
First, a mobilisation of all those opposed to the assumptions and practices of 
corporate-dominated free markets, that is, economic liberalism. That implies a 
mobilisation of the majority of humans, believe it or not. Most of us disdain 
economic liberalism, and it is in fact economic liberal fundamentalists who are 
in the minority. Yet because those doctrines flatter, support and offer intellectual 
sustenance to the interests of the economically powerful, that minority represents a 
very powerful elite. This is not to treat free market capitalism as a bête noire whose 
dissolution will produce a fairy tale ending. As noted in the Introduction, social 
democrats and others share culpability for the situation we find ourselves in. But 
having dominated the last two centuries of social and economic development, 
the social and ecological failings of free market liberalism are all too obvious to 
growing numbers of us.
Second, we should not be purists about the road ahead. Although we 
increasingly know what the answer is not, we still need to be open-minded 
and allow for several possible strategies. Although this book has made a robust 
defence of a centre-left approach, we also need to be open and receptive to other 
perspectives. There are many ways in which social-natural interdependencies 
can be articulated and institutionalised. For a patriot it can derive from devotion 
towards country, its landscape and heritage; for a spiritualist it can derive from a 
sense of the world as a feeling of love inhabiting the soul of God; for an atheist 
it can derive from a sense of wonder at what hydrogen atoms can do if you cook 
and leave them to simmer for 14 billion years. Not everyone needs to sign up to 
the same set of motivations, even were this a reasonable expectation. This is not 
an attraction to diversity for diversity’s sake. Yet if the end is what is important and 
urgent – as proposed at the end of the last chapter – then we should not be too 
precious about the means. Pluralism, in other words, means deploying whatever 
means will get us to the end we, and those for whom we are responsible, need: 
limitations on global warming.
Many people would echo the observation of Eleanor Ostrom (in Chapter 
Eight) to the effect that the ideal property regime implies a combination of 
state, market and communal practices working together in the greatest possible 
harmony, with each sector enabling the others but also acting as a constraining 
hand on their possible excesses. Such a property regime would likely consists of 
multiple zones within zones, that is, not just the independent cells of Table C.5, 
but fluctuating groups of cells.
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Conclusion
There is no single cross-national model that can encompass all of the relevant 
zonal intersections since these will often be subject to reconfigurations as we 
respond to new evidence, reflecting on and making readjustments to all our 
social and environmental practices, including the outcomes of previous actions 
and interventions.
Finally, however, this does not mean we should shrink from promoting those 
solutions that have, to date, shown results. If it is the case that, with important 
caveats, the social democracies have come closest to reducing poverty rates 
while addressing climate change, we would be foolish to ignore their record and 
the lessons they hold (Fitzpatrick, 2011d, pp 68-73). If we need to recognise 
the natural sources of our social wealth by treating as common property those 
resources that stand at the intersection of our social-natural interdependencies, 
socialised forms of ownership might be recommended. The global community 
established a moratorium on drilling in the Antarctic and holds a collective interest 
on not extracting a good three-quarters of the fossil fuels still in the ground. Yet 
to repeat: in a world of political, religious, moral and cultural pluralism, such 
solutions have to be translated into other idioms and contexts. We cannot simply 
expect everyone to line up behind one another in a queue labelled ‘European 
social democracy’.
Similarly, although I believe that reductions in carbon emissions are less likely 
to occur without reductions in poverty levels, and vice versa, there is no iron law 
that says that if you have one you must have the other (Fitzpatrick, 2003, pp 141-
4). A society desperate for survival might adopt authoritarian, justice-insensitive 
measures. Alternatively, if two billion people in developing countries suddenly 
decide that they want to escape poverty by emulating western affluence – and that 
fixing global warming is the responsibility of the west – then while that may not 
be a sustainable, long-term solution, it’s not entirely an unreasonable one either. 
In short, in Figure C.1 we need to cajole and prod nations as far towards the top 
right corner as we can, but there may be instances where trade-offs are required: 
either high, short-term emissions in a dash for growth that reduces poverty, or 
emissions reductions that temporarily compromise anti-poverty programmes.
All of which is to say that if there is no one model of a green society, there 
is no fuzzy-less, ‘high-definition’ version of social and environmental justice. 
Green societies are likely to be ‘low definition’, which is why throughout this 
book I have stressed the need for a reflexive, dynamic approach to the forms of 
organisation that might be adopted. The ecosocial approach must always be a 
work in progress. Policy programmes and agendas have to lay the ground of their 
Table C.5: The means: multiple cells and zones
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own future development. This is equivalent to throwing a series of balls into the 
air at such a trajectory that they can be caught effectively by our future selves 
and by future generations.
In one sense, those participating in the Peasants’ Revolt, the Diggers’ occupation 
of St George’s Hill or the Swing Riots did not prevail. History passed them by. Yet 
the very attempt to make social changes is itself a form of victory that can inspire 
progress further down the road. Without their example, think how different our 
history might have been. And historical events are always pregnant with other 
possibilities, with lost histories which might have developed had chance, fate, 
or whatever you want to call it, been slightly different. Progressives are adept 
at self-flagellation, at obsessing on conflicts they lost. Yet progressives have also 
won many conflicts, and appreciating this is important if those victories are to 
inspire the conflicts to come, indeed the conflicts we are waging already. We make 
the history that future generations will look back on as somehow inevitable, as 
examples of ‘common sense’. And if we don’t make it in a just, sustainable one, 
then others will make it correspond to principles that the poorest and the planet 
can no longer afford.
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“This is an important book that explores the critical interaction 
between social policy and climate.”     
James Meadowcroft, Professor and Canada Research Chair, School of 
Public Policy, Carleton University, Canada 
Climate change is the main challenge facing developed countries 
in the 21st century. To what extent does this agenda converge with 
issues of poverty and social exclusion? Climate change and poverty 
offers a timely new perspective on the ‘ecosocial’ understanding of the 
causes and symptoms of, and solutions to, poverty, and applies this to 
recent developments across a number of areas, including fuel poverty, 
food poverty, housing, transport and air pollution. Unlike any other 
publication, the book therefore establishes a new agenda for both 
environmental and social policies which has cross-national relevance. 
It will appeal to students in social policy, public policy, applied social 
studies and politics and will also be of interest to those studying 
international development, economics and geography.
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